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ABSTRACT
It’s About Time: Institutions, Election Timing, and the Economic Vote
by
Cassandra Rose Grafstrom
Co-chairs: William Roberts Clark and Robert J. Franzese, Jr.
The literature on constrained economic voting emphasizes how voters hold politicians
less accountable for economic outcomes when those politicians have less control over
policy (e.g., Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Hellwig 2008; Powell & Whitten, 1993). This
literature, however, is based on the highly problematic assumption that elections
are fixed events that the affected politicians have no capacity to manipulate. This
dissertation considers how our empirical expectations of accountability relationships
change when election timing is fungible by parties both in and out of power. The
dissertation shows that different types of elections result from variations in economic
performance, and the capacity of both the prime minister and the opposition to call
elections at will. Because the institutions that constrain or empower different actors
in parliament to bring about elections covary with those typically used in clarity of
responsibility arguments, the weak direct effects found in previous studies between
institutions, economics, and election outcomes are better explained by the consider-
ation of strategic politicians opportunistically timing elections. I show that the type
of election mediates the effect of the economy on the retention of the prime minister
in 19 parliamentary countries for elections between 1967 and 2010. The implications
xii
of the economic vote for democratic accountability are thrown into question, as the
economys primary effect on election outcomes is through the incentive for strategic





–James Carville, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign manager
Like James Carville, many political scientists assume the economy’s primacy in
election outcomes. It is taken by many to be self-evident that the state of the econ-
omy can make or break an incumbent government’s hopes of reelection (Arceneaux,
2005; Beck, 1987; Bengtsson, 2004; Gelman and King, 1993; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lewis-
Beck and Paldam, 2000; Peffley, 1984). Poor economic performance, the thinking
goes, tends to harm incumbents’ electoral prospects, while good performance can
help buoy a government at the polls. A prominent explanation of this phenomenon
is that voters attribute blame for bad economic outcomes and credit for good ones
to those controlling the government. However, this relationship is inconsistent both
across countries and over time. In response to this inconsistency, scholars formulated
new theories wherein the state of the economy is expected to be a poorer predictor of
electoral outcomes in countries where political institutions are more complex (Books
and Presby, 1999; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993). Where
determining who is ‘in charge’ of government is quite easy, economic outcomes ought
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to prove a better predictor of electoral outcomes. As politics (or government insti-
tutions) becomes more complicated, voters’ choices at the ballot box are no longer
straightforward. When policymaking responsibility is shared, voters are thought to
face the difficult task of determining to whom to attribute credit or blame (typically)
with a single vote. In these situations, the economy’s impact on incumbent perfor-
mance at the polls is weaker because voters don’t know how to attribute credit or
blame.
Unfortunately, the conventional wisdom about the relationship between institu-
tions, the economy and elections is faulty. Complex political institutions do not
simply obscure accountability. The institutions considered by the literature for their
effects on voter attributions of responsibility are reflective of the more general con-
centration of power in a country at that moment that contribute to the behaviors of
politicians. While some voters may be aware of the constraints politicians face in im-
plementing policy and managing the macroeconomy, all politicians are keenly aware
of these restrictions. The concentration of political power affects strategic relation-
ships between government and opposition parties more than it is likely to change how
voters view the degree to which those in power are responsible for economic or other
policy outcomes. The variation in policymaking power concentration is likely to be
related further to how parliaments end and how elections come about. Differences in
the concentration of power alter the ability and incentive of some partisans to prema-
turely dissolve parliament and bring about early elections. This dissertation argues
that it is the strategic timing of elections that explains the swings in the impact of
the economy from one electoral cycle to the next in parliamentary systems.
While the strength of the institutionally contingent economic vote (referred to
interchangeably as the “clarity of responsibility” hypothesis (Powell and Whitten,
1993)) is broadly accepted in the discipline, our empirical understanding of this phe-
nomenon at the level of election outcomes is fundamentally unsound due to model
2
misspecification and misinterpretation. This chapter demonstrates that, upon cor-
rectly specifying and interpreting cross-national economic voting models, very little
remains of that certainty and we are left with a new set of puzzles to investigate. I
find that, contrary to expectations, increasing governmental clarity of responsibility
generally has either no moderating effect or even reduces the impact of economic
variables on government vote share in a sample of elections in 21 advanced industri-
alized democracies from 1967-2010.1 This leads to the fundamental puzzle addressed
in the dissertation: What is the mechanism by which political institutions influence
the economy’s effects on election outcomes?
I argue that it is precisely those contexts in which who governs is most clear that a
single partisan actor is most likely to have the capacity to unilaterally determine the
timing of parliamentary elections. That actor, however, does not necessarily have the
incentive to call elections when the sitting government is likely to perform well at the
polls. By focusing on the incentives and capacities of actors who precipitate elections,
instead of how voters understand complex parliamentary institutions, I derive new
expectations about the causal path by which the economy affects election outcomes,
which in turn lead to a different set of observable implications between these variables.
This chapter describes our current understanding of the macro-level economic
vote, focusing first on its theoretical underpinnings and then examining its empiri-
cal support. While many treat the economic vote as established fact, and perhaps
the most important determinant of an incumbent’s retention of office, the literature
is actually quite fraught. Early analyses found significant variance in the degree to
which the economy predicted incumbent support, while later studies have tended to
examine the economic vote at the individual level due to the inconsistency of findings
at the level of election returns. In section 1.2.1 I discuss why we ought to be skeptical
1These cases were chosen because they are incredibly common in the literature, have generally
stable political institutions during the period over which economic data is readily available, and they
generally have long histories of democracy prior to the period under examination.
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of the theoretical underpinnings of the the economic voting hypothesis. The economic
voting literature is flawed by two linked premises that make the relationship between
economic outcomes, electoral outcomes, and democratic accountability problematic:
1) voters are highly informed and consider the capacity of governing parties to affect
economic outcomes, and 2) election timing is exogenous. When these assumptions
are relaxed such that elections are endogenous to the economic outcomes we use to
predict their results, voters need not be highly informed or fully rational, and politi-
cians have multiple means of affecting election outcomes. Section 1.2.2 discusses the
shortcomings in some of the most prominent work on the economic voting literature
that lead to incorrect inferences about the economy’s impact on election outcomes.
Section 1.3 addresses these highlighted methodological problems in a sample of elec-
tions from twenty-one advanced industrialized democracies over a forty-year span
from 1967-2010. I provide both a set of regression estimates correcting for method-
ological problems in a seminal article in the field, Whitten and Palmer (1999), and
cumulative results from more than 1,600 model estimates that attempt to replicate
and find support for the clarity of responsibility theory. Ultimately, there is little
evidence supporting the argument that the political institutions considered by the
economic voting literature significantly moderate the relationship between the econ-
omy and election results in the expected direction. With these findings in hand,
Section 1.4 lays out the framework for the remainder of the dissertation in which I
evaluate how the capacity to strategically time elections is key to understanding the
economy’s variable impact on who wins elections.
1.1 Economic voting: current controversies
The economic vote is a phenomenon that occurs at both the level of the individual
and the electorate writ large. While significant attention continues to be paid to how
individual voters come to formulate and use economic evaluations in their vote choices,
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how and why the economy affects vote share and retention of incumbents has received
less attention over the past decade. While those interested in election outcomes tend
to include economic performance in their explanations, little recent work has focused
on how the economy matters in determining who governs. Some may think this is
because the question is settled. In fact, the literature is full of contradictory and weak
findings about how the economy matters to election results.
Early studies of the economy’s effects on election outcomes focused on single coun-
tries, with a number focusing on the US (e.g., Tufte, 1975), UK (e.g., Whiteley, 1986),
New Zealand (e.g., Ursprung, 1984), France (e.g., Lewis-Beck, 1988), and other in-
dustrialized countries. However, Michael Lewis-Beck’s Economics and Elections: The
major Western democracies (1988) compared the economic vote across elections in
six advanced industrialized democracies and noted a troubling puzzle: the magnitude
of the economic vote varied considerably both across countries and within individual
countries across elections. Lewis-Beck (1988) documents the effects of the economy
on incumbent support in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and West Ger-
many, but finds less support for this relationship in Italy and Spain. Across the
aggregated studies in these countries, Lewis-Beck notes that the degree of support for
this relationship varies significantly, as different measures of economic performance
seem to matter in some studies or countries, but not others, or have unexpected direc-
tional effects on support for incumbents or opposition parties. As the economic vote is
hailed as an important means of empirically establishing the presence and strength of
democratic accountability, this variance disturbs norms about democratic practices.
If governments are inconsistently held to account for what is consistently one of the
policy areas that voters’ care most about, there is perhaps little accountability in
democracy.
The solution posited to this puzzle in the literature was the clarity of responsibility
theory (Powell and Whitten, 1993). The clarity of responsibility theory argues that
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the relationship between macroeconomic and electoral outcomes is conditional upon
the ease with which voters are able to connect the economy to their vote choice (Duch
and Stevenson, 2008; Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Hellwig, 2001; Powell and Whitten,
1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999). In particular, political institutions play a central
role in determining the clarity or complexity of a political system for voters. When
political institutions make it clear that one party is responsible for economic poli-
cies during the previous administration, credit and blame are easily attributable to
that party. However, as policymaking responsibility is shared amongst an increasing
number of partisan actors, this attribution becomes more complicated, as multiple
parties could reasonably be held responsible for observed outcomes, and so the econ-
omy serves as a more blurred indicator of how to vote (Bednar, 2007). Institutions
that decrease this clarity of responsibility include bicameralism, coalition and minor-
ity governments (Powell and Whitten, 1993), opposition control of committee chairs
(Strøm, 1984, 1998), federalism (Lowry, Alt and Ferree, 1998), and international in-
tegration (Fernandez-Albertos, 2010). The posited mechanism through which these
institutions affect election outcomes is that voters observe the constraints that incum-
bents face and hold them less responsible for outcomes when they have to cooperate
with more partisan actors (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993;
Whitten and Palmer, 1999). While some accounts allow for politicians to help bring
these constraints to light through their campaign activities (Powell and Whitten,
1993), in others voters are assumed to be highly informed and make complex, ra-
tional decisions about how much credit or blame to place on incumbents (Duch and
Stevenson, 2008).
The economy provides a means by which politicians are held accountable to vot-
ers is premised on the idea that governments take action to increase economic output
and that these actions are, in fact, effective. The idea that voters have a readily
available means by which to consistently evaluate their elected officials is normatively
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appealing. The literature on economic voting consistently links the phenomenon to
the concept of democratic accountability (e.g., Duch, 2001; Hobolt, Tilly and Ban-
ducci, 2010; Powell, 2000; Powell and Whitten, 1993). Because politicians are thought
to have control over macroeconomic policy levers, voters’ use of economic outcomes
as a means of evaluating government performance allows politicians to be held ac-
countable and thereby incentivized to produce good outcomes. It is posited that
when there are multiple hands on these levers, voters are less able to target their
rewards or sanctions on individuals and parties in the government appropriately, and
so accountability may suffer (c.f., Franzese, 2002).
Early models considered more diffuse concentration of responsibility for macroe-
conomic policies to lead voters to confusion over who is ‘in charge’ of the economy,
and so lead to lower levels of economic voting (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten
and Palmer, 1999). While voters may change their support to other parties between
elections, this decision is potentially based on other factors, such as scandals or a gen-
eral attitude of malaise toward longstanding leaders, these decisions are less strongly
linked to measures of government performance when there are more actors who can
credibly take the credit or the blame. These accounts (the clarity of responsibility
thesis) considered the impact of differences in political institutional settings such as
the presence of a bicameral opposition, minority and coalition governments, presiden-
tialism (Samuels, 2004), and federalism (Lowry, Alt and Ferree, 1998) on the degree of
economic voting, arguing that their presence should reduce the clarity of responsibil-
ity and so reduce the impact of economic outcomes on incumbent electoral prospects.
While more recent work considers political institutions as constraining politicians dif-
ferently than in the clarity of responsibility model, the general relationship between
institutional complexity and the strength of the economic vote remains. Duch &
Stevenson (2005, 2008) argue that complex institutions serve not to confuse voters
about who is responsible for the economy, but make attributions more diffuse. Voters
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in their model seek to elect competent economic managers and use the state of the
economy as a (noisy) signal of politician competence. In both formulations, political
institutions affect the degree to which the economy affects who wins elections.
While there are differences in the observable implications of these two causal
mechanisms at the level of the individual voter, their implications are quite similar
for the patterns of aggregate incumbent support in elections: more complex divisions
of power ought to reduce the effect of the economy on incumbent vote share. Unfortu-
nately, findings on this question are inconsistent. While Powell and Whitten (1993),
and later Whitten and Palmer (1999) purported to find evidence of political institu-
tions of moderating effects on incumbent vote share, others, such as Royed, Leyden
and Borrelli (2000), find little to support these moderating effects. Despite the in-
consistent support for the clarity of responsibility thesis, it is commonly treated as
consensus (e.g., Anderson, 2000; DeVries, Edwards and Tillman, 2010; Hobolt, Tilley
and Banducci, 2013; León, 2010; Parker-Stephen, 2013). Differences in the object of
economic voting, the institutions that affect it, and the aspects of the economy that
matter most have led to a bevy of contradictory findings. As Singer writes, “[there]
is little consensus in the extant economic voting literature about (a) whether the
economy’s importance varies and (b) the factors that might explain this variance”
(2011, pg. 289). However, as the following section shows, the clarity of responsibility
argument’s empirical and theoretical foundations are weaker than many believe.
1.2 Problems in the clarity of responsibility literature
The economic voting literature’s focus on how political constraints, particularly
how formal institutions, moderate the effect of the economy on support for incumbents
suffers from both theoretical and empirical limitations. Either problem alone casts
the accepted clarity of responsibility theory into question; combined, they produce
serious doubts about the way in which institutions affect economic voting.
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1.2.1 Theoretical problems
As described above, the macro-level economic voting literature has argued that the
strength of this economy-to-election relationship is conditional upon political insti-
tutions (e.g. Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999). The theoretical
underpinnings for this argument rest on two problematic assumptions about the re-
lationship between voters, the economy, and elections: voters have significant stores
of political and civics knowledge, and that the occurrence of an election is unrelated
to the state of the economy.
High information voters are essential to theories of institutionally contingent
economic voting. Powell and Whitten (1993) argue that voters understand the insti-
tutional and political constraints that government’s face in the formation and imple-
mentation of policy. Though they say institutions allow politicians to diffuse blame
(pg. 399), they require attentive citizens who receive and accept these messages. Re-
cent work on the individual-level effects of institutional context by Duch and Steven-
son (2008) does not posit a mechanism through which voters acquire the large stores
of information about both political and non-political actors with significant effects on
the state of the economy required of their model. In Duch and Stevenson’s formula-
tion, voters know the precise division of power between the government (or relevant
political party in coalition governments, where appropriate) and other political and
non-political actors. Institutions that provide for a larger number of actors to affect
economic outcomes or that increase the variance of a country’s economic outcomes
reduce the strength of the signal that the economy provides for voters. That is, the
economy provides less information about government competence when institutions
are more complex than when they are simpler.
These assumptions are at odds with the literatures on political knowledge and
perception biases that find most citizens lacking detailed knowledge about politics
9
(Lupia, 1994; Zaller, 1992) or the economy (Walstad, 2002). The public opinion and
political psychology literatures examine the conditions under which voters are likely
to know a lot about politics, and find that politically knowledgable individuals are
the exception, rather than the rule, in democracy. The way individual voters view
both the state of the economy and attribute responsibility between actors depends
upon individual characteristics such as partisanship (e.g., Rudolph, 2006) and earlier
vote choices (e.g., Elinder, 2012) in addition to factors such as media consumption
(e.g., Anderson, Mendes and Tverdova, 2004; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000).
Further, voters are consistently found to know little about politics, particularly
political institutions, in a variety of contexts (e.g., Converse, 1990; Gillens, 2007; Lu-
pia, 1994; Zaller, 1992). Institutionally contingent economic voting arguments assert
that as political institutions obscure clarity of responsibility between specific politi-
cians or parties and macroeconomic outcomes, the economy matters less for electoral
performance (Powell and Whitten, 1993). However, if voters tend to know little about
either political institutions or the economy, and their views of the economy are bi-
ased by their preexisting partisanships or voting history, then the causal mechanisms
through which the clarity of responsibility thesis are purported to work are unlikely
in practice. Further, evidence shows that the economy’s salience in whether individ-
uals voters support the incumbent increases when the economy is performing poorly,
and other issues gain salience when the economy is performing well (Bloom and Price,
1975; Grafström and Salmond, 2010). While these problems do not exclude the possi-
bility of finding statistical relationships between institutions, the macroeconomy, and
election outcomes, they cast doubt on the prevailing logic. Nonetheless, as shown
in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.3 below, the empirical support for the posited relationships
between these factors is weaker than many believe.
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The exogeneity of elections to the economy is the second problematic premise
of the clarity of responsibility literature. Perhaps arising from the literature’s roots in
American election forecasting, the literature on the economic vote, and in particular
its clarity of responsibility strand, implicitly assume that the timing of elections is
fixed. While this is true in several countries (e.g., the United States, Switzerland,
and Norway), in most parliamentary countries elections can be held at any time up to
parliament’s constitutionally mandated maximal term.2 The opportunistic election
timing literature finds that elections called by prime ministers are driven by economic
booms, making them potentially different from elections where there is no opportunity
to go to the polls early (e.g., Chowdhury, 1993; Ito, 1990). Very little of the economic
voting literature has either theoretically or empirically accounted for the possibility
that elections occurring at the end of the term may differ in substantively important
ways from those held early. Only one paper currently incorporates the potential
differences between end-of-term and early elections into studies of election outcomes
in the context of economic voting (Samuels and Hellwig, 2010). Samuels and Hellwig
(2010) (Table 1) divide elections into those in which the parliament served its full
mandate, opportunistic early elections called by the prime minister, and other early
elections. They estimate marginal effects of the type of election on the economic
vote after separating out those elections with high versus low clarity of responsibility.
Samuels and Hellwig find that in high clarity contexts, the economy has little effect
on incumbent vote share regardless of how the election came about. However, when
considering incumbent retention, they find that incumbents are less likely to retain the
prime ministership in high clarity of responsibility contexts when they call elections
2While some would consider the potential for early dissolution to be a defining attribute of a
parliamentary system, I choose to employ Strøm’s (2000, 265) minimal definition of a parliamentary
government as one in which the executive is accountable, through a confidence relationship, to
any parliamentary majority. While it is true that most parliamentary countries allow for early
dissolution of parliament, several prominent cases, such as Norway and Switzerland, do not allow
for such contingencies. Instead, any parliament that cannot form a working government must muddle
through until the next constitutionally mandated election date.
11
themselves, but more likely to stay in power when early elections are brought about
in some other way. This difference is
This gap in theory is problematic because it indicates a potential endogeneity bias
in our observation of elections: in many of the countries pointed to as evidence of
economic voting, it could be that we are observing some elections precisely because
of the state of the economy has led politicians to go to the polls at that moment.
Recent work by Tavits and Schleiter (2014) shows that opportunistic elections3 result
in higher vote shares for incumbents than do other types of elections. This undermines
the causal story posited by the economic voting literature, and could sever links
between evidence of economic voting and democratic accountability in parliamentary
countries.
Moreover, the factors generally used to explain the timing of elections are re-
lated to political institutions (e.g., Kayser, 2005), macroeconomic performance (e.g.,
Chowdhury, 1993; Ito, 1990), and the likelihood of success or failure at the polls (e.g.,
Smith, 2004), the very aspects of politics scholars interested in macro-level economic
voting consider. This redoubles concerns about the validity of existing theoretical and
empirical models of economic voting at the level of election outcomes that exclude the
timing of elections. Economic performance affects both incumbent support and the
likelihood of an election being held, while the ability to call elections at will is related
to the institutions under consideration in the clarity of responsibility literature. We
might mistakenly infer that institutions moderate economic voting relationships for
voters when, in fact, they serve to empower or constrain politicians from capitalizing
on the economy’s salience. The true stakes of the relationships between institutions,
the economy, and elections are only understood when we bring election timing into
the equation.
3Tavits and Schleiter (2014) define opportunistic elections as elections held more than one month
prior to the end of the parliamentary term and were called by the prime minister, cabinet, or
government parties in parliament.
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1.2.2 Empirical problems
While Section 1.2.1 noted two prominent theoretical problems in the literature on
economic voting, and especially the prominent clarity of responsibility literature, it
had little to say about the strength of the empirical findings in the literature. Many
scholars treat the idea that the economy is a strong predictor of election outcomes as
established fact. Unfortunately, extant studies find mixed evidence in support of the
economic vote at the national level.
Early studies of the effects the macroeconomy on U.S. Congressional election
returns found, variously, no effects on support due to changes in unemployment but
significant effects arising from changes in real income (Kramer, 1971); no effects from
either changes in unemployment or real income (Stigler, 1973); and that only during
downswings does the economy affect support (Bloom and Price, 1975; Clagget, 1986).
These early mixed findings in the United States are compounded by equally puzzling
findings abroad. The early cross-national economic voting literature found that the
factors that mattered, and the degree to which they mattered, vary significantly both
across countries and between elections (Lewis-Beck, 1988).
The response to these inconsistent findings was to consider how context shapes
the strength of the economic vote. Powell and Whitten (1993) were the first to pro-
vide a systematic account of the contextual effects of the economic vote. Their study
proposed that a set of institutions can serve to diminish or magnify economic voting
effects on election outcomes and tested them in a broad set of advanced industri-
alized countries. Their claims that a set of parliamentary attributes that serve to
mystify responsibility for policy outcomes – namely opposition control of committee
chairmanships, opposition control of an upper house, weak party cohesion, minor-
ity government status, and coalition government status – reduce the effects of GDP
growth, unemployment, and inflation on incumbent government vote share has largely
been taken as accepted knowledge in the literature. Powell and Whitten’s concept of
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clarity of responsibility is consistently integrated into any cross-national comparison
of economic voting at the macro- or micro-level. While refinements were made to the
original models and methods, perhaps most notably in Whitten and Palmer’s (1999)
re-examination of the original Powell and Whitten article that allows for time varying
clarity of responsibility within countries, the underlying validity of their findings is
still broadly accepted and some version of the clarity of responsibility variable is still
a widely used control in statistical analyses.
However, some scholars have challenged the clarity of responsibility argument.
Royed, Leyden and Borrelli (2000, 2003a,b) argue that misspecified statistical models
and inappropriate interpretation of results led researchers to believe that the clarity
of responsibility institutions serve to moderate the effects of the economy on election
outcomes when, in fact, they have no effect. In his 2007 meta-analysis of the eco-
nomic voting literature, Anderson states that, “the evidence available to date strongly
suggests that the economic voting effect ... is intermittent, highly contingent, and
substantively small,” and that, “economic effects on election outcomes do not qualify
as a ‘robust fact’ about elections” (286). Kayser (2013: 1) finds that support for
the economic vote is “disconcertingly sporadic.” The existing evidence has tended
to be interpreted as either supportive of the economic voting hypothesis or of there
being no significant relationship. This dissertation shows that the relationship may
be significant, but work through an alternative mechanism to that hypothesized by
existing economic voting theories.
The relationship described above is one of context conditionality (Franzese, 2002).
Theory tells us that the relationship between economics and elections is moderated by
the institutional context in which political actors (both elected officials and voters)
find themselves. For example, prime ministers constrained by the need to compromise
with coalition partners or an upper house controlled by an opposition party hold a
lesser share of responsibility for policy outcomes than do parties ruling alone that face
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no significant challenges from other institutional veto players (Narud and Valen, 2010;
Powell and Whitten, 1993; Tsebelis, 2002). Knowing these constraints, or perhaps
simply being confused by them, voters do not attribute all responsibility for outcomes
to the party of the prime minister. Instead, as constraints increase, governing parties
are thought to have less direct control over policy. In the case of economic policy,
they would be less accountable not only for the policies but for the final outcomes
those policies produce.
This moderating effect of institutions implies an interactive model of the econ-
omy’s impact on election results of the general form shown in Eq. 1.1. According
to Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), the empirical estimation of moderation effects
requires one to estimate regression coefficients for both the variable of interest (Econ-
omy), the moderating variable (Clarity), and their interaction (Economy*Clarity).
Once all three coefficients are estimated, researchers can determine the marginal effect
of a change in the moderating variable on the variable of interest’s impact on the out-
come variable. It is here that problems arise in the empirical clarity of responsibility
literature.
Y = β0 + β1Economy + β2Clarity + β3Economy ∗ Clarity + ε (1.1)
Of those studies that use multiplicative interaction models two main problems
exist. The first is that they fail to include all constitutive terms4 in the empirical
model; the second is that while including all constituent terms they fail to properly
interpret the models. As Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) discuss, these are nei-
ther uncommon nor trivial problems in the broader discipline. Failing to include all
constitutive terms, while sometimes appropriate for theoretical reasons (e.g., if one
thought that the effect of one term was zero unless the interacted term was present,
4The constitutive terms, sometimes called the “main effect” or “direct effect,” are the two or more
variables used to produce the interaction term. For example, Economy and Clarity of Responsibility
are the constitutive terms in the interaction in Eq. 1.
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see Kam and Franzese 2007), causes estimation problems if the theory indicating a
zero effect is wrong, as the excluded term is correlated with the dependent variable
and–by construction–the interaction term, causing biased estimates of the coefficient.
This is a problem in Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whitten and Palmer’s (1999)
pioneering work on clarity of responsibility. While there have been a number of pa-
pers building on Powell and Whitten in the 22 years since its publication, few have
placed clarity of responsibility in the center of their work. Instead, subsequent work
has generally controlled for clarity of responsibility while focusing on other potential
confounders to contribute to our understanding of elections. In order to better eval-
uate foundational claims of the economic voting literature, I replicate Whitten and
Palmer’s work and then specify their empirical model more fully.
1.3 Empirical replication and extension
To assess whether the methodological errors described in Section 1.2.2 actually
lead to inferential errors, this section first replicates Whitten and Palmer’s (1999)
findings to ensure that the data collected for this dissertation closely approximates
that used in comparable studies. Important estimation problems are then addressed
with corrected models that show little empirical support for the clarity of responsi-
bility theory. Finally, a meta-analysis of more than 1,600 estimated regressions of the
clarity of responsibility theory that considers many possible ways of measuring both
outcome and various independent variables, in multiple combinations is presented
in Appendix B. This meta-analysis also fails to support the clarity of responsibility
theory.
1.3.1 Replication
Whitten and Palmer (1999) argue that the degree to which governments are re-
warded or punished for economic outcomes is a function not only of the clarity of
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responsibility of the government, but also its composition. They claim that different
types of governments benefit more through strong performance in some types of eco-
nomic output than they are by others. As such, they argue that right governments, as
the traditional protectors of capital, are expected to focus on maintaining low infla-
tion and so are punished more harshly for a failure to produce that. Left and center
governments, with bases of support stemming from the working classes, are expected
to focus on generating low unemployment and so voters are expected to punish them
more severely than right governments for higher rates of unemployment. Further,
they argue that coalition governments, having to compromise between the various
parties in government, will focus on the ‘lowest common denominator’ of growth; as
such, they are rewarded more for producing high growth than are single-party govern-
ments. Whitten and Palmer also test the claim that minority governments ought to
gain more votes in the next election because voters recognize that these incumbents
are unable to pass legislation without the support of other parties in the parliament.
However, the longer a minority government is in power the smaller this benefit of
the doubt given them will be, as minority governments are forced to compromise
their policy agendas time and again due to their very dependency on creating new
coalitions for each policy. Whitten and Palmer also make that case that the greater
the number of parties in the government, the fewer votes the government as a whole
should lose since a vote away from one member of the governing coalition has a higher
likelihood of being transferred to another coalition member. Finally, they include a
lagged dependent variable in their analysis to account for the autoregressive nature
of the data (pg. 55 Whitten and Palmer, 1999). Many of the hypotheses tested in
this extension of Powell and Whitten (1993) are conditional in nature, requiring the
inclusion of interactive terms and their constitutive terms.
Whitten and Palmer (and my replication) use government vote share as their
dependent variable (Wolfram, 2011; Ortiz de Zárate, 2010). The original sample con-
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tains elections in advanced industrialized democracies5 between 1967 and 1994; this
data is expanded to include elections through 2010 in the dissertation’s full sample.
The independent variable of interest in their analysis is clarity of responsibility. They
measure clarity as an additive index composed of the presence of bicameral oppo-
sition, a minority government, weak parties, and opposition control of committee
chairs. This index theoretically ranges from 0 to 4; however, there are only a few
cases in which there are three of these factors present in any parliament. Because
Whitten and Palmer split their sample and run separate regressions on each sub-
sample, they combine the few observations with a value of 3 with the larger group
of observations that take on a value of 2, leading to three categories of clarity. In
the replications below, I do the same, but reverse their coding so that clarity takes
on a value 0 when institutions are least clear, 1 when there is middling clarity, and
2 when institutions are most clear. Economic performance is measured as growth,
inflation, and unemployment relative to OECD averages. Coalition government takes
on a value of 1 when multiple parties controlled government together and 0 when a
single party controlled the government prior to the election. Right governments are
those scoring a 1 or 2 on Castles and Mair’s (1984) scale; center/left governments are
those governments scoring 3 through 5. These are dichotomized such that right takes
on a value of 1 when left takes on a value of zero, and vice versa. The number of gov-
ernment parties (# gov parties) is a count of the number of parties in the government
prior to the election. Minority takes on a value of 1 when the government controls
fewer than 50% of the seats in parliament and zero otherwise. Minority duration is
measured as the number of months that an incumbent minority government was in
power; it is valued 0 for majority governments. Summary statistics for all of these
variables can be found in Table A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
5Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States are included in the sample provided by Whitten and Palmer. The extended dataset
contains all elections from these countries plus Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal.
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Table 1.1 shows the original estimates reported in Table 4 of Whitten and Palmer
(1999, pg. 58) in the first, third, and fifth columns and the corresponding replication
estimates using the data collected for this dissertation in the second, fourth, and sixth
columns.6 The expected sign and, when clearly indicated from theory, magnitude of
each coefficient is reported beside the coefficient name on the far left of the table.
Comparing each set of columns, the replication shows broadly similar results to those
reported in Whitten and Palmer’s work; nearly all significant coefficients from their
analyses are signed the same and of similar magnitudes in my replications, though
they sometimes fail to reach similar levels of statistical significance in the replicated
analyses. I attribute the larger standard errors and slight changes in coefficients in
my analyses to slightly different measurements of the economic variables7. When
reading the coefficients from this and subsequent tables, it is important to remember
that the coefficients on the constitutive terms (e.g., comparative growth, comparative
inflation, comparative unemployment) indicate the effect of a one-unit shift of that
variable when the variable it is interacted with (e.g., coalition or, later, clarity of
responsibility) takes on a value of zero. For example, when institutions are least
clear (column 6), the effect of a one unit increase in comparative growth for a single
party government is an increase in government vote share of 1.83% according to the
replication results in the last column. This same increase in comparative growth is
estimated to increase government vote share by only 1.32% for a coalition government.
It is interesting to note that in all but one case (comparative growth in the least
clear contexts upon my replication) the constitutive economic performance coefficients
fail to reach standard levels of significance. This finding seems to be in line with their
argument that particular attributes of a government lead voters to assess them on
6The observations used in Table 1.1 are only those used in Whitten and Palmer’s original sample
of elections.
7For instance, I use the IMF’s World Development Indicators for my measures of growth and
inflation, where Whitten and Palmer used OECD data; I also weight economic performance to the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































particular dimensions of the economy, but absent those attributes, they will focus on
different indicators of performance. Since, for example, it is right-wing governments
that are expected to be most accountable for inflationary performance, this implies
that the absence of a right-wing government (i.e., a center or left-wing government,
when the interaction term takes a value of zero) ought to lead inflation to be less
important or a completely unimportant determinant of government vote share. Eval-
uating the coefficients on the interaction terms is trickier, unfortunately. In the most
clear category, the coefficients on the interaction terms are in the expected direc-
tion for all variables. Coefficients for the interactions of growth and unemployment
in the middle clear category are correctly signed in Whitten and Palmer’s analysis
while the interaction term including inflation is incorrectly signed; in my replication
the interaction on comparative growth is incorrectly signed while my results are sim-
ilar to those of Whitten and Palmer for the interaction terms that include inflation
and unemployment. Finally, in the least clear category, the coefficients on all of the
interaction terms except Whitten and Palmer’s estimation of right*comp inflation
are incorrectly signed. Given their own results, the support for context conditional
economic voting is tenuous.
However, as stated in Section 1.2.2, the decision not to include constitutive terms
may have resulted in significant bias of the coefficient estimates in Whitten and
Palmer’s work and, by extension, my replication. Table 1.2 shows a fully specified
replication of their model and Table 1.3 provides the marginal effect of each economic
variable on government vote share at different levels of clarity of responsibility. You
will notice in Table 1.2 that the constitutive terms coalition and right have been added
to the regression; further, because right and center/left would be perfectly collinear
(a value of one on right requires a value of zero on center/left), I omit center/left
and interact comparative unemployment with right. This leads to a slightly different
interpretation of the coefficient on comparative unemployment than in the previous
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Table 1.2: Whitten and Palmer’s Economic Voting Model, Fully Specified
Most Middle Least
V otet−1 (0 < β < 1) 0.640*** 0.642*** 0.832***
(0.14) (0.08) (0.10)
Comparative Growth (+) -0.920 0.230 2.425**
(0.84) (0.55) (0.76)
Coalition (0) -2.127 1.535 -4.173
(3.23) (2.13) (4.60)
Coal*Comp Grow (+) 1.484 -0.405 -2.004
(1.09) (1.22) (1.34)
Comparative Inflation ( - ) 0.701 0.072 0.512
(0.36) (0.24) (0.39)
Right (0) 6.993 -3.297 -2.756
(3.76) (1.87) (3.27)
Right*Comp Infl ( - or 0) -1.051* -0.187 -0.819
(0.46) (0.33) (0.59)
Comp Unemployment ( - ) 0.417 0.444 -0.132
(0.25) (0.36) (0.52)
Right*Comp Unemp (+) -1.167* -0.319 0.777
(0.55) (0.39) (0.79)
# Gov Parties (+) 4.286 0.983 1.006
(2.26) (1.21) (2.07)
Minority (+) 5.409* -10.055*
(2.55) (4.28)
Minority Duration ( - ) -0.473*** -0.031
(0.06) (0.08)
Constant (+) 2.436 14.259*** 17.117*
(5.91) (3.99) (7.16)
R2 0.780 0.780 0.920
N 36 60 35
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: Marginal effects of Growth, Inflation and Unemployment on Government




Single Party -0.920 0.230 2.425**
(0.84) (0.55) (0.76)
Coalition 0.564 -0.175 0.421
(0.78) (1.11) (1.05)
Comp Inflation
Center/Left Gov 0.701 0.072 0.512
(0.36) (0.24) (0.39)
Right Gov -0.349 -0.115 -0.307
(0.29) (0.23) (0.39)
Comp Unemployment
Center/Left Gov 0.417 0.444 -0.132
(0.25) (0.36) (0.52)
Right Gov -0.749 0.124 0.645
(0.46) (0.27) (0.63)
table. Here the coefficient on comparative unemployment is the effect of a one unit
change in comparative unemployment for center and left-wing governments. As such,
we expect this coefficient to be negative and significant and the coefficient on the
interaction with right to be positive.
Looking at the estimated coefficients on comparative growth across levels of clarity,
we see that it is only in the least clear contexts that growth has a positive and
significant predictor of incumbent single-party government vote share. The coefficient
on comparative growth is negative for the most clear contexts and indistinguishable
from zero for the middling clarity cases. Given that we would expect either positive
or insignificant results this is not damning evidence, though it is not particularly
supportive of their theory either. If anything, it implies that an increase in growth
relative to the rest of the OECD only seems to help those governments in which there
is the least amount of clarity (last column) and that when institutions lead to the
highest degree of clarity, growth has no relationship to government vote share (first
column) and may in fact harm the government!
Comparative inflation is never significant and always estimated to be greater than
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zero for left-wing and center governments. Since their theory predicts that right-
wing governments would be punished more harshly for increased inflation, the lack of
significant coefficients on comparative inflation at any level of clarity of responsibility
when Right is zero does not necessarily undermine their theory, so long as right-wing
governments are punished more harshly for inflation, evidenced through a negative
and significant coefficient on the interaction of Right and Comparative Inflation and
a negative and significant marginal effect of inflation, particularly in the most clear
case. The third and fourth rows of Table 1.3 show that this requirement is unfulfilled:
comparative inflation, while negative for right-wing governments, is never statistically
significant.
Comparative unemployment estimates the relationship between relative unemploy-
ment rates and vote share for left-wing governments. The coefficient estimate shows a
significant relationship at all levels of clarity of responsibility but that the estimated
effect is incorrectly signed for both the most and middle clarity coefficients. Further,
the only case where the coefficient is signed correctly (though insignificant) is the
lowest clarity case, even though we would expect that the coefficient would be the
most negative when institutions are most clear.
Whitten and Palmer’s theory could be read to imply that there should be no rela-
tionship between government vote share and a particular economic outcome when the
necessary condition is absent; as such the null results on the constitutive growth and
inflation terms could be taken as supportive evidence of their partisan conditional
economic voting model. However, as we can see in Table 1.3 the presence of those
necessary conditions does not lead to significant or even appropriately signed esti-
mated marginal effects. Table 1.3 shows the marginal effects of comparative growth,
inflation, and unemployment in the absence8 (top two lines) and presence (bottom
two lines) of the relevant modifying variable. Looking at the marginal effects of these
8Coefficients and standard errors for the absence condition are simply the coefficients of the
constitutive term in Table 1.3.
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economic indicators we see that there exist no significant relationship between any
of these measures of economic performance and government vote share conditional
on attributes of the government. The marginal effect of growth for coalition govern-
ments is indistinguishable from zero at all levels of clarity of responsibility. Likewise,
center and left-wing governments are not punished more stringently for higher un-
employment than are their right-wing counterparts. In fact, at the highest level
of clarity (first column) the positive marginal effect of comparative unemployment
for center and left governments nearly reaches traditional levels of significance (p <
0.064), indicating that when policy responsibility is easiest for voters to discern and
the policy preferences of the government is to pursue low unemployment, increasing
unemployment relative to the OECD average actually helps those governments. The
only variable for which the marginal effect is signed correctly for all three levels of
clarity in the presence of the requisite modifying is comparative inflation. However, in
no case is comparative inflation’s estimated marginal effect on government vote share
significantly different from zero. The lack of robust relationships between economic
performance, partisan/governmental attributes, and government vote shares across
differing degrees of institutional clarity of responsibility in a fully specified model
suggests that the clarity of responsibility argument is weaker than many believe it
to be; those trends that do exist generally move in the opposite direction to those
of the clarity of responsibility argument – if any relationship exists, it is that clearer
institutions are associated with less economic voting, not more.
More recent studies have built on the foundations of this institutionally condi-
tional economic voting theory and have tested the implications of their expanded
theories using appropriately specified empirical models. Unfortunately, of those stud-
ies that include all constitutive terms (e.g., Duch and Stevenson 2008, Table 7.19),
9Duch and Stevenson (2008) exclude their dummy of Leftist PM; however their main findings
related to trade and a limited state sector do include all constitutive terms. There are similar
omissions in their other empirical tests.
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few properly interpret their results.10 Specifically, they fail to calculate substantively
meaningful marginal effects and standard errors. The nature of the theory of in-
stitutionally dependent economic voting assumes that the effect of the economy on
elections varies over different degrees of clarity of responsibility. As discussed above
when considering the ramifications of omitting constitutive terms, the variables in-
cluded in interactive models matter not only on their own but affect our understanding
of the information provided by the other variables, both the magnitude of the effect
and its significance.
In particular, when interpreting the significance of the interaction term one must
compute the standard error of the variable of interest (in this study, that of economic
performance) at different values of the interacted term. Computing the standard error
requires the use of the variance of the interacting variables and their covariances.
It is therefore not straightforward to comprehend significance by looking at results
reported in a regression table: the standard errors on the individual coefficients could
be significant, but the marginal effect can be insignificant. Without reporting the
standard errors at different values of the conditioning variable, we cannot tell if the
relationship is conditionally significant at all, some, or any values of the modifying
variable (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Hence, statements like that in Duch
and Stevenson (2008:204), when describing their results that economic constraints
moderate the effects of the economy on vote choice, that, “[t]hese estimates clearly
support the hypothesis because all of the coefficients are statistically significant and
in the expected direction,” is incorrect. We are missing key pieces of information that
allow us to make appropriate inferences about the conditional relationships we are
interested in.
Below, I simplify the models used by Whitten and Palmer (1999) in another
10Notable exceptions at the macro-level is the work by Hellwig and coauthors (2001, 2007, 2008).
However, Hellwig’s work has not focused on the impact of domestic political institutions on gov-
ernment electoral performance, instead focusing on how changing exposure to international markets
affects electoral performance.
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attempt to find evidence of traditional interpretations of institutionally conditional
economic voting. Section 1.3.2 first shows a streamlined Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) model using panel-corrected standard errors that includes the same variables
as above. In Appendix B I then describe the results of more than 1600 estimated
regressions that consider different measures of both the key independent and depen-
dent variables, as well as dividing the clarity of responsibility index into its constituent
parts to find some evidence of clarity of responsibility’s impact on the economic vote.
Much like Anderson (2007), I find the evidence in favor of institutionally conditional
economic voting limited.
1.3.2 Simplified models of economic voting
Given that received wisdom is based on misspecified models, the first order of busi-
ness is to correctly specify a model of economic voting at the macro-level. In order to
return to the most essential aspects of the clarity of responsibility theory, the models
below do not condition the effects of economic outcomes on the partisanship of the
government as in Whitten and Palmer, nor does it split the sample, as this reduces the
power of the tests by limiting the number of observations in any regression. Further,
splitting the sample implicitly assumes that all variables–including control variables
such as previous vote share–have different effects in each institutional context. In-
stead, I create a model similar to that in Eq. 1.1, in which each economic indicator
is interacted with a measure of clarity of responsibility and both constitutive terms
are included in the regression. As shown below, these simple baseline regressions
elucidate a puzzle for the economic voting literature: why does the economy’s effect
vary?
Once again, I use the total government vote share as my dependent variable. The
total government vote share is used to ensure comparability between this and pre-
vious work. This dependent variable ranges from 6.4 (Spain’s 1982 UCD incumbent
27
government) to 95.8 (Greece’s 1990 incumbent grand coalition) percent of the vote. I
employ an OLS model with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). I
include the government’s vote share in the previous election (the lagged DV) to help
protect against autocorrelation across elections.
The models below are estimated using the extended dataset gathered for this dis-
sertation. It includes 21 countries11 between 1967 and 2010. To measure economic
performance, I use both the comparative measures of growth, unemployment and
inflation (comparative economic measures), as above, and the difference between the
economic growth, inflation, and unemployment in the year leading up to the election
from the country’s average growth, inflation, and unemployment for the previous 4
years (relative economic measures). It is likely that recent economic experiences in-
fluences voters’ economic expectations, indicating that a time-based comparison may
be as appropriate than a cross-national one. By differencing current economic con-
ditions from those of the recent past, we can proxy for the incumbents’ performance
relative to the expectations that reasonable voters would have for that performance.
Further, due to differences in sticky institutions such as labor market regulations and
central bank independence, some countries’ natural levels of growth, inflation, and
unemployment may be consistently higher or lower than the OECD average, leading
us to incorrectly predict electoral support for these countries. Both measures are in
line with the “first derivative” mentality that voters are posited to hold - voters react
more to changes in income, unemployment and inflation than to their levels (Kiewiet,
2000). Both measurement strategies weight economic performance by the proportion
of the current fiscal year that had passed by the time of the election. Estimates
that used non-differenced growth, inflation and unemployment numbers produce sub-
stantively similar but less significant results. The first two columns of Table 1.4 use
11All countries included in Whitten and Palmer’s analyses are included, except Switzerland, due to
the long-standing agreement between the four major parties that ensure that the governing coalition
always includes them, regardless of the relative vote shares of each constituent party. It further
includes Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal.
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the comparative economic measures as in the previous estimates, while the third and
fourth columns of use the relative economic measures.
I also use two different measures of clarity. For the first, I use the clarity of re-
sponsibility index developed in Powell and Whitten (1993) and updated in Whitten
and Palmer (1999) used in estimates found in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. This measure of
clarity is an additive index by which the presence of a bicameral opposition, oppo-
sition control of committee chairs, weak party voting cohesion, and minority status
each serve to decrease clarity. The results using Whitten and Palmer’s measure of
clarity found it columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.4. The second measure is very similar
to the first, however opposition control of committee chairs is omitted and govern-
ment coalitions is added to the index. This is done to measure attributes that align
more closely with the theoretical underpinnings of the clarity of responsibility thesis.
Clarity of responsibility assumes that voters are able to observe and/or understand
the arguments about constraints made by politicians. Whether the government is
composed of a single party or is a coalition is more readily observed by voters than
whether the parliament’s committee chairmanships are distributed proportionally or
not. The results using alternative clarity can be found in columns 2 and 4 of Tables
1.4. Recall from Tables 1.1 and 1.2, Whitten and Palmer’s decision to split their
sample led them to combine the least clear cases with those cases that were one level
clearer due to a paucity of observations in the least clear category. This is unneces-
sary in my specification, so there are four categories observed for both measures of
clarity, with 0 being the least clear and 3 being the most clear.
Table 1.4 shows the results of the estimated effects of the economic vote on total
government vote share. There are a few important patterns to note here. First, recall
that all of the coefficients on the economic variables show the estimated effects of that
measure of economic performance when clarity of responsibility is at its lowest, while










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Marginal Effects of Economic Outcomes on Government Vote Share con-
ditional on Clarity, Full Sample
Clarity




0.112 0.241 0.369 0.497
(0.823) (0.510) (0.281) (0.365)
ClarityAlternative
-0.164 0.132 0.427 0.722
(0.839) (0.458) (0.271) (0.544)
Relative
ClarityW&P
1.045 0.214 -0.616α -1.447*
(0.394) (0.193) (0.365) (0.651)
ClarityAlternative
1.837** 1.016** 0.195 -0.626α




-0.494 -0.222 0.051 0.323
(0.251) (0.275) (0.147) (0.204)
ClarityAlternative
0.042 0.092 0.144 0.196
(0.839) (237) (0.142) (0.206)
Relative
ClarityW&P
0.555 0.419 0.283 0.148
(0.321) (0.172) (0.268) (0.480)
ClarityAlternative
0.550 0.486 0.421* 0.357




0.281 0.095 -0.091 -0.276
(0.449) (0.275) (0.151) (0.207)
ClarityAlternative
-0.026 -0.070 -0.113 -0.157
(0.458) (0.258) (0.139) (0.261)
Relative
ClarityW&P
-0.832α -1.017*** -1.202* -1.387
(0.481) (0.275) (0.496) (0.863)
ClarityAlternative
-0.906 -0.944* -0.982*** -1.020*
(0.748) (0.434) (0.273) (0.466)
(a) Note: α = p ≤ 0.10, * p = ≤ 0.05, ** p = ≤ 0.01, *** p = ≤ 0.001
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Since higher values on clarity mean there are fewer encumbrances on voters’ abilities
to attribute responsibility, the coefficients on the interaction and constitutive terms
ought to be signed in the same direction. Looking at the first two columns, when using
the comparative economic measures none of these constitutive terms reach statistical
significance and half are incorrectly signed. The coefficients on the interactions be-
tween clarity of responsibility and both comparative unemployment and growth are
correctly signed.
The constitutive terms for growth and unemployment are both correctly signed
in the regressions in columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.4 that employ relative economic
measures, three of which are significantly. However, the estimated effects of increased
inflation over the average rates of the previous four year is positive, nearing conven-
tional levels of significance when using Whitten and Palmer’s measure of clarity of
responsibility. The signs on the coefficients on the interaction terms are correctly
signed for both inflation and unemployment, but incorrectly signed and significant
for growth. However, as in the discussion of earlier results in Table 1.1, it is not until
we examine the marginal effects that we can determine the support for the clarity of
responsibility theory.
Table 1.5 shows the estimated marginal effects of a one-point increase in our
measures of economic performance at each level of clarity of responsibility. The table
is divided first by the general measure of economic performance (growth, inflation,
or unemployment rates), then by whether the cells indicate use of the comparative or
relative economic measures in the second column. The third column indicates which
measure of clarity of responsibility is used: Whitten and Palmer’s or the alternative
measure described above. The final four columns show the marginal effects of a one-
point increase in the economic measure under consideration on the vote share of the
incumbent government in that clarity context, as well as the estimated standard error
around that effect.
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Beginning with the marginal effects of comparative growth, we can see that at
no level of clarity of responsibility for either clarity measure is there an effect that
significantly differs from zero, though the estimates do become more positive. When
relative growth is used as the measure of the economy there are some statistically
significant marginal effects. Unfortunately, these effects are going in the opposite
direction to theory, with the largest positive effects of growth occurring at the lowest
levels of clarity of responsibility for both clarity measures, and both ending with neg-
ative and statistically significant estimated marginal effects of growth at the highest
levels of clarity.
The marginal effect of an increase in comparative inflation is never statistically
significant for either measure of clarity at any level. It is only at a middling level of
alternative clarity that there is a statistically significant marginal effect for relative
inflation on government vote share, but as in the case of the statistically significant
findings for relative growth, its direction runs counter to theoretical expectations.
Finally, considering the marginal effects of unemployment, comparative unemploy-
ment is not significant at any level or measure of clarity of responsibility. The marginal
effect of relative unemployment is more complex. When moderated by Whitten and
Palmer’s measure of clarity of responsibility the marginal effect of unemployment is
negative and marginally significant at the lowest levels of clarity. The marginal ef-
fect becomes more strongly negative as clarity increases, but is no longer statistically
significant at the highest level of clarity of responsibility. This lack of significance in
the highest clarity cases could be due to there being too few observations (only 15).
The marginal effect of relative unemployment is negative at all levels of alternative
clarity, and is statistically significant as clarity increases beyond its lowest observed
level. The findings from relative unemployment are the only evidence in favor of
clarity of responsibility moderating economic voting at the macro-level. Overall, the
evidence seems to undermine the accepted theory of economic voting at the level of
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election outcomes. But four regressions do not disprove a theory.
The appendix to this chapter describe the results of 1,620 regressions that ad-
dress potential shortfalls of the models above. These regressions broke the clarity of
responsibility measures above into their component pieces and interacted them with
various measures of both our dependent and independent variables. Overall, in less
than 30 percent of the 1,620 estimated regressions were both the constitutive eco-
nomic term’s coefficient and the interactive term coefficient signed in the expected
direction. Of these, there were only 16 regressions (less than 1 percent of the total)
in which these correctly signed pairs of coefficients were statistically significant. Fur-
ther, all 16 pairs of coefficients were found when unemployment was the economic
variable under consideration. This is incredibly weak evidence in favor of the clarity
of responsibility thesis. Equally troubling, a similarly sized proportion of estimates
found just the opposite relationship, with approximately 35 percent of all estimates
signed in a way that would support a perverse relationship between economic voting
and clarity of responsibility wherein better economic performance for governments
with high levels of control over policy were punished for this performance. Of these
cases, many more produced statistically significant marginal effects: 98 sets were
statistically significant (approximately 6 percent). Further, the number of cases in
which the constitutive term is correctly signed and paired with an incorrectly signed
interactive term is nearly identical to the number of cases in which the opposite is
true, indicating no more support for an unconditional explanation of economic voting
than one conditional on political institutions. Overall, the meta-analysis provides no
substantial support for the clarity of responsibility theory. As such, the significant
variation in economic voting at the election level identified in the literature is still
largely unexplained. Below I provide an overview the framework for an alternative
explanation of the variations in economic voting developed here and a description of
the remainder of the dissertation.
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1.4 Strategic politicians and the economy: the plan going
forward
Due to the economic voting literature’s empirical origins in the United States (e.g.,
Hibbs, 1977) and the important contributions of citizen perceptions of the economy
on their vote choices (e.g. MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Kiewiet and Kinder,
1979), scholars of economic voting have focused on voters, while politicians are largely
excluded from theoretical or empirical analysis in the literature. However, as discussed
in Section 1.2.1, voters are unlikely to hold much knowledge of how power is divided
between political parties in parliament and to focus their attributions on the parties
of the most visible policy maker, likely the country’s premier. If voters are unlikely
to possess the institutional knowledge to reward or punish politicians based on their
responsibility for policy outcomes, but the economy’s effect varies across elections,
then another mechanism must be behind the unexplained variance in economic voting
at the level of elections.
This dissertation argues that shifting the focus of economic voting analyses from
voters to politicians leads to a different set of observable implications about both
the timing and results of elections than traditional theories of either. The theory
developed in Chapter 2 is built on assumptions of voters whose political priorities
and support depend on the state of the economy and politicians who act strategically
based on their understandings of the behavioral patterns of voters with respect to
the economy. The tendency of people to focus their concern on what is going wrong
rather than what is going right means that the salience of the economy will vary with
economic performance, with the economy being more important when it is performing
poorly than when it is performing well (Arceneaux, 2003; Bloom and Price, 1975;
Hood, 2002; Martin, 2008; Soroka, 2006). If economic outcomes have a stronger
(and negative) impact on incumbent support during a downturn, then the timing
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of an election within a business cycle may well explain much of the variation in
economic voting within a country. It does not, however, provide any explanation for
the differences in average levels of economic voting cross-nationally.
Differences in political institutions are still likely to be the explanation for these
differences, but not through the mechanism posited by the clarity of responsibility
literature. Instead of voters recognizing the constraints politicians face and fairly
holding them more accountable when they have more power to affect policy out-
comes, politicians act to enhance their own power to the extent those constraints
allow them. Specifically, politicians with the power to dissolve parliament will do so
when economic conditions favor them. Unlike earlier examinations of opportunistic
election timing (e.g. Ito, 1990; Kayser, 2006; Smith, 1996, 2004), this dissertation
examines the incentives and capacities of politicians both in and out of government
to determine the timing of elections. Incumbent prime ministers, in their pursuit
of office holding, want to call early elections when the economy is performing well,
and will do so more often when political institutions allow them to do so with ease.
While these elections are driven by the economy, the economy’s strong performance
will make it a relatively weaker predictor of incumbent support than in elections in
which the economy is performing poorly. Politicians’ concern for voter support is
only incidental to their primary goal of retaining government power. I posit that the
weakened impact of the economy on election returns when the economy is performing
well is made up for by the increased likelihood of retaining their post as premier.
The incumbent prime minister is not the only actor who can choose when elec-
tions occur. By considering how arrangements of political power that shift over time
within countries determine the possibility (and, as seen in Chapter 3, common occur-
rence) of opposition parties timing elections we come to expect elections to be held
at particularly inopportune moments for the incumbent prime minister under partic-
ular sets of circumstances. A struggling economy is likely to mobilize opposition to
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the incumbent prime minister, providing a strong incentive to non-prime ministerial
parties to bring about elections and improve their own chances of governing. When
opposition parties have the capacity to force early elections on a prime minister, they
are likely to do so when the economy is performing poorly. Thus, when institutional
arrangements produce both the opportunity to force early elections, they are more
likely to do so when the economy is performing poorly. Moreover, the economy’s
effect on incumbent support is likely to be larger in opposition-timed elections than
in other types of elections, precisely because it is relatively more salient. Thus, the
theory developed in Chapter 2 expects political institutions to play an important role
in the magnitude of the economic vote, it does so through a different mechanism than
existing theories and produces a different set of observable implications.
Chapter 3 describes the data on the how elections arise in advanced industrialized
democracies. Four distinct types of elections are possible: those occurring at the
end of the parliament’s constitutionally mandated term; those held before the end of
the parliament’s term brought about by the prime minister; elections held before the
parliamentary term’s end forced by the opposition; and those held early for other,
non-office-seeking reasons. While the specifics surrounding the individual elections in
each category vary, I show that there are institutional commonalities that correlate
with occurrence of each type of election.
The theory that institutions affect the capacity to act on economic incentives
of politicians in and out of government to time elections is tested in Chapter 4.
Using strategic probit models, I find that the benchmarked unemployment rate has
a statistically significant effect on the decisions of prime ministers and oppositions
to time elections. When prime ministers can unilaterally call elections they use that
power, but are less likely call an early election as unemployment rises. Opposition
parties are more likely to force early elections when they control a presidency, and
this tendency increases as the unemployment rate climbs.
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Building from these findings, Chapter 5 tests the implications strategic timing
of elections for the election’s ultimate outcome. As the type of election is expected
to mediate the effect of the economy on incumbent prime ministerial retention in
particular, a simple mediation model is estimated. While election type has minimal
mediating effects on vote or seat share, it has a strong mediating effect on the impact
of the economy on retention. The economy’s impact on whether the prime minister
keeps her job is at least as strongly determined by how the election came about as it
is by the state of the economy itself.
Chapter 6 concludes that bringing politicians back into explanations of economic
voting is essential to understanding aggregated mass behavior. We know that voters
follow elite cues; the ability of elites to not only help set the priorities of what voters
base their choices at the ballot box on but to determine when they get to express
their evaluations of incumbent performance on those priorities calls into question
scholar’s equivalence of performance voting with democratic accountability. The final
chapter of the dissertation explores these implications and proposes directions for




A Theory of Economic Voting with Strategically
Timed Elections
The previous chapter showed that the proposed mechanisms of macro-level eco-
nomic voting are based on unrealistic assumptions about the differential impact of
the economy on voters, rather than politicians, due to institutional constraints and
inconclusive empirical evidence upholding those assumptions. I do not dispute the
importance of political institutions on electoral outcomes or economic voting, but
this chapter makes the case for changing our view of how and why institutions mat-
ter for economic voting. I argue that the effects of institutions on the economic vote
operate through the strategic responses of politicians to the incentives of economic
performance and the actions available to them in their institutional environment as
they pursue power. It is institutions’ empowering or constraining effects on the early
dissolution of parliaments by partisans that determine the strength of the relationship
between economic performance and election outcomes. Institutions that concentrate
policymaking power are likely to coexist with other institutions that provide prime
ministers significant leeway with which to time elections strategically. More dispersed
policymaking institutions are more likely to coincide with institutions that empower
multiple partisan actors to strategically dissolve parliament, leading to greater vari-
ance in the motivations of those calling elections than in premier-timing countries.
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The economic voting literature assumes that the economy provides the same ba-
sic information (e.g., the government’s level of competence) about incumbent perfor-
mance in all elections, which voters then use to decide how to vote. These studies
focus on voters, while paying little attention to the behavior of politicians. Yet, if
the economy matters as much as both political scientists and politicians believe for
electoral outcomes, then politicians have an incentive to manipulate both economic
outcomes1 and when elections occur in an economic cycle. If voters are more likely
to retain incumbents when the economy is performing well, then the government has
an incentive to call elections during economic upswings (e.g., Balke, 1990; Duch and
Stevenson, 2008; Powell, 2000). Further, since voters tend to focus their reward on
the most prominent party in government, this is particularly the case for the party of
the prime minister2 Conversely, members of the opposition are likely to attempt to
force elections during economic slumps, as their prospects to rule are inversely related
to those of the incumbent.
This chapter presents a theory of economic voting that accounts for the possibility
that politicians attempt to maximize their likelihood of either attaining or prolonging
their time in office by calling elections at opportune moments. This incentive exists
in all democratic systems, but the capacity of politicians to call early elections is con-
strained by political institutions. Only within parliamentary and semi-presidential
political systems can (some) politicians choose when they face the voters. Within
this set of countries the capacities of the prime minister’s party and the opposition to
bring about early elections varies considerably. Parties’ abilities to precipitate elec-
1This is the basis of the political business and political budget cycle literatures. This work argues
that as elections approach, politicians will attempt to create short-term booms to improve their
prospects of reelections. Through the manipulations of fiscal and/or monetary policy, politicians
attempt to expand the economy before inflation catches up, leading voters to reward them either for
the expansion or for their perceived competence in engaging in such expansion with few inflationary
consequences. See e.g. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1993); Franzese (2002); Shi and Svensson (2006)
for reviews of this work.
2Research suggests that the party of the head of government in coalition governments and of
the president in cohabitation situations is generally the target of economic voting (e.g. Duch and
Stevenson, 2008; Powell, 2000).
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tions in time with economic performance differ based upon both the largely constant
national features of formal institutions and strong norms empowering particular ac-
tors in parliamentary dissolution, and the dynamic feature of parliamentary partisan
composition. While all parties have incentives to call elections at opportune moments,
their capacities to act on their preferences explain when the economy will (not) be a
strong predictor of an election’s outcome. If the strength of the relationship between
the economy and incumbent support at the polls is contingent on the strategic be-
havior of politicians, then evidence of economic voting may have little relationship to
normative conceptions of democratic accountability.
In addressing the question of how institutions that structure election timing affect
election outcomes, I provide evidence that these institutions are both theoretically
and empirically linked with measures of clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten,
1993). However, while correlated with clarity of responsibility, the theory presented
here produces a different set of observable implications of how institutional variation
affects economic voting than exists in the literature. The following section explains
how the failure to model the relationship between clarity of responsibility and dissolu-
tion powers produces biased estimates of the economy’s effects on election outcomes.
Section 2.2 proposes a mechanism by which election type (that is, whether an election
occurs at the end of the maximal parliamentary term or is held as a result of the prime
minister or the opposition dissolving parliament prematurely) is associated with dif-
ferences in the salience of the economy as a whole and with the salience of particular
indicators of performance to voters, thereby affecting the magnitude of the economic
vote. Forward-looking politicians’ anticipation of voter response to the economy – not
the rational response of voters to the institutional constraints politicians faced during
the previous term – is what drives differences in the economic vote. I then briefly
introduce new data (described in greater depth in Chapter 3) in Section 2.3 that
establishes who precipitated an election and show how the means by which elections
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come about is related to both measures of clarity of responsibility and constitutional
rules empowering either the prime minister or the parliamentary opposition to bring
about early elections. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.1 Economic performance, the economic vote, and omitted
variable bias
As discussed in Chapter I, a large strain of the economic voting literature has
focused on how institutions clarify or obfuscate responsibility for policy outcomes.
When institutions produce a single partisan actor who can implement its policies
unilaterally, that actor will be held responsible by voters for the consequences, partic-
ularly the country’s economic performance during their rule. Beginning with Powell
and Whitten (1993), clarity of responsibility was defined by having generally high
party voting cohesion, government control of all legislative committee chairmanships,
no opposition control of an upper house, and single party majority government. Pow-
ell (2000) later argues for a simple dichotomy between majoritarian and proportional
electoral systems to distinguish high and low clarity countries. Other scholars have
added additional conditions to achieving clarity such as a unitary state (Anderson,
2006), the availability of alternative governments (Bengtsson, 2004), and presiden-
tialism (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008) to name a few.
Regardless of how the institutional constraints in the clarity of responsibility the-
ory are operationalized, the goal is to measure the control that a government–and
specifically the prime ministers’ party–has over the policies proposed and adopted by
the parliament. There is an underlying assumption that voters recognize this level
of control. Powell and Whitten (1993: 398, emphasis mine) argue that ”[t]he greater
the perceived unified control of policymaking by the incumbent government, the more
likely is the citizen to assign responsibility for economic and political outcomes to the
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incumbents,” while Duch and Stevenson (2008: 248) more recently argue that their,
“explanation for contextual variation in economic voting assumes that voters know
how much of the variation in random shocks to the economy is due to the competence
of the government rather than the influences of nonelectorally dependent exogenous
factors.” While politicians may help inform voters about how political responsibility
is divided (see Grafström and Salmond, 2010; Powell and Whitten, 1993), the onus re-
mains on voters to comprehend the institutional and political constraints incumbents
faced and judge their policy success or failure accordingly. This burden is likely to
be quite onerous for the average citizen. Surveys consistently show that most voters
know little about either the long-standing political institutions in their country (e.g.
Galston, 2001; McAllister, 1998) or the changing configurations of power within those
institutions (e.g. Duch and Stevenson, 2013).
However, many of the same features of a nation’s politics that grant a prime min-
ister significant power over the shape of policy are likely to also provide her with
substantial leeway over the timing of elections. Institutions that disperse policymak-
ing power within parliaments are likely to go along with other means of power-sharing
that constrain the prime minister’s ability and/or reduce her incentive to call elec-
tions when economic circumstances are favorable for her party alone. For example,
countries that distribute committee chairmanships proportionally across parties are
those in which no single party is likely to gain a majority of seats, that tend to engage
in corporatist or consociational politics, and often formally constrain the premier’s
legal right to unilaterally dissolve parliament (Strøm, 1990). Sweden, for instance, is
a country in which no single party tends to win an outright majority of votes, com-
mittee chairmanships are distributed proportionally across all parliamentary parties,
and it allows the prime minister to dissolve parliament early. However, an early elec-
tion in Sweden is considered an “extra” election that simply elects a new parliament
to fill the remainder of the current term; it does not reset the clock, reducing the
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incentive to return to the polls. The premier’s ability to extend her officeholding is
circumscribed in Sweden alongside rules that limit her capacity to uncompromisingly
implement her policy agenda. Further, governments that form in these countries rely
on the support of multiple parties, making the dissolution calculus more complex, as
an early election may result in the formation of a less preferred government in the
subsequent parliament. More generally, when power is dispersed among a number of
parties, numerous avenues for non-prime ministerial parties to influence policy tend
to develop that restrict the autonomy of the head of government (Strøm, 1990). In
these systems, the prime minister’s autonomy to call elections is often restricted by
other rules such as a requirement for the full cabinet to agree to a dissolution, the
approval of a partisan head of state, or for the parliament to vote in favor of new
elections.
The incentives to call early elections are likewise smaller for prime ministers in
these systems, as the benefits of office are reduced by the need to gain the support of
other parties for proposed policies in both present and expected future governments.
The strengthening of one’s own hand in parliamentary negotiations may come at the
expense of partners with whom one may want to work with, resulting in worse policy
outcomes (Tsebelis, 2002). Likewise, countries in which the prime minister’s party
is able to implement its policy agenda in a relatively unobstructed manner also tend
to allot the prime minister the right to call elections unilaterally. Kayser’s (2006)
categorization of countries with “premier timing” of elections–countries where the
prime minister has significant power to call elections at will–is composed largely of
countries that tend to have high levels of institutional clarity in the three tiered scale
as defined in Whitten and Palmer (1999). Further, one would expect that, where
prime ministers can readily implement their policy agendas, that agenda would likely
include the ability to strategically time elections. While the opposition would resent
this government power while outside the cabinet, they are unlikely to change it once
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they are the ones controlling the prime ministership.
This confluence of powers leads to an alternative avenue through which politi-
cal institutions produce differing patterns of economic voting over time and across
countries. The opportunistic election timing literature posits that prime ministers
“surf” the economy, calling elections when the economy is near a peak, in an effort to
“ride” the economic vote to reelection. These elections are considered opportunistic
because voters are assumed respond merely to the state of the economy, allowing
politicians to strategically time elections to align with this behavioral pattern of vot-
ers. If prime ministers call elections when they expect to retain office, and if strong
economic performance improves their chances of retaining office, then their decisions
to call elections will be a function of the economy’s performance (Balke, 1990; Cargill
and Hutchinson, 1991; Chowdhury, 1993; Ito, 1990; Kayser, 2005, 2006; Palmer and
Whitten, 2000; Smith, 2003; Warwick, 1994). However, their ability to do so will
depend on the constraints they face both in parliament and the cabinet.
Kayser (2005) shows that economic booms are associated with early elections in
a cross-section of countries where the prime minister has sufficient capacity to deter-
mine election timing more or less unilaterally. This capacity, however, is quite varied
across parliamentary countries. Further, while showing that economic expansions are
associated with early elections in countries that tend to have what Kayser terms “pre-
mier timing systems,” he does not go so far as to show that these elections are more
likely to result in incumbent victories, nor the degree to which the economy produces
this effect on incumbent success. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) document how
the rules governing the ease with which early elections can be called by particular
political actors vary significantly, and that these different institutions have a signifi-
cant impact on the ways that elections occur. In many parliamentary countries the
prime minister is constitutionally constrained in the calling of elections or lacks this
power altogether, with parliamentary dissolution lying with the head of state or the
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parliament itself.
Prime ministers are not the only actors with an interest in the timing of elections
though: they are simply the most studied. Certainly prime ministers will generally
be best placed both in terms of formal institutions and political power (since the
prime minister’s party often controls a plurality of parliamentary seats). However,
in some contexts where prime ministers are constrained, other parties may be em-
powered to provoke early elections. These opposition-timed elections are confounded
with premier-timed elections in the endogenous election timing literature. To date,
the endogenous elections literature has considered the factors that precipitate early
elections in countries such as Japan (Ito, 1990), India (Chowdhury, 1993), and the UK
(Smith, 2004) where the prime minister has significant power to unilaterally call elec-
tions at any point. Other configurations of power in parliamentary systems, however,
can both limit the prime minister’s leeway to determine election timing and increase
other parties’ abilities to force elections when their prospects of entering government
are high. For instance, a partisan president with the power to dissolve parliament
unilaterally would provide a point of access to election timing that non-prime minis-
terial parties could use to promote their own partisan interests during cohabitation.
In addition, minority governments face the prospect of an opposition that unites to
dissolve parliament and bring one or more opposition parties into power. Once again,
an expectation of economic voting is likely to inform the calculations of staging an
opposition-timed election.
Many of the factors listed above that empower prime ministers or opposition
parties have been used as measures of institutional clarity in the economic voting
literature (e.g., minority government, coalition, presidency). Clarity of responsibility,
therefore, may be acting as a proxy for other institutions that affect the strategic
behavior of politicians in deciding when to dissolve parliament. If the decision to
hold early parliamentary elections is a function of economic performance as assumed
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in the endogenous election timing literature, then the use of clarity of responsibility–
which is theoretically correlated with variables that affect the capacity and incentive
for different parties to call early elections–could be producing omitted variable bias
in estimates of the magnitude of the economic vote. When a prime minister has the
greatest control over when elections are called they will likely call them when the
economy is performing well; when a prime minister lacks this tool elections may be
held in a mix of good and bad economies. Furthermore, when the prime minister’s
control is reduced other actors may be empowered. Leaders of multiparty and mi-
nority governments are more susceptible to losing parliament’s confidence than their
single party and majority counterparts, and are therefore more likely to face early
elections held at inopportune moments. Other partisan actors are likely to have in-
terests and incentives that run counter to those of the prime minister, preferring
elections be held during downtimes as their own governing prospects rise when those
of the prime minister fall.3
If control over election timing and control over other policy levers are correlated,
then this implies that politicians, not simply voters, ought to be a central focus of the
economic voting literature. Politicians are constrained and empowered by different
sets of institutions, norms, and parliamentary strengths in their pursuit of office and
policy. Those who are least constrained in achieving their policy goals are likely to be
similarly unconstrained in pursuing office through the strategic timing of elections.
Existing parliamentary rules reflect the relative power of different groups in society to
advance their interests over time. Where multiple groups compete for power and none
is likely to predominate, power-sharing institutions develop to help address conflict
(e.g., Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998; Hallerberg, 2002). When parties other than that
3Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms “opposition parties” and “other partisan actors”
interchangeably. The theory presented here makes the case that all parties aside from the prime
minister’s party, including junior coalition partners, have electoral incentives that may diverge sig-
nificantly from those of the prime minister and ought to be thought of as potential members of an
opposition.
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the prime minister are involved in policymaking, they are likely to also create rules
that protect themselves from the electoral opportunism of a prime minister by creating
rules or norms that require broader agreement before parliament can be dissolved.
The coevolution of rules governing how legislation is drafted and overseen by non-
prime ministerial parties with those establishing the purview of the prime minister
herself are likely to lead to a positive correlation between the ease with which the
prime minister can implement her legislative agenda and her capacity to unilaterally
call elections.
To my knowledge Samuels and Hellwig (2010) are the only scholars who have
started down this route of considering how the type of election might affect the degree
of democratic accountability and economic voting in elections. Samuels and Hellwig
divide elections into three types: those held at the end of the mandated electoral
period for the parliament, those held early by the prime minister, and those that
are held early for some other reason. They find that the economic vote’s strength
varies across election types and levels of clarity of responsibility within those different
election types. Both end-of-term and early elections that are not called by the prime
minister have strong economic votes, while those early elections called by the prime
minister experience little economic voting. However, their empirical model does not
address the endogeneity of expected election outcomes and economic performance.
Instead they present this evidence through the lens of clarity of responsibility driving
election outcomes independent of its relationship to the capacity to time elections.
This important work provides a starting point for the examination of whether
and how election timing affects election outcomes and the relationship of both to
economic performance. The economic vote does seem to differ based on how elections
come about. Both Smith (2003, 2004) and Samuels and Hellwig (2010) indicate
that economic voting may be weaker in elections called by prime ministers than in
elections arrived at by other paths. Prime ministers are expected to call early elections
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when the economy is performing well, providing at least two explanations for why the
economy would have a lesser impact on election outcomes. These elections could serve
as a signal of expected near-term economic deterioration by the government (Smith,
2003, 2004), or it could be that voters’ tendencies to focus attention on problems
rather than successes makes the economy less salient during premier-timed elections
(Kahneman and Tverski, 1979). Because Smith and Samuels and Hellwig largely
focus on how the economy and institutions matter on the prime minister’s path, the
other paths to election are left largely unexplored. We now turn to the questions of
precisely how the economy affects when elections are called, by whom, and what their
ultimate effect is on incumbent reelection.
2.2 Elections as context in economic voting
Despite the literature on opportunistic election timing, scholars of economic voting
have not fully considered the implications of non-fixed election dates on how the
economic vote functions. One reason this contingency has not been fully considered in
the economic voting literature is that it is not obvious why reaching an election via one
path rather than another would lead to a different relationship between the economy
and that election’s outcome. Much of the opportunistic election timing examines
when elections are called, but does not investigate how they end. Smith (2004)
argues early elections called by the prime minister during economic peaks provide
information to voters about future economic downturns, moderating the economy’s
effects in early elections in the UK. Samuels and Hellwig (2010) find that economic
performance has little effect on vote or seat share, regardless of clarity of responsibility,
when incumbents opportunistically call elections, and has a negative effect on their
retention when clarity of responsibility is highest.
This small body of work indicates that how elections occur matters for the effects
of the economy on those elections’ outcomes, but still do not consider the full set of
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potential pathways to elections. When there are multiple routes to elections rather
than a single path, the road chosen can provide researchers with clues about the vary-
ing importance of the economy in, and the expectations of politicians for, electoral
outcomes. Instead of examining how voters view the economy through the lens of
political institutions, I assume that politicians are weighing the expected response of
voters to current economic stimuli in light of the constraints they face to opportunisti-
cally calling elections. In most parliamentary countries there are three potential ways
to arrive at an election: elections can be held because the constitutionally mandated
expiry of the parliamentis reached, the prime minister has called for new elections, or
the premature dissolution of parliament is brought about by the opposition. I take
as a starting point that each of these types of elections is initiated under different
general economic circumstances, potentially different institutional configurations, and
with different expectations about the incumbent prime minister’s fate.
To begin, assume that all parties are interested in maximizing their likelihood of
entering government. To the extent that winning more votes improves the chances of
entering government, parties are vote share maximizers (or vote share loss minimiz-
ers). While additional benefits to increased vote share likely exist (e.g., the claim of
a popular mandate), the ability to enter government and implement preferred poli-
cies is assumed to be the primary goal of political parties, making vote share only
incidental to this more fundamental goal. Further, assume that politicians believe
that a proportion of voters are likely to reward incumbents when the economy is
performing well and to punish them when the economy is struggling. While voters
may rely more on the economy in their evaluations of incumbents during downturns
than during upswings, the economy still provides a powerful heuristic for voters at
any election and is an important driver of changes in support at both the individual
and aggregate levels (Bloom and Price, 1975; Kiewiet and Kinder, 1979). Thus the
prime minister and her party want elections to occur during economic booms, while
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opponents would prefer elections be held during downturns in order to capture some
defectors. Due to their desire to retain preeminence in government, premiers will at-
tempt to not only time elections to coincide with economic upswings, but also to wait
as long as possible within their current term before dissolving parliament in order to
maximize their hold on power (Balke, 1990; Smith, 2004). This desire to hold gov-
ernment power, however, ensures that parties outside government are less concerned
about when in a parliamentary term elections occur, because an early election held
at any time that improves their chances of being in power is preferred to their cur-
rent marginalized status. Thus, opposition parties prefer elections be held during an
economic downturn, regardless of when during the term they occur. Junior coalition
partners hold an intermediate position: while they would like to maintain their posi-
tion in government, they likely have to support more policies that they dislike than
the senior partner (potentially harming their future electoral prospects). If they are
linked in voters minds to an unpopular government, then they have little to gain by
remaining in the coalition and so may improve their chances of staying in power by
defecting from their coalition in order to join a new post-election government, even if
this is costly in the short-term.
In order for early elections to occur a government must end and no other viable
government must be able to form. Governments end in part due to perturbations of
the environment in which parties bargain for policies, cabinet positions, and other
benefits of office (Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber, 1986; Diermeier and Stevenson,
2000; King et al., 1990; Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Warwick, 1992). Though the institu-
tions and partisan compositions in parliament are unlikely to change much during a
term, exogenous shocks to the larger political environment can alter incentives such
that parties’ preferences realign with respect to the value of the current government
and the current parliament (Lupia and Strøm, 1995). There are many possible shocks,
such as ministerial scandals (Dewan and Myatt, 2007) or policy failures (Huber and
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McCarty, 2001), but shocks to the economy are the focus of this dissertation. These
shocks can be either positive or negative, are both relatively common, and have broad
implications for voters. Fluctuations in the business cycle provide economic shocks
that can alter voters’ expectations about their futures, increasing or decreasing per-
ceived risk and associated anxiety, and providing a potential incentive to find someone
to blame for bad outcomes (Haller and Norpoth, 1997; Kahneman and Tverski, 1979;
Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). These shocks can also alter the set of feasible poli-
cies, as tax receipts alter the need for governments to tighten belts or allow them to
engage in largesse, leading governments to change the policies they implement. To
the extent that other non-economic shocks are motivating election timing and results,
the estimated effects of the economy on elections ought to limit out ability to detect
the expected effects, making any statistically significant results in favor of the theory
presented here more compelling. When economic performance exceeds or falls below
expectations, this alters incentives for all actors to bring about early elections. It is
the confluence of these incentives with the institutional capacities to act that pro-
duces the patterns of election types observed in Chapters III and IV. I argue that it
is through the timing of elections by partisan actors that the economic vote has its
most substantial effect.
While these preferences over the timing of elections, based on the business cycle,
for those in and out of power, are relatively constant, the capacity of parties to force
elections at their preferred moments differ both across countries and over time. Elec-
tion timing is therefore a function of both (a) the incentive for an actor to call an
early election and (b) their capacity to do so. As discussed in Section 2.1, the rules
governing how parliaments end can vary significantly across countries. Constitutions
determine who has the legal right to dissolve parliament, while variance in traditions
and norms may well lead to divergent costs for early dissolution to various actors.
Countries such as Norway, Switzerland, and the US do not have a procedure for the
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early dissolution of their legislatures, while, until 2011, the British prime minister
could easily dissolve parliament by her sole accord.4 Other countries’ laws and cus-
toms dictate that still other actors be involved in the decision to dissolve parliament,
enhancing or inhibiting the capacities of partisan actors to further their electoral goals
through election timing.
There are two general manners in which parliaments are dissolved early: either
by the executive or through the executive’s loss of parliamentary confidence. The
executive–be it in the form of the prime minister, the cabinet, or a directly elected
president–has the legal capacity to dissolve parliament and bring about early elections
in most parliamentary countries. When a single actor has the legal right to dissolve
parliament unilaterally, then we ought to see that actor bringing about early disso-
lutions more regularly when the economy provides favorable electoral circumstances.
5
Hypothesis 1. Countries in which a single partisan actor can unilaterally dissolve
parliament will have a higher likelihood of early elections than countries in which no
single actor has such unilateral power.
Unlike elections called by a single partisan actor, those that occur due to the
government’s loss of parliamentary confidence require the assent of multiple actors
with distinct, and often competing, interests. When multiple actors must agree to an
4The Fixed-term Parliaments Act of 2011 decreed a fixed election calendar every five years for the
UK’s national parliament as part of the Conservative-Liberal coalition agreement. Under the Act,
parliament is dissolved 17 (25 following the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013)
days prior to the end of the parliament’s five-year term unless there is a vote of no confidence in the
government or a two-thirds majority of the House of Commons votes in favor of an early general
election. However, due to the flexible nature of the British constitution, any future single-party
majority governments could retract this law so as to have the option of ending the parliamentary
term early.
5For the purposes of this study a single actor is any unified partisan actor. That is, any single po-
litical party or individual person representing that political party. It is assumed that the preferences
of individual party leaders reflect the interests of their larger organizations. While, for instance, the
preferences of a president may diverge somewhat from his colleagues in parliament, their preferences
are likely to be more similar to one another than they are to other parties.
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early dissolution of parliament, timing becomes more difficult. If multiple parties are
required to agree to dissolution, then they must jointly determine that the benefits
of an election today exceed the net benefits of continuing the current parliament
(Lupia and Strøm, 1995). Multiple actors may need to assent to dissolve when the
constitution requires that the full cabinet agree to early elections, a majority of the
parliament itself must vote on its dissolution, or in cases of the cabinet’s loss of
parliamentary confidence. These instances of coordinated dissolution do not require
that all parties expect their vote share to improve, but that their chances to hold office,
and the value of that office, are better under an election today than one further down
the line. When continuing the current parliament is likely to harm future electoral
and governmental prospects more than taking a beating in the polls today, parties
may be willing to align with others against their own short-term interests. This
may be why, for instance, junior coalition partners are sometimes willing to leave
a government and join with opposition parties to bring down a prime minister and
force an early election. External forces, such as economic downturns, may produce the
incentives necessary to bring down a sitting prime minister. While the argument that
economic hardship is likely to strain coalition governments is not new (e.g., Bernhard
and Leblang, 2008; Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber, 1986; Diermeier and Stevenson,
2000; Warwick, 1992), the logic that these downturns lead junior coalition members
to seek an early return to the polls in order to maximize their time in office is.
When these external forces are likely to persist regardless of who sits in the cabinet,
there may be little incentive for those in the opposition to rule over the attenuated
remainder of the parliament as the new governing parties become associated with
these problems in the minds of voters, harming the incumbent’s long-term capacity to
rule. Because economic indicators such as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment
are all relatively sticky, negative economic shocks are likely to be persistent. In these
situations, parties may prefer to go to the polls in order to secure a full parliamentary
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term, during which time the outside forces may either subside on their own or the
new government’s policies will have sufficient time to run their course and economic
improvements be observed by voters. Whether then by design or accident, persistent
negative shocks are likely to produce opposition-timed early elections, an outcome
unexplored in the literature.
The assumptions above lead us to a set of expectations for both the conditions
under which we ought to see different types of elections held and their results. First,
consider elections held before the end of the parliament’s term at the request of the
prime minister or a co-partisan president (premier-timed elections). Because early
elections involve a tradeoff between the value of continuing to rule with the possibility
of another full term if the gamble pays off and losing the remainder of the current term
in office, prime ministers will call elections at their last best opportunity (Balke, 1990;
Heckelman and Berument, 1998; Ito, 1990; Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Warwick, 1994).
While they want to hold onto power as long as possible, if they cannot reasonably
expect another opportunity as good as the current moment to arise and the value
of the current parliament is less than their expected value of the next parliament
that results from an election today, then they will call a snap election. If, as theories
of economic voting suggest, voters will reward governments when the economy is
performing well, the prime minister has an incentive to call an early election when
the economy is performing well, particularly as the end of the parliament’s term
nears. We should therefore expect premier-timed elections to be called toward the
end of a parliamentary term, during an economic upswing, when prime ministers (or
a presidential co-partisan) has the legal power to dissolve parliament unilaterally.
Hypothesis 2. When prime ministers (or co-partisan presidents) have the sole power
to dissolve parliament, they will do so when the economy is performing well.
Hypothesis 3. Early elections called by the prime minister (or a co-partisan president)
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are more likely to return the prime minister’s party to government than other types
of elections.
Early elections that are brought about due to the actions of parties other than
that of the prime minister, what I define as opposition-timed elections, are likely to
occur under very different circumstances. Opposition parties’ control of a presidency,
a majority of seats in parliament, or their ability to peel off members of the current
government provide them with the capacity to call early elections.6 Because continu-
ing the current parliamentary term has little value for those outside the government,
and potentially less for junior members of the government than for the prime minis-
ter’s party, opposition-timed elections may occur at any point in the term when there
is economic incentive to bring them about. Voters’ tendency to consider the economy
retrospectively and with significant lag, however, means that opposition parties’ in-
centives may lead them to wait until the economy is in the doldrums for quite some
time before foisting elections on a faltering government to ensure that voters are able
to observe the downturn. By waiting until the economy has been in a downturn
for several fiscal quarters, opposition parties have a larger pool of disaffected voters
to capture and have less of the negative shock remaining in their subsequent term,
increasing the length of their rule (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2003; Gelman and
King, 1993). This route to early elections, however, has not been explored signifi-
cantly in the literature on election timing, nor its implications for the outcomes of
those elections tested. Opposition-timed elections are therefore more likely to be held
during an economic downturn when opposition parties have the institutional capac-
ity to dissolve parliament either unilaterally (e.g., during cohabitation) or through a
6Presidency for the purposes of this dissertation is defined as a directly-elected head of state.
In semi-presidential systems, a dual executive composed of the independently elected president
and the prime minister, elected by the parliament, share power. The president’s term cannot end
prematurely, but the parliament’s, and thereby the prime minister’s, can. Because the president’s
term is fixed, the parliament can be dissolved by the president to ensure that the government is able
to function when there is disagreement between the two parts of the executive.
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parliamentary vote of no-confidence.
Hypothesis 4. When actors other than the prime minister bring about the early dis-
solution of parliament, they do so when the economy is performing poorly.
Hypothesis 5. Early elections called by the opposition are less likely to return the
incumbent prime minister’s party to government than other types of elections.
Finally, consider elections held at the end of the parliamentary term. At first
glance, we would expect these elections to be the most like fixed-term elections gen-
erally assumed in the economic voting literature–they are held at the very end of
a parliamentary term just like all elections in the US or Norway. However, unlike
fixed-term elections, the occurrence of an end-of-term election is the result of ear-
lier strategic choices by various parliamentary actors. Since politicians in fixed-term
systems know precisely when they will next face the electorate, they are unable to
capitalize off of windfalls throughout their terms to the extent that politicians in par-
liamentary systems are able. End-of-term elections that occur in systems where there
is the possibility of earlier ones are conceptually different from those held at the end
of a fixed-term because all actors who could precipitate an early election chose not
to do so. These elections held at the end of a parliament’s mandate could be arrived
at along multiple avenues. An end-of-term election could indicate that there were no
sufficiently good opportunities for an election earlier in the term, that earlier oppor-
tunities were missed, or that no actor had the capacity to bring about an election.
For instance, the protracted economic downturn engulfing much of Europe since 2008
have both left incumbent electoral prospects in the gutter, and simultaneously made
the short-run value of ruling unclear for opposition parties. Incumbent governments
have little reason to enter the opposition early with an anticipated loss of power;
the opposition has little incentive to start their term when there is little prospect of
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noticeable turnaround in the medium-run. If opposition parties wait, they may still
gain power after a short while, but be able to claim credit for an eventual economic
turnaround under their watch, extending their hold on power even longer than if
they took the cabinet right away. In this circumstance both benefit by allowing the
parliament to run its full course.
The other side of that coin would be a parliament in power during a strong eco-
nomic upturn. It could be that the economy’s upswing had propelled the incumbent’s
support high enough that the opposition could not expect significant gains (and per-
haps some losses) from an early election. The prime minister, likewise secure in her
knowledge that she is likely to retain support in any election during the remainder
of the term, has little incentive to risk cutting her tenure in office short by returning
early to the polls. Over the near-term, particularly for a premier whose parliament
has lasted into the final months of its mandate, little is likely to change so as to alter
those electoral expectations, reducing any benefit of going early for either side.
Elections held at the end of the parliament’s term could also indicate that the
government simply missed a good opportunity for an election earlier in the term.
Expected booms may fail to materialize later in a term, or politicians may misjudge
current strengths, leading them to regret not going to the voters earlier. Because
there is generally little to be gained from returning to the polls immediately after
the last election, economic shocks need to be much larger in the beginning of a
term to precipitate an election than are necessary later in the term (Balke, 1990).
This question of timing within a parliamentary term is particularly important for
prime ministers in their decision to head to the polls early or not. As discussed
above, opposition parties have little to lose from forcing an election at any point
in the term if they can reasonably expect to enter government as a result. Prime
ministers, however, give up the remainder of their term.7 Due to the greater variety
7E.g., economic performance may unexpectedly decline and fail to recover during the remainder
of the term. In this case, the prime minister may have preferred to call elections before the downturn
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of circumstances that can produce end-of-term elections, the expected covariances
between economic performance and election outcomes ought to be smaller than for
either type of early election.
Furthermore, constitutional rules and arrangements of political power within par-
liaments and cabinets may simply make capitalizing on a strong economy too difficult
for any (set of) political actor(s). When forcing early elections is particularly diffi-
cult or costly, elections are likely to occur at the end of the term. We should then
expect some end-of-term elections to fall in good economic times and others in bad.
Thus, an end-of-term election is unlikely to be correlated with economic performance,
but the fact that the election falls at that moment is due to earlier expectations of
electoral outcomes and decisions not to dissolve parliament. Because of the mixed
state of the economy and our inability to discern between the multiple reasons for
observing an end-of-term election, these elections should be no more likely to return
the incumbent to power than to install a new prime minister. The economy’s effect
should be positive, with stronger economic performance aiding an incumbent, while
an anemic economy should result in a loss of electoral and parliamentary support for
the incumbent.
Hypothesis 6. There is no relationship between economic performance and the occur-
rence of end-of-term elections.
Hypothesis 7. End-of-term elections are no more likely to return the incumbent than
to install a new prime minister.
Table 2.1 lists the seven major hypotheses drawn from the theory described here
in terms of their and independent variables, and the expected direction of the rela-
tionship. These hypotheses are related to both average differences in the state of the
had they known what was coming. UK’s Labour under Gordon Brown (2007-2010) would likely fall
in this category.
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Table 2.1: Hypotheses for the relationship between institutions, economic perfor-
mance, types of elections, and election outcomes
Dependent variable Independent variable Direction of ef-
fect
H1: Occurrence of early elections Number of actors with power to
dissolve
Negative
H2: Premier-timed elections Economic performance Positive
H3: Prime ministerial retention Premier-timed elections Positive
H4: Opposition-timed elections Economic performance Negative
H5: Prime ministerial retention Opposition-timed elections Negative
H6: End-of-term elections Economic performance Null
H7: Prime ministerial retention End-of-term elections Null
economy in the run-up to each type of election and differences in the implications
of the economy for incumbent retention. The theory of politician-centered economic
voting laid out above moves the focus away from the measure of vote share to the
question of who governs. I argue that the economy’s main effects on who rules is
through its effects on who calls elections and when: once the type of election is
accounted for, the economy has little additional direct effect on the incumbent’s like-
lihood of retaining the office of the prime minister in early elections. Because strategic
politicians can generally assume that there will be some positive relationship between
the state of the economy and their electoral prospects, their ability to time elections
to coincide with these upturns will be the main avenue through which the economy
affects election outcomes in early elections. This is described in Hypothesis 8.
Hypothesis 8. The economy’s effect on incumbent retention in early elections is through
its effects on the timing of elections.
By considering the specific institutions that empower partisans to choose when
they face voters and their economic incentives to do so, we can better understand
how the economy affects democratic accountability. A precursor to doing this is
establishing a relationship between existing measures of institutional constraints and
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the types of elections held under those institutions, to which I now turn.
2.3 Descriptive statistics of clarity of responsibility and elec-
tion types
In Section 2.1 I argued that measures such as clarity of responsibility are theo-
retically related to the types of institutions that make it easier or more difficult for
strategic politicians to time elections based on economic performance. In this section,
I show that this theoretical relationship is borne out in the data.
Table 2.2 divides countries by their average level of clarity of responsibility as
defined by Whitten and Palmer (1999) and lists the number of elections held in
each country categorized into four election types. The three major types of elec-
tions described in Section 2.2 account for the bulk of observations: end-of-term elec-
tions, premier-timed elections, and opposition-timed elections. As described in much
greater detail in Chapter 3, end-of-term elections are those elections held within the
final three months of a parliament’s constitutional interelectoral period (i.e., within
three months of the absolute latest date they could be held); while premier- and
opposition-timed elections are those held more than 3 months prior to the end of the
parliament’s maximal term and called by the prime minister or opposition parties,
respectively. Finally, I have a group of “other” early elections: elections held early for
some constitutional or apparently non-political reason. For example, Sweden’s 1970
parliamentary election was held early in order to elect a parliament to the newly uni-
cameral Riksdag. The countries included are advanced industrialized parliamentary
democracies where early elections are possible from 1967 through 2010.8 See Chapter
3 for full details of sources, methodology, and the code assigned to each observation.
Due to the relationship between clarity of responsibility and the institutions that
empower some actors to initiate early elections over others, we should expect differ-
8Or second democratic election in the cases of Greece, Portugal, and Spain
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Table 2.2: List of countries and observed election types
Country No. Elections End-of-term Premier-timed Opposition-timed Early other
High Clarity
Australia 15 7 7 1 0
Finland† 11 8 0 2 1
France† 11 6 3 2 0
Greece 11 3 6 0 2
Ireland 11 3 5 3 0
Japan 13 2 8 2 1
Spain 8 3 3 2 0
UK 11 3 7 1 0
Total 91 35 (38%) 39 (43%) 13 (14%) 4 (4%)
Middle Clarity
Austria† 13 7 3 3 0
Belgium 13 5 4 2 2
Canada 12 4 5 3 0
Italy 10 3 3 4 0
Netherlands 13 7 1 5 0
New Zealand 14 12 2 0 0
Portugal† 11 4 3 3 1
Total 86 42 (49%) 21 (24%) 20 (23%) 3 (3%)
Low Clarity
Denmark 15 1 13 1 0
Germany 10 7 2 0 1
Luxembourg 8 8 0 0 0
Sweden 12 11 0 0 1
Total 45 27 (60%) 15 (33%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%)
Grand Total 222 104 (47%) 75 (34%) 34 (15%) 9 (4%)
† Semi-presidential countries where the president has (had) either sole prerogative or
needed to consent to calling early elections.
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ences in the types of elections held in countries at different average levels of clarity
of responsibility. Due to the coevolution of institutions, countries with high levels of
clarity of responsibility ought generally to have mechanisms that allow a single par-
tisan actor to time elections that coincide with opportune economic circumstances
and, thereby, more strategic early elections. In particular, prime ministers are likely
to be empowered to dissolve parliaments with relative ease in these countries, lead-
ing to more premier-timed elections. High clarity countries with semi-presidential
systems may also have more opposition-timed elections in which presidents who are
contra-partisans to the prime minister call elections to gain a supportive parliamen-
tary majority. Systems that produce middle levels of clarity may have both mod-
erately constrained premiers and empowered oppositions in parliament, producing
both premier- and opposition-timed elections. Finally, countries with very low levels
of clarity of responsibility are likely to have institutions that make early dissolutions
exceedingly difficult and thereby rare. Because governments and opposition parties
are highly constrained in the policymaking process, generally requiring significant
coalition building in and out of the cabinet, there is little expectation that there
would be easy levers at hand for any actor to bring about early elections, meaning
most parliaments reach their full mandates. While there are clear expectations about
the relationship between general levels of clarity of responsibility and the distribution
of election types, this is not a monotonic relationship. While we expect high clarity
countries to have the most premier-timed elections, middle clarity countries to have
fewer, and low clarity countries to have the least, we expect opposition-timed elec-
tions to peak in middle clarity countries and there to be exceedingly few in either
high or low clarity contexts.
Table 2.2 lists the total number of elections in each country as well as how these
elections came about. The first bloc shows that in countries with generally high clarity
of responsibility, the plurality of elections are premier-timed (43%), in line with our
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expectations about the relationship between clarity of responsibility and the ability of
actors to unilaterally dissolve parliaments. Nearly as many elections occur at the end
of the parliament’s term (38%), while very few result from opposition timing (14%)–
only a third the number of premier-timed elections. Only four percent of elections in
high clarity of responsibility countries are held early for other, non-strategic reasons.
This pattern is in line with expectations above relating the institutions that largely
determine clarity of responsibility to the ability of prime ministers to indulge in
their desire to call elections at opportune moments, and the relative powerlessness of
opposition parties to bring about early elections in these countries.
The second bloc shows the distribution of election types across middle-clarity
countries. End-of-term elections are the most common, accounting for approximately
49% of all elections in this group. The proportion of premier-timed elections (24%) is
nearly identical to the proportion of opposition-timed elections (23%). Moreover, the
lion’s share of all opposition-timed elections are held in middle clarity countries where
multiple actors may be empowered to call elections, as predicted above. 20 of the 34
opposition timed elections in the sample were held in middle clarity countries. Only
three percent of elections in middle-clarity countries were held early for other/non-
strategic reasons. Once again, the pattern of elections in countries with middle levels
of clarity, in which power is shared between both opposition and premier parties, is
in line with the expectations given above.
The final bloc shows the distribution of election types in low-clarity countries.
In low-clarity countries sixty percent of all elections are held at the end of the par-
liament’s term. Another thirty percent of elections in countries with generally low
clarity of responsibility were initiated by the premier. However, nearly all of the
premier-timed elections in the low clarity group were called in Denmark, where the
prime minister has the sole prerogative to call elections (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones,
2009), even though the prime minister otherwise faces a relatively fractionalized par-
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liament where committee chairmanships are distributed proportionally across parties,
and the prime minister’s party often rules in minority or coalition governments. Only
one election (2%) was initiated by the opposition in this bloc, and two elections (4%)
were held early for other reasons. While the trend among low clarity of responsibility
countries is for elections to be held at the end of the parliament’s term as predicted,
the imperfect match between clarity of responsibility and the institutions that struc-
ture the choices politicians have available for initiating elections make its use for
considering the economic vote through the lens of strategic politicians potentially
inappropriate.
Table 2.2 suggests that the differing capacities of governments and oppositions to
enhance their electoral prospects by calling elections at opportune moments is related
to measures of clarity of responsibility. However, this relationship is not one in which
increasing clarity from its lowest to highest levels has a uniform linear relationship
with each type of election. While a monotonic relationship is evident in end-of-term
elections, the non-linearity in opposition-timed elections, where the peak in elections
of this type is in the middle-clarity countries, has implications for the use of clarity of
responsibility to moderate estimates of the economic vote would affect our findings.
If election timing explains the variance in economic voting at the election level, then
this non-linearity in the relationship between election type and clarity of responsibility
could lead us to weak estimated economic voting effects. If this is the case, then the
use of economic performance to predict electoral success across these various kinds
of electoral contexts contains important sources of bias. However, the degree to
which institutional rules covering dissolution explains the patterns of dissolution can
be more directly examined using constitutional provisions and established norms in
these countries.
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) categorize which actors have constitutional
powers to dissolve (or block the dissolution of) parliament in a set of European democ-
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racies. The categories they lay out are for countries in which the prime minister has
the power to initiate parliamentary dissolution (Prime Minister Dissolution), the head
of state has the sole prerogative (Head of State Dissolution), countries where disso-
lution can only occur when there exists no feasible government that could obtain
parliamentary confidence (Constrained Dissolution), and a set of countries that fall
into none of these categories that I term “other means of dissolution”. While these
categories need not be mutually exclusive in theory, they are in practice. That is,
there are no constitutions in this dataset that give more than one actor the ability
to unilaterally dissolve parliament. Further, even when constitutions give a single
actor the ability to dissolve parliament at will, should that actor be unable to main-
tain parliamentary support, they would eventually be forced to return to the polls in
order to gain a mandate and effectively govern.
Table 2.3 draws on an expansion of the categorizations of constitutional rules
over parliamentary dissolution from Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) to include all
countries in the dissertation dataset included.9 Table 2.3 shows the distribution of
the types of elections described above across dissolution rules. The first column shows
that end-of-term elections are the most common type of election in all countries other
than those in which the prime minister can unilaterally dissolve parliament. Only
in countries where the prime minister has the sole right to call elections are end-
of-term elections not the most common; nor do end-of-term elections account for
the majority of elections in either countries where the prime minister or the head of
state can unilaterally call elections. It is end-of-term elections that most scholars of
economic voting seem to have in mind when examining the relationship between the
economy and election results. However, when either the prime minister or head of
state have the right to call early elections they do so with nearly equal (or in the case
of prime ministerial control of dissolution, greater) frequency as they wait until the
9This data comes from the first three columns of Table 1 in Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009).
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Table 2.3: Who Can Unilaterally Call Elections and Election Types
End-of-term Premier-timed Opposition-timed Early other
Head of State Dissolution 17 10 11 2
Prime Minister Dissolution 43 55 13 4
Constrained Dissolution 7 2 0 1
Other Means of Dissolution 37 8 10 2
Total 104 75 34 9
end of the term.
Unsurprisingly, premier-timed elections are the most common in countries where
the prime minister can unilaterally dissolve parliament. While prime ministers often
choose to allow parliament to carry out its full term in office when they have the power
to dissolve early, they still are twenty percent more likely to call an early election than
to last their full mandate.
When a head of state can unilaterally dissolve parliament early elections are nearly
evenly split between premier- and opposition-timed elections. This reflects the po-
tential for presidents to be of the same party of either the majority or minority in
the parliament: when the president is the government’s co-partisan, an early election
is considered premier-timed; a president aligned with an opposition party’s decision
to dissolve parliament is considered opposition-timed. Finally, the only country with
constrained parliamentary dissolution in this dataset is Germany, where the majority
of elections have been held at the end of the parliamentary term. Through the rest
of the dissertation, this category is combined with the Other Means of Dissolution
category.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 both suggest that institutions matter in determining how parlia-
ments expire. They also indicate that traditional measures of clarity of responsibility
are correlated with institutions that empower prime ministers and opposition parties
in the timing of elections, indicating that models using only clarity of responsibility
are suffering from omitted variable bias. The ability to go to the polls at will provides
some politicians the opportunity to improve their chances of holding power beyond
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what we might expect from simple economic voting models. While the relationship
between clarity of responsibility and the proportion of end-of-term, premier-timed,
and opposition-timed elections is clear, it is also clearly not linear. In particular,
moving from least to most clear institutional context does not result in anything
approaching a linearly decreasing proportion of premier-timed or opposition-timed
elections. If these elections are being called precisely because they are likely to result
in significantly different outcomes for incumbent prime ministers, this non-linearity
could result in statistically insignificant or even incorrectly signed coefficients for con-
textually dependent economic voting models, like those described in Chapter 1. The
patterns detected in Table 2.3, however, more strongly align with the theory presented
here.
2.4 Conclusion
There are considerable reasons to rethink the current use and interpretation of
institutional constraints on the study of the economic vote. The exclusive focus on
voters’ interactions with political institutions fails to incorporate how strategic politi-
cians use these institutions to promote particular types of economic voting as it suits
their needs. This chapter introduced a theory of endogenous economic voting. Politi-
cians observe the economy and the constraints that they face when calling elections.
Voters need not pay any attention to this strategic behavior, and instead they need
only respond to the economic stimuli they face in their daily lives when they enter
the ballot box. Anticipating a relatively unsophisticated electorate, politicians call
elections at moments they anticipate economic voting to best serve their office- and
policy-seeking goals to the extent feasible given the constraints they face. The institu-
tional factors that empower or constrain various parties are many of the same factors
used to explain variance in the economic vote in the clarity of responsibility theory
that assumes highly attentive, rational voters and helpless politicians. However, as
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seen in Table 2.2, if the theory presented here is correct, clarity of responsibility alone
would produce muddled and insignificant results such as those shown in Chapter 1.
The non-linear relationship between clarity of responsibility and the types of elec-
tions being called would mean that the linear models of increasing clarity producing
increased economic voting and, thereby, increased vote share for incumbent prime
ministers are likely to come up short.
The rest of the dissertation explores the implications of this theory. Before testing
the theory, however, Chapter 3 describes the election types data in greater detail. In
particular, it describes each of the cases included in the dissertation, definitions of
each election type category, and describes in greater depth many illustrative cases. It
also provides specifications of the empirically novel opposition-timed election category
developed in this dissertation. While the role of the opposition is described in the
theoretical and case studies literatures of coalition termination (e.g., Diermeier and
Stevenson, 2000; Lupia and Strøm, 1995), its role in election timing and outcomes
has not been broadly tested in the literature. The appendix of Chapter 3 contains
the coding and a brief vignette for every observation in the dataset.
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CHAPTER III
How Elections Happen: End-of-term and varieties
of early elections
Electoral swings are generally thought to be driven by economic performance in
developed democracies. However, the predictive strength of the economy’s effect on
election outcomes is generally weak, even after accounting for institutions that make
identifying the actor(s) who ought to be held accountable more or less difficult (see
Chapter 1). The previous chapter identified an explanation for the weakness of these
results: the incorrect assumption that the presence of an election is exogenous to
economic performance. In fact, the timing of elections is fungible in most highly
industrialized democracies. Evidence that economic performance predicts the timing
of elections across a number of these countries (see Kayser, 2005; Strøm and Swindle,
2002; Ito, 1990; Smith, 2004) undermines this common, implicit assumption about
the comparability of cases in much of the empirical work on economic voting at the
level of election outcomes.
Building on Chapter II and Lupia and Strøm (1995), this chapter identifies four
distinct ways that parliaments can end. Two of these types of elections ought to
be strategically similar: the first is through the expiry of the parliament’s maximal
constitutional term; the second is an election held before the maximal term but
called for reasons unrelated to who governs, such as constitutional changes or the
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death of the prime minister. The other two types of elections are called early, but
promulgated by different actors. Many are initiated by the prime minister in order
to retain her party’s dominance in government, while some are initiated by non-
prime ministerial parties. In the following section I describe how these elections are
identified. Section 3.2 describes each type of election in greater detail, showcasing
examples of each type of election. Section 3.3 describes some empirical regularities
between the constitutional and political arrangements that are associated with the
different types of elections. These observations inform the following chapters where
evidence that the economic means and political capacity to time elections drives
election outcomes is tested. Appendix C shows which type of election each observation
is coded as and a brief description of the basis for the coding.
3.1 The universe and categorization of elections
The universe of cases included in this dissertation are elections held between
19671 and 2010 in highly industrialized, parliamentary countries where parliament
can legally be dissolved before the full tenure has expired. The legal capacity to dis-
solve parliament before its maximal term is essential to the causal mechanism that
strategic politicians call elections at moments when the economy’s salience provides
them electoral benefit. Countries with set parliamentary terms, such as Norway, the
US, and Switzerland, are not appropriate for testing this theory.
The first step in categorizing observed elections is to determine whether the elec-
tion was held “on time” or “early.” Work on opportunistic election timing examines at
what point during a parliamentary term elections are called. While much of this work
considers time in a continuous fashion, the delineation between early and end-of-term
elections is blurred. Reid (1998) counts any election in the last year of a parliament
1Observations for Greece, Spain, and Portugal begin only in the second regular election after
their return to democracy.
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as an end-of-term election; Hellwig and Samuels (2008) consider only elections held in
the final three months of a parliament as being end-of-term; and Tavits and Schleiter
(2014) only consider elections held in the month prior to the maximum parliamen-
tary term to be end-of-term. This dissertation follows Hellwig and Samuels (2008) in
delineating “on-time” elections from early ones by considering any election held more
than 3 months prior to the maximal parliamentary term to be early and all others to
be end-of-term elections. Once all early elections are identified, how the early election
came about must be identified.
In order to determine how each election came about I read contemporaneous and
historical accounts of each early parliamentary dissolution.2 For each election at
least two sources were consulted. For nearly all dissolutions, Keesing’s World News
Archives and/or the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s PARLINE dataset were used to
identify the circumstances under which the early election was called. Many dissolu-
tions in the 19 countries in this sample since 1981 are covered by the journal Electoral
Studies , where national specialists give detailed descriptions of how the election came
about, what issues the campaign was fought on, and the election’s outcome. When
at least two of these sources were unavailable or there remained ambiguity in how
the election came about, other sources, such as national newspapers, books on the
country’s politics, or personal correspondence with national experts were used.
In most cases, who brought about the dissolution was relatively clear. For instance,
Margaret Thatcher’s 1983 dissolution of the British House of Commons was clearly a
decision made by Mrs. Thatcher and her Conservative Party – the party ruled alone
through it’s commanding 52% seat share and it is only on the advice of the prime
minister that the Queen dissolves parliament (see Section 3.3 below). However, there
are instances in which who brought the parliament to an early end is debatable. When
2Parliamentary dissolutions are the formal procedure for ending a parliament and bringing about
new elections in parliamentary countries. For a description of the circumstances under which par-
liaments can be dissolved, see Section 3.3 below.
72
a coalition agreement links the parliament’s term to the government’s tenure (as the
agreement between the SPÖ and the ÖVP in Austria following the 1994 election did),
does a junior coalition member’s decision to withdraw from the government constitute
an opposition or premier-timed election? Was there a reasonable policy concession
that could have been made to keep the government (and thereby the parliament)
running (as per Lupia and Strøm (1995))? Was the coalition agreement truly binding,
or could the prime minister’s party have continued on, ignoring its earlier promise?
These are ultimately questions of judgment and scholars could interpret these cases
differently. The appendix to this chapter lists every election coded for this project.
It provides the coding of each election and a very brief synopsis of the circumstances
surrounding each early election in this dataset to illustrate why it was assigned to a
particular category.
3.2 Election types
In this section, I describe the ways in which elections come about in the developed
democracies. While the modal election occurred because of the parliament was at (or
within three months) of its maximal length, most elections in parliamentary countries
are called early. Of those early elections, most are called by the country’s premier, but
nearly 30% are brought about by the opposition. Below, I describe what end-of-term,
premier-timed, opposition-timed, and other early elections look like and how these
election types might differ from one another in ways that affect our observations of
the economic vote.
3.2.1 End-of-term elections
End-of-term elections are elections of necessity. They are held when the consti-
tution mandates, anywhere from three to five years after a parliament’s election. In
some democracies, such as the United States, Norway, and Switzerland, elections are
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only held on these constitutionally mandated dates, with no possibility for premature
polling. Most parliamentary states, however, provide a maximal term length, while
allowing for early elections. These latter countries are the focus of this dissertation.
In countries where elections can be held at any time, nearly half (49%) of all elections
still occur in the last three months of the parliament’s term.
Below, the motivations and expectations that produce early dissolutions are ex-
amined. Power is assumed to be a motivating factor in the timing of parliamentary
dissolutions, with those who call an early election expected to fare well at the voting
booth. Does the observation of an end-of-term election provide us any similar insights
into the expected outcomes of these elections? Generally, one would conclude that it
does not.
End-of-term elections can signal any number of expectations for an election’s
outcome. Assuming that politicians are interested in maximizing their power, and
that their power is tied to their electoral success, then end-of-term elections can
indicate at least three expected outcomes for politicians with the capacity to call
early elections: they expect to lose regardless of when elections are called; they expect
to win regardless of when elections are called; or they are highly uncertain of their
electoral prospects and risk averse. If a premier3 is able to sustain a cabinet through
the end of the parliament’s term, this could indicate that the government is stable
and could have maintained parliamentary support well beyond the end of the term;
alternatively, it could have been in peril of falling any day, only just eking over the
finish line (Warwick, 1994). We thus know little about the value of the current
parliament to the premier based on the observation of an end-of-term election.
Furthermore, end-of-term elections could signal a premier who expects to handily
3For ease of explication, I refer only to the premier’s incentive to call early elections. Since, as
described below, premiers tend to have significantly more institutional power to time elections, and
they have been the focus of previous studies on election timing, I choose to maintain this language.
However, similar – though not identical – logic applies to opposition parties’ incentives to call early
elections rather than wait out the parliamentary term.
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win any election, or one that is quite certain her party will be on the outs after the
election. A premier who is quite certain that she will be returned to power by the
voters has no incentive to cut her term unnecessarily short by calling an early election.
Such a premier can maximize her hold on power by letting the parliamentary term run
its course and the presiding over the subsequent one. A premier who expects to see
her party turned out of office at an election has similarly little incentive to march to
her fate early. She will hold onto office until the last possible moment the constitution
allows before facing the voters. Social scientists, however, cannot distinguish between
these two types (or any intermediate type with a fair degree of uncertainty about their
chances at the polls) a priori through the observation of an end-of-term election. In
fact, end-of-term elections are nearly as likely to return the premier to office as they
are to turn her out: approximately 52% of end-of-term elections result in the prime
minister’s retention.
All countries in this dataset held end-of-term elections in the past forty years.
Some countries have rarely seen their parliaments fulfill their full mandate – only
one of the fifteen elections in Denmark since 1970 have occurred at the end of the
term. For many countries, however, end-of-term elections are the norm. Germany,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden all have many more end-of-term elections
than early elections. Section 3.3 discusses some of the institutional similarities that
reduce the incentive or capacity of premiers and opposition parties to end parliament
early.
3.2.2 Premier-timed early elections
Premier-timed elections are elections of choice. Premiers who call elections before
the end of their maximal term are giving up a relatively certain hold on power in
the near term for a potential extension of that power in the long term. Given this
tradeoff, a premier ought to call elections only when the value of the remainder of
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their current term is relatively low and the likelihood of winning a new election now
is relatively high, to hedge against the risk of loss (Lupia and Strøm, 1995). Premier-
timed elections are therefore expected to maximize the premier’s hold on power.
Premiers are generally synonymous with prime ministers in this dataset. In the
cases of semi-presidential systems,4 elections initiated by a president who is from the
same political party or bloc as the prime minister are considered premier-timed elec-
tions because their interests, though not identical, are highly aligned. The president
is assumed to prefer co-partisans ruling in parliament to any opposing party. Hence,
if the president calls an early election for the parliament while its party is leading the
cabinet, this is likely to be an effort to bolster his party’s power continued control of
parliament and, thereby, his own power.
Premier-timed elections are called by politicians who want to return the current
prime minister and/or her party to the preeminent position in government. While we
cannot directly observe these preferences (and premiers’ expectations do not always
come to fruition), we can observe the manner in which the early election comes about.
Premier-timed elections are those in which the election is held at least 3 months prior
to the parliamentary maximal term as prescribed by the constitution and in which
a premier calls for early elections while still able to maintain the confidence of the
current parliament.5 That is, the premier is still able to accomplish the day-to-day
tasks of governance (though perhaps not able to implement major policy proposals)
with the parliament and there is no apparent expectation of imminent confidence
4In this dataset, semi-presidential countries are Finland until 1990 and France, totaling 17 elec-
tions.
5There are some instances in which prime ministers lost confidence votes and yet were coded
as premier-timed elections. This is directly opposed to the definition of premier-timed elections.
In particular, two early elections in Germany resulted from lost votes of confidence. Both the
election in 1983 and the election in 2005 resulted from lost confidence votes engineered by the
Chancellor. Due to the impediments to early elections in place in the German constitution, it
takes a loss of confidence and the Bundestag’s inability to invest a new government that produces a
constitutional crisis necessitating a parliamentary dissolution. Chancellors Kohl and Schröder both
instructed members of their own party to abstain from a confidence vote and subsequently vote
against alternative governments in order to go to the polls early (Helms, 2007; Kaase, 1983)
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votes being held or lost.
The question of whether or not a government faces a vote of no confidence from
the parliament is, on some level, tautological. The key aspect of the definition of a
parliamentary system is that the government can be dismissed by the legislature at
any time. However, the risk of a confidence vote being raised, let alone lost, varies
considerably (Williams, 2013, 2014). Most no-confidence measures do not result in
the removal of the government. Premiers in minority and coalition governments face
a larger risk of facing and losing a confidence vote than do governments controling a
majority of parliamentary seats on their own. Those with weak party cohesion may
lose the support of backbenchers in confidence votes, though backbencher revolts on
questions of confidence entail serious political costs and are exceedingly rare. For the
purposes of data categorization, I considered governments that were not defeated on
a major policy initiative in the immediate run-up to the dissolution and/or held a
majority of seats in the lower house to be impervious to an imminent threat of lost
parliamentary confidence.
The ability to govern pushes premiers to call early elections. Blocking important
measures, such as budget/supply or reforms the premier’s party campaigned on, re-
duce the value of the current parliament for incumbents–regardless of the expected
value of a new parliament–making an early election relatively more attractive. Fur-
thermore, a prolonged spell of government crisis may in fact harm the incumbent
at any future polling date as voters increasingly view the premier as unable to “get
things done.” Since enacting significant policies is ostensibly the raison d’être for
governing, the threshold for calling new elections falls with the difficulty of passing
major legislation.
These dynamics are best shown through considering historical elections. Below, I
describe several of the premier-timed elections in this dataset. These cases illustrate
the various reasons that premiers cut their rule short and the outcomes that these
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choices can produce.
The United Kingdom’s election of 1987 is the prototypical example of the “op-
portunistic” elections described in the literature (e.g., Ito, 1990; Kayser, 2006; Smith,
2004). On 18 May, Margaret Thatcher dissolved parliament a year early and set
elections for 11 June. The dissolution was announced four days after local elections
in which Mrs. Thatcher’s Conservative Party performed well (Inter-Parliamentary
Union, 1987; Cozens and Swaddle, 1987). This election occurred following a rebound
in the polls for the Conservatives, who had suffered from embarrassments most no-
tably the internal cabinet fights made public in the Westland affair6 of 1985 and 1986.
Following a period of volatility in electoral support, the period of strength in polling
was viewed as, “a window of popularity [that] opened up, it was an opportunity
the prime minister felt unable to miss” (Cozens and Swaddle, 1987, p. 263). Mrs.
Thatcher’s gamble paid off, with her Tories retaining a commanding majority of 102
seats in the parliament and her place as first among equals secure. Similar stories lie
behind many premier-timed elections in countries like Canada and Japan.
While many of the premier-timed elections considered in this dissertation follow
the prevailing narrative of a prime minister opportunistically calling an election to
coincide with a strong economy and robust support in the polls, there are numerous
instances in which premiers called elections because their ability to enact legislation
was hindered to such a degree that the value of ruling in the current parliament was
6The Westland affair involved Prime Minister Thatcher and her Defence Minister Michael Hes-
eltine’s cabinet dispute over the future of the British helicopter industry. Westland Helicopters had
become unprofitable and by November 1985, American Aircraft Corporation offered a bailout deal
that would give them a minority stake in Westland (Travis, 2014; Winder, 1986). Heseltine pre-
ferred a European solution, while Thatcher preferred the offer of an American company, Sikorsky
Aircraft, to purchase a minority share of Westland. The dispute was made public through a series of
leaked letters from both Heseltine, where he argued to Llyods Bank that Westland was likely to lose
European contracts if it chose the Sikorsky option, and from the Solicitor-General, which accused
Heseltine of making claims with “material inaccuracies” (Kavanagh, 2015). Ultimately, Heseltine
resigned his cabinet post over the disagreement. The contradictory statements made by those in
Thatcher’s inner circle and by supporters of Heseltine led many to wonder who was lying (Winder,
1986).
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exceedingly low. The Danish election of 1988 exemplifies such a case. On 14 April
1988, Prime Minister Schlüter’s four party minority coalition government was defeated
on an opposition sponsored resolution to tighten the country’s ban on nuclear weapons
during peacetime, including in ports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1988a; Statsminis-
teriet, 2014a). On the 18th Schlüter announced the dissolution of the parliament and
the date of new election only eight months after the previous election. Schlüter aimed
to receive a mandate to maintain Denmark’s continued full membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While his Conservative People’s Party lost
three seats, Schlüter was able to form a new minority coalition government with the
Ventstre (Left) and Radicale Venstre (Radical Left/Liberal) Parties that lasted two
and a half years (Statsministeriet, 2014b). This case shows how the incentive to call
elections is influenced by coalition politics and the ability to push forward the party’s
platform
Finally, while we can typically assume that premier-timed elections are the re-
sult of significant forethought and strategic decision making, it is important to note
that mistakes can and do occur. New Zealand’s 1984 election was, by many
accounts, an impulsive choice by National Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon.
Convention in New Zealand was that prime ministers only ask the Governor-General
for parliament’s early dissolution when they cannot maintain parliamentary support
or when highly contentious legislation is under consideration that is deemed to need
a new electoral mandate, making early dissolutions rare (McLean, 2014). Muldoon’s
decision to dissolve parliament at 11:15 p.m. on 15 June thus came as a surprise to
many (Jackson, 1985). His government had only a two seat majority and at least
two MPs would regularly vote against the government on individual measures, but
they supported the Muldoon cabinet in all measures of confidence. When National
MP Marilyn Waring told the prime minister that she planned to resign the whip on
an opposition-sponsored anti-nuclear bill, Muldoon announced that he was dissolving
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parliament (Jackson, 1985, p. 75). While Muldoon was visibly drunk when he made
the announcement (TVNZ, 2001), recent improvements in both inflation and unem-
ployment (and expectations that these improvements were unlikely to be sustained
through November, when regular elections would have been held) made July a better
time for National to go to the polls than any other foreseeable moment (Jackson,
1985). It is thus unclear the degree to which this was a strategic decision rather than
a brash mistake. Ultimately, however, Muldoon’s National Party was defeated in the
election, losing ten seats and its narrow majority to the Labour Party.
While these cases differ in many ways – from the underlying reason PMs wanted
to go to the polls early to the election outcomes – they are all cases in which the
premier (or her party) was the one to decide on the timing of elections. As the
following section shows, a significant subset of early elections are brought about by
parties that do not control the premiership, and these elections are very different
affairs from those described above.
3.2.3 Opposition-timed elections
Unlike premier-timed elections, opposition-timed elections are inherently not of
the premier’s choosing. These elections occur when some actor(s) outside of the
prime minister’s party dissolves the parliament. While these dissolutions are likely
to be motivated by similar incentives as those initiated by premiers, their outcomes
are likely to be quite different. While premier-timed elections are expected to result
in the prime minister’s continued power, those timed by the opposition ought to be
least likely to result in the prime minister retaining her office. If the opposition were
interested in forming a government with the sitting prime minister, it is unlikely that
they would initiate such a proposal by publicly censuring the sitting government.
Beyond the potential for a premier party to lose seats and be unable to form a
government with the initiating party, both sides face problems if they try to work
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together too soon after an adversarial face-off. Premier parties are unlikely to trust
parties that voted them out of office in a humiliating fashion to negotiate honestly or
abide by coalition agreements. Likewise, parties that bring down a sitting government
are likely to face constraints from their voters that make working with a party it
publicly stated to have no confidence in that preclude immediate coalescence.
In this dataset, any early election that the prime minister did not sanction is
considered an opposition-timed election. Thus, an election forced by a vote of no
confidence, by the withdrawal of an important coalition partner, or by splits in the
prime minister’s own party are all counted as opposition-timed election.
Canada’s 2006 parliamentary election exemplifies how many opposition-timed
elections come about. In 2006, the Canadian House of Commons was dissolved three
years early when Prime Minister Paul Martin’s minority Liberal Party government
lost a vote of confidence. While the government was expected to call an election
later in the spring, “the three opposition parties had simply decided, each for its
own reasons, to bring about an election earlier rather than later” (LeDuc, 2007, p.
716). The government was dogged by the long-running sponsorship scandal7 that had
cost the Liberal Party their parliamentary majority in 2004 and remained a source
of embarrassment to the government when the House of Commons was dissolved in
7The sponsorship scandal pertains to the misuse and misallocation of funds from the “sponsorship
program” in the province of Quebec. The sponsorship program’s aim was to advertise the work of the
federal government in the province as part of an attempt to reduce support for Quebec independence
and promote federalism (Spo, 2006). Between 2002 and 2004, improprieties in this program were
brought to light by federal auditor general, Sheila Fraser. The Auditor General’s Commission of
Inquiry on the sponsorship program found, among other problems, “insufficient oversight at the very
senior levels of public service which allowed program managers to circumvent proper contracting
procedures and reporting lines; a veil of secrecy surrounding the administration of the Sponsorship
Program and an absence of transparency in the contracting process; ... gross overcharging by
communications agencies for hours worked and goods and services provided; ... deliberate actions to
avoid compliance with Federal legislation and policies ...; five agencies that received large sponsorship
contracts regularly channelling money, via legitimate donations or unrecorded cash gifts, to political
fundraising activities in Quebec, with the expectation of receiving lucrative government contracts;
... the refusal of Ministers, senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office and public servants to
acknowledge their responsibility for the problems of mismanagement that occurred” (Minister of
Public Works & Government Services, 2005, pp. 5–7).
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January 2006. Although the economy was performing well, with the unemployment
rate at its lowest point in more than twenty years and growth at a respectable 2.5%,
the long-governing Liberals were unable to capitalize on this and set the campaign’s
focus on economic performance and economic policy because of the timing of the
election (LeDuc, 2007). Ultimately, this resulted in the Liberal Party’s loss and the
formation of a minority Conservative government headed by Stephen Harper with
245 seats to the Liberals’ 103.
Opposition parties can sometimes determine election timing even when facing
majority governments. Whether through coalition breakdown, interventions by the
head of state, or factionalism of the prime minister’s party, majority governments are
still vulnerable to opposition-timed elections. The Austrian election of December
1995 was brought about by the Socialist Party of Austria’s (SPÖ) junior coalition
partner, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). The grand coalition between the SPÖ
and the ÖVP formed following the 1994 election tied the parliament’s term to the
government’s term, with the coalition agreement stating that the parliament should
be dissolved if the government broke apart (Müller, 1996). By April 1995, ÖVP had
fallen behind the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in opinion polls and the
party elected a new chairman, Wolfgang Schüsell. Under Schüsell’s leadership, the
ÖVP recovered in the polls to pull ahead of the FPÖ.
In an effort to retain momentum, the ÖVP “decided not to compromise in the
budgetary negotiations with the SPÖ,” and insisted that all budgetary shortfalls be
addressed through spending cuts, particularly cuts to social expenditures targeted at
SPÖ supporters (Müller, 1996, p. 411). While the ÖVP had been gaining in the
polls, support for the SPÖ had been in decline since the 1994 election and its lead
over ÖVP was minimal. In October 1995, the ÖVP declared that an impasse in
budget negotiations had occurred and that the voters needed to resolve this politi-
cal question. The ÖVP’s withdrawal from the government triggered early elections;
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Schüssell declared that the party was willing to form a coalition with any party, im-
plying that the ÖVP would form a government with the FPÖ if given the chance.
The campaign’s focus on economic issues, coupled with the ÖVP’s newfound willing-
ness to move away from the political center, ultimately resulted in a strengthened
SPÖ at the expense of the FPÖ. The FPÖ’s electoral rise since 1986 was based on
its xenophobic and anti-establishment platform, which made an election focused on
questions of economic governance a disadvantage. Ultimately, the election produced
a new grand coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, with the ÖVP once again in
the position of the second party (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995). In this instance,
a short-term boost in support for the ÖVP was not sustained at the voting booth
after they forced an election on the chancellor’s party.
Early dissolution of the French parliament by the President are sometimes at-
tempts at opportunistic election timing by an opposing partisan. The 1988 French
parliamentary election followed on the heels of the presidential election in May
of that year when Socialist Francois Mitterand was returned to power. He faced
a parliament narrowly controlled by the conservative bloc, led by Jacque Chirac of
the RPR, elected in 1986 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1988b). Upon his re-election,
he dissolved parliament and scheduled new elections for June. The new parliament
produced a coalition government composed of center-left and the center-right that
largely supported Mitterrand’s agenda. Because of the staggered timing of French
parliamentary and presidential elections, the potential for divided government arises
throughout presidential and parliamentary terms. While most elections occur at the
mandated end of the parliamentary term, two of the five early French elections in
this dataset were an attempt by presidents to gain a favorable parliamentary major-
ity when facing a opposition dominated parliament.
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Japan’s 1993 election resulted from a combination of opposition pressure and fac-
tionalism in the long-governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The Social Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) brought a no-confidence measure to the floor of the
Diet eight months before the mandated end of the parliament, citing the Miyazawa
government’s failure to address corruption and failure to act on promises of com-
promise with the opposition on electoral reforms (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993;
Jameson, 1993). Fifty-five members of the LDP either abstained or voted with the
opposition, leading to a 255 to 220 defeat of the government that ostensibly had a
274 seat majority (Jameson, 1993). The defectors went on to form two new liberal
parties prior to the election, the New Party Sakigake and the Japan Renewal Party.
Following the election, the SDJP, Japan Renewal Party, and New Party Sakigake
formed a coalition government with four other small parties under the leadership of
SDJP’s Mirohiro Hosokawa. It was the first government to exclude the LDP since the
party’s formation in 1955. While most elections in Japan since the 1970s have been
premier-timed (8 of 13), even governments in “premier-timing countries” (Kayser,
2006, p. 440) may at times face unplanned, and unwelcomed, early elections.
These four examples illustrate the vulnerability that minority and majority gov-
ernments alike face when either political institutions or political divisions empower
opposition parties to force early dissolutions. These dissolutions, however, are less
likely to benefit the prime minister’s party than those she chooses herself. Of the
32 opposition-timed elections observed, 65 percent resulted in the election of a new
premier party. This is compared with turnover of the premiership in only 29 percent
of premier-timed elections, a marked difference in outcomes.
3.2.4 Other-early elections
Both opposition- and premier-timed elections are the result of strategic choices
by politicians to promote their hold on power. There is a small set of early elections,
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however, that do not fit into either categorization. These other-early elections are
generally not timed to increase the power of the premier or opposition, but to ful-
fill some other requirement. These range from changes in national institutions that
require parliamentary dissolution; resuming traditional election timing after the pre-
vious election was held early; or because the prior election was predicated on the
promise of fulfilling specific, limited goals. While it is possible that some of these dis-
solutions were in fact part of a power grab, my research has not provided me evidence
of this.
These other-early elections can take on myriad forms. The Swedish 1970 elec-
tion was held one year early because a constitutional reform that changed Sweden
from a bicameral to a unicameral parliament was passed in 1969, and so a new single
parliament had to be elected (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1970). The timing of this
election was agreed upon by the parties contesting it. Similarly, the Belgian elec-
tion of 1968 was held a year ahead of schedule following the passage of constitutional
reforms increasing devolution to linguistic communities (Inter-Parliamentary Union,
1968). Changes to the constitution are not ratified until they have been passed by two
parliaments, each with their own electoral mandate. As such, amendments made to
the constitution result in nearly immediate dissolution of both houses of parliament
in Belgium.
The 1979 Finnish election was held approximately six months early to return
elections to their traditional timing in the early spring. All accounts of this election
describe it as “a parliament that had run its full four-year course” (Arter, 1979, p.
422). However, the previous election had been held in September 1975, meaning that
this election that is treated as end-of-term by many analysts is considered early in
this study. It is this very ambiguity that requires coding the 1979 election as an
other-early election.
Finally, in times of crisis, governments can form under the premise of solving
85
particular problems and then returning to both politics as usual and the ballot box.
The Greek elections of November 1989 and April 1990 fit this description. The
November 1989 election followed only five months after the previous parliamentary
election that produced no clear majority party. The New Democracy party partnered
with Synaspismos8 to govern in the short-term while investigating corruption charges
against the outgoing Social Democratic PASOK government. Once the investigations
were complete (which led to removal of parliamentary immunity for several former
government ministers, including former Prime Minister Papandreou, and their referral
to the justice system), the government resigned and a caretaker government was
installed until elections could be held five weeks later (New York Times News Service,
1989; Simons, 1989; Wor, 1989).
Ultimately, the November election also failed to produce a single-party majority
government, leading to an ecumenical government of all three major political parties
– New Democracy, PASOK, and Synaspismos – led by the respected former head
of the Bank of Greece, Xenophon Zolotas. The parties formed a unity government
under the agreement that new elections would be held in April of 1990 (World In
Brief: Greece: Accord Reached on Unity Government, 1989). This was in order to
stay off a return to the polls in December that would be constitutionally required if
no government received the support of parliament. Both of these elections illustrate
instances in which a post-election government is formed with the precept of fulfilling
a specified mandate and then returning to the voters. The timing of these elections
is therefore not strategic in the sense that we have considered for both premier- and
opposition-timed elections.
All remaining other-early elections can be examined in Appendix C. While their
specifics may vary from those described above, their lack of any clear partisan ad-
vantage means they do not fit into any of the earlier categories. In the statistical
8Synaspismos is alternatively known as the Coalition of Left-Wing and Progressive Forces, an
alliance of left-wing and communist parties.
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work of Chapters IV and V these observations are typically pooled with end-of-term
elections, though their exclusion from the analyses generally does not alter the sub-
stantive relationships. When their exclusion does produce different results, these are
noted in the text.
3.3 Institutions and types of elections
Section 3.2 describes the types of elections observed in advanced industrial democ-
racies over the past forty years. The theory presented in Chapter II argues that the
patterns we observe between the state of the economy and election outcomes is a
result of the type of election voters are confronted with, and that the type of election
is itself a product of the incentives to go to the polls and the ability of politicians to
bring about an election when they have the incentive to do so. This ability to call
elections at will, however, varies between both premier and opposition parties within
a country and over time, as well as for these actors actors across countries. This
section describes the conditions under which we might expect these incentives and
capacities to be enhanced or hindered.
3.3.1 Incentives
While the focus of this dissertation is on economic performance as the driver of
early elections, even in times of good (poor) economic performance, early elections
may not promote the goals of the premier (opposition). Additional institutional and
political factors can make early elections more or less attractive than the business
cycle would otherwise suggest. In particular, the length of the parliamentary term
and the need for cooperation with other parties both affect the incentive to hold
elections prior to the term’s end.
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The maximal term length of the parliament (dis)incentivizes early elections
for premiers.9 The longer the maximum term, the smaller the share of total tenure
any early election represents. For instance, an election held one year before the end
of the term represents fully one-third of the government’s possible time in power in
New Zealand, but only twenty percent of the term of a British prime minister. From
the perspective of the prime minister, losing the last year of a term is much more
“expensive” in New Zealand because it constitutes so much of their possible tenure.
Furthermore, as the term length increases, so to do the opportunities for positive
economic circumstances to arise that increase the incumbent’s likelihood of extending
her hold on office. If the likelihood of an upturn in the business cycle is equally likely
in any given year,10 then the likelihood that an upturn of sufficient magnitude will
occur increases. As such, we would expect that longer parliamentary terms increase
the likelihood of premier-timed elections. Table 3.1 below, lists the maximal term
lengths of parliaments in the sample, as well as the number of premier-timed and
total number of elections for each country. While there are a number of premier-timed
elections in countries with longer terms, countries such as Australia (3-year term) and
Denmark (4-year term) both defy expectations with their high proportions of premier-
timed elections. However, one should keep in mind that this single incentive is not
expected to explain the frequency in premier-timed elections cross-nationally.
An additional factor that affects incentives for early elections is the need for co-
operation with other parties to govern. Two related aspects of this are the effective
number of parliamentary parties and the need to form a coalition government.
9Term length ought not affect the incentive for opposition parties to bring down a government.
Opposition parties are not giving up something of great value when faced with the possibility of
entering the halls of government in place of being in the opposition. As such, term length should
only affect the likelihood of premier-timed elections.
10This is potentially a problematic assumption. Being in an upturn in any particular year will
be related to the business cycle in the preceding year. Further, national macroeconomic policies
could affect economic performance as per the political business cycle theory. However, most of
the countries in this sample would be considered relatively small and effectively price takers on
international markets (with perhaps the exceptions of Germany, the UK, and Japan), meaning that
their abilities radically alter their countries’ economic prospects are limited.
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These two facets of parliaments both affect the incentive to call early elections through
different avenues. First, the more fragmented the parliament (i.e., the larger the ef-
fective number of parties) decreases the chances of attaining a single party majority,
increasing the need to form coalitions. More fragmented parliaments mean that there
are more potential coalition partners, which ought to decrease the likelihood of need-
ing to dissolve parliament over an inability to pass legislation. However, while there
may be more potential coalition partners (or replacements for existing partners),
forming new coalitions is a potentially costly process (e.g. Heller, 2015; Lupia and
Strøm, 1995). Coalition formation can be a difficult process that involves significant
negotiation over cherished values and strategically important portfolios. The incen-
tive to pay the costs of these types of negotiations wanes over the parliament’s term.
Thus, the effective number of parliamentary parties increases the incentive to call
early elections for both premiers and opposition parties as the term wanes.
However, the fragmentation of parliament is a generally persistent feature of a
country’s political cleavages and institutions. As such, parties can expect that they
will face broadly similar options over coalition partnerships in the next parliament
as they face in the current one (though with some shifts in the relative bargaining
powers of the parties due to their changing seat shares, to be sure). While there may
exist many potential coalition partners, some will hold policy positions so different as
to make them uncoalitionable. As such, while there exist 2n−1 possible combinations
of parties in any parliament, only a few subsets of parties are likely to coalesce with
one another and other combinations are, while mathematically feasible, practically
unlikely to form (Heller, 2015; Warwick and Druckman, 2006). If only a subset of
coalitions is likely to form, and those coalitions are likely to contain many of the
same parties from one election to the next, then the decision to force early elections
entails considerations not only of one’s own party’s expected results, but the outcome
of preferred coalition partners. As recent research suggests that citizens in countries
90
that are generally governed by coalitions are able to predict the outcomes of coalition
negotiations (Duch and Tyran, 2013), it is reasonable to assume that politicians un-
derstand the likely outcomes of coalition formation very well. Politicians preferences
over election timing is therefore likely to account for the expected electoral outcomes
not only of their own party, but that of their preferred coalition partners relative
to alternative coalitions. This means that there are likely to be circumstances in
which calling an early election would allow a premier (or main opposition) party to
improve their seat share, yet might diminish the value of the subsequent parliament
because they would have to form an undesirable government or be left out of the
cabinet entirely. As such, the expectation of needing to cooperate with other parties,
and indirectly the expected fractionalization of the parliament, ought to reduce the
incentive to call early elections for incumbents and oppositions alike. Thus, expec-
tations for the direction of these factors’ effects on the likelihood of premier- and
opposition-timed elections are ambiguous.
3.3.2 Capacities
Even with strong incentives to return to the electorate early, not all actors are able
to bring about premature elections across countries. Political institutions provide the
clearest constraints on the calling of early elections. When one partisan actor cannot
dissolve parliament without the agreement of another, that decreases the capacity of
any single party to opportunistically time elections. Likewise, having the legal right to
dissolve parliament unilaterally ought to increase the likelihood (and the observance)
of early elections.
Table 3.2 describes how parliament can normally11 be dissolved in each country
in this dataset. There are broadly four categories of dissolution capacities. The first,
11Normally means not due to a constitutional requirement to dissolve parliament. For example,
several constitutions require new elections to be called if a set amount of time elapses and the par-
liament has not passed a vote of investiture for a new government, but this would not be considered
“normal” dissolutions.
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most consistent with the literature on opportunistic election timing, is countries where
the prime minister can dissolve parliament at will. While in some of these countries
(e.g., the United Kingdom12) the monarch is technically the person who dissolves
parliament, convention dictates that she agree to early elections upon the prime min-
ister’s request. It is these countries that we would most expect to see premier timed
elections and few opposition timed elections. The third column of Table 3.2 shows the
number of premier-timed elections over the total elections held in that country during
the period from 1967 through 2010. The first group of countries are those where the
prime minister can dissolve parliament unilaterally. As we would expect from the dis-
cussion of the intersection between incentives and capacities, premier-timed elections
are quite common where prime ministers can call early elections unchecked by other
partisans. For six of the eleven countries where the prime minister can unilaterally
dissolve parliament, premier-timed elections are the modal form of election. Premier-
timed elections are not the modal type of election for any country where the prime
minister cannot unilaterally dissolve parliament. It is only in two of the countries
where prime ministers are able to unilaterally call early elections that we observe
no premier-timed elections. The prime minister of Sweden had the power to initiate
early elections for only three years in the dataset before a constitutional amendment
made it such that any premature elections did not start a new parliamentary term,
but only elected a new parliament to fulfill the existing parliament’s mandate. This
change significantly diminished the incentive to call elections as it did not give a
new, full mandate. The other country with no premier-timed elections in this group,
Finland since the 1991 amendment to the constitution, requires that the president
dissolve parliament only when he has received a request from the prime minister, but
also requires that he talk to all of the parliamentary groups and ensure no alternative
government exists, thereby lessening the ability of the prime minister to call elections
12In the period after this dissertation’s data endpoint, the coalition government led by David
Cameron passed a law that forbid early dissolutions of parliament.
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opportunistically.
Additionally, there are some countries where a head of state is the only actor
with the legal power to dissolve parliament. The five countries in this category,
seen in the second group in Table 3.2, are all republics where a president serves
as head of state. If a head of state can unilaterally dissolve parliament this could
incentivize both elections favoring the prime minister’s party and the opposition,
depending on the whether the head of state and prime minister share a partisan
affilliation. As such, countries with a head of state who is constitutionally empowered
to dissolve parliament unilaterally ought to experience both premier- and opposition-
timed elections. Again, this is the pattern we see in the second set of countries.
Countries where the president can unilaterally call early elections see nearly equal
occurrances of premier-timed and opposition-timed elections (column four). This
is to say that presidents in these countries are very willing to prematurely dissolve
parliament – whether this is a categorized as a premier-timed or opposition-timed
election depends on whether the president and the prime minister are from the same
party.
A third group of countries’ constitutions (found in the third set of countries in
Table 3.2) state that only the parliament itself can vote to dissolve the body early.
This generally requires that preferences for early elections are held by a broad set
of parties. Both Austria and Belgium have generally failed to produce single-party
majorities during the period studied in this dissertation, ensuring that multiple par-
ties must agree to an early dissolution of parliament. The early elections in these
countries were generally a result of majority coalition governments that fell apart
and could no longer expect to maintain the support of their parliaments. In some
instances these were initiated by prime ministers, while in others they were the re-
sult of withdrawals from junior coalition members. However, in both of the countries
where parliaments have to vote to dissolve themselves, the modal means of reaching
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an election is through reaching the end of the constitutionally mandated term. Early
elections, both initiated by the premier party and opposition parties, are less common
than in either of the other circumstances described above.
Finally, there is a set of countries where early dissolutions, while constitutionally
possible, are significantly constrained. In this set of countries, early elections are rare
and, when they do occur, are oftentimes contentious political battles themselves. For
instance, Germany requires that any vote of no confidence against a government be
accompanied by a vote investing a new government with executive power. The two
instances in which elections have been held early in Germany were both cases in which
the chancellor engineered his own defeat in order to return early to the polls. In both
cases, the Federal Constitutional Court had to rule as to whether or not a premature
election was a legally valid option. The Netherlands has had one premier-timed and
five opposition-timed elections in the past 40 years. This is due to the strong norm in
Dutch politics that majority governments should rule and rompkabinetten should not
govern long, and so minority governments tend to end with an early dissolution by
the monarch. The opposition timed elections were all a result of the exit of a single
party in a coalition government that led a formerly majority government to become
a minority one.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has described the types of elections voters face in the industrialized
parliamentary democracies. Early elections are brought about for seemingly similar
office seeking reasons. However, the identity of the actor who initiated an early
election provides us with an indication of the likely outcome of the election. Early
elections, at the least, are likely called by premiers or oppositions that expect a better
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Table 3.2: Dissolution Powers Across Nations





Finland (1991 – ) 0/5 0/5
Greecea (1986 – ) 6/9 0/9
Ireland 5/11 3/11
Japan 8/13 2/13
New Zealand 2/14 0/14
Spain 3/9 2/9
Sweden ( – 1973) 0/2 0/2
United Kingdom 7/11 1/11
Head of state
Finland ( – 1990) 0/6 2/6
France 3/11 2/11










Sweden (1973 – ) 0/10 0/10
(a) The Constitution of Greece (Art. 41.2) states that the President of the Republic “shall
dissolve the Parliament on the proposal of the Cabinet which has received a vote of confi-
dence, for the purpose of renewing the popular mandate, in view of dealing with a national
issue of exceptional importance.” In practice the Greek electoral system favors the creation
of single party majorities in parliament, ensuring that the cabinet is composed of a single
party. When the cabinet is composed of multiple parties (specifically, prior to the Novem-
ber 1989, April 1990, and post-January 2015 elections), then no single partisan actor can
dissolve parliament unilaterally.
(b) The Luxembourgish constitution states in Art. 74 that, “The Grand Duke may dissolve
the Chamber [of Deputies].” However, the Grand Duke is effectively a figurehead. Prior to
the 2013 dissolution of the parliament over the spying scandal in which the government as
a whole requested early elections, there have been no early dissolutions in the post-war era.
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chance of entering government following the election than if they were to wait until
the parliament ended its mandate. Whether they do or not is an issue I return to in
Chapter 5.
There remains, however, the question of what circumstances are likely to produce
each type of election. The economic voting literature would predict that a strong
economy increases the likelihood that the prime minister’s party performs well at
the polls, while a weak economy would lead to increased punishment of incumbents.
These expected voter responses to the economy produce a set of economic incentives
in the timing of elections. Do bad economic times incentivize opposition parties to
bring down the government and force and early dissolution? Do premier’s capitalize
on economic upturns to extend their hold on power? As this chapter began to show,
not all oppositions or premiers have equal abilities to bring about elections when the
timing is right. The next chapter tackles this question by determining the institu-
tional, political, and economic circumstances under which premier-, opposition, and
end-of-term elections are most likely to occur.
96
CHAPTER IV
Paths to Elections: Who Calls Them (Or Doesn’t)
and Why?
The endogenous election timing literature finds that the strength of the economy
matters to prime ministers when deciding to call an early election (Chowdhury, 1993;
Ito, 1990; Kayser, 2006; Lächler, 1982; Smith, 2004). When premiers have the capacity
to call elections at will they tend to do so when the economy is on an upswing (e.g.
Cargill and Hutchinson, 1991; Chowdhury, 1993; Ito, 1990; Palmer and Whitten, 2000;
Smith, 2004). This literature has focused on early elections that are brought about
by the prime minister in countries where the premier has significant or sole power to
determine election timing.1
However, as detailed in Chapters 3, a substantial proportion of early elections
in industrialized parliamentary democracies are brought about by actors other than
the premier party: opposition-timed elections account for approximately 29% of all
early elections. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that many of the puzzling results in
the clarity of responsibility stream of the economic voting literature likely stem from
their lack of attention to politicians and can be better explained by election type than
by institutional complexity alone. The previous chapter describes the processes by
1Early elections are elections called before the end of the parliament’s maximum term. As
described in Chapter 3, I consider early elections to be those held more than three months before
the constitutionally mandated parliamentary termination.
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which the parliamentary elections considered in this study were initiated. In order to
better establish the causal mechanism for why the type of election voters find them-
selves in matters for the magnitude of the economic vote, it is necessary to determine
what factors lead to different types of elections. This chapter models the strategic
relationship between the lead party and the opposition that determines whether the
premier calls an early election, the opposition forces one, or the parliament serves its
full term.2
In the next section, I expand on the logic set forth in Chapter II arguing that the
economic circumstances surrounding the election voters face is the result of strate-
gic choices made by politicians who are constrained by both formal institutions and
their limited knowledge of their adversaries’ preferences. While the choice to call
snap elections is motivated by the state of the economy opposition-timed elections
result partly from the prime minister’s lack of information about the preferences of
other parliamentary parties and risk aversion. In Section 2, I describe the strategic
choice model that prime ministers and oppositions face over early elections. Section
3 identifies factors that are likely to enter into the utility functions of the prime
minister and the parliament over the three potential outcomes of the election game:
premier-timed, opposition-timed, and end-of-term elections. The argument is then
tested using a strategic probit model in Section 4. The results support the exist-
ing literature’s finding that prime ministers who are sufficiently empowered to call
elections are more incentivized to do so when the national economy is performing
well. When prospects for reelection are bleak, however, there is little that the prime
minister’s party can do but hope that the opposition is unable or unwilling to force
early elections. When the opposition has one of several avenues through which it can
bring bring down the government, its decision to do so is weakly contingent on the
economy’s performance. This is particularly true when an opposition party holds the
2Throughout this chapter, I use “lead party,” ”premier party,” and ”prime ministerial party”
interchangeably.
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office of independently elected head of state with the constitutional power to dissolve
parliament at will. Section 5 discusses an alternative estimation strategy and de-
scribes steps to be taken to gain additional leverage on the question of what factors
lead to different types of elections. The findings of this chapter support the theory of
economic voting dependent on election type outlined in Chapter II and are expanded
upon further in Chapter V.
4.1 Economics, institutions, and election types
The ability to hold elections when political fortunes are most in one’s favor is
a valuable asset. The ease with which different actors are able to initiate elections
at their desired moments varies considerably across countries and over time. While
some countries have fixed election dates (e.g., Norway and the United States), nearly
all parliamentary democracies allow for the possibility of elections before the end of
the maximum parliamentary term. The endogenous elections literature has focused
on a subset of parliamentary countries: the so-called ‘premier-timing’ countries in
which the head of government has a significant or the sole prerogative to determine
the timing of elections up to the end of the maximal parliamentary term set forth by
the constitution. Within the set of premier-timed countries, economic performance
is found to significantly predict the calling of early opportunistic elections, with good
economic performance predicting elections in premier-timed countries (e.g. Cargill
and Hutchinson, 1991; Chowdhury, 1993; Ito, 1990; Palmer and Whitten, 2000).
Kayser (2006) finds that unexpected economic booms predict early elections in
a large sample of premier-timing countries. Further, Smith (2004) finds that when
economic performance has been improving for an extended period of time, early elec-
tions result in larger vote shares for the incumbent government in the UK, providing
evidence that calling elections during an economic upturn does in fact produce elec-
toral benefits. Even within premier-timed countries, however, end-of-term elections
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are far from rare with nearly 40% of all elections occurring within three months of
the constitutional maximum. Less common, and largely unstudied, are opposition-
timed elections.3 Opposition-timed elections constitute nearly 21% of all elections
(and approximately 27% of early elections) in premier-timing countries.
The assumption of office holding as the primary motivator of politicians underlies
the economic voting, opportunistic election timing, and political budget cycle theories.
Parties in and out of government are assumed to be office-seeking in much of the
literature and in the theory developed in Chapter II. While implementing preferred
policies is desired, the ability to do so is contingent on first entering the cabinet. The
best way to enter the cabinet (as well as end up in a desirable coalition if one fails to
gain a majority outright) is to control the most seats in parliament, as the largest party
is also the most likely to be named formateur and to control the prime ministership
in the resulting government (e.g., Gamson, 1961; Martin and Stevenson, 2001). By
holding elections when factors associated with increased (decreased) support for the
prime minister’s party are present, the prime minister (opposition) can further its
office-seeking goal through increased vote and, more importantly, seat shares.
From the prime ministerial party’s view, early elections are a trade-off between
the certainty of continued rule (the value of which diminishes both as the end of
the term nears and as the likelihood of the opposition calling an election increases)
and the gamble of another full term in office by calling elections when prospects of a
return to office look good (e.g., Balke, 1990; Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Warwick, 1994).
If voters respond to a weak economy by voting the rascals out, then incumbent prime
ministers ought to call elections before the end of the term when the economy is
strong (Chowdhury, 1993) but likely to fall in the near future (Smith, 1996, 2004),
and the benefits of continuing in office are small, making early elections more likely
further into a parliamentary term (e.g. Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Warwick, 1994).
3Recall that opposition-timed elections are those in which the parliament’s dissolution was pre-
cipitated by someone other than the prime minister.
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The incentives for and against calling early elections are quite clear for the prime
minister and her party. The literature’s focus on premier-timed countries allows us to
look for evidence of opportunism in the cases where the prime minister’s ability to act
on those electoral incentives is greatest. However, all parties have an interest in the
timing of elections. Other parties, either in coalition with the prime minister or in the
opposition, would likely choose to hold elections under different circumstances than
would the prime minister. Parties in the opposition may anticipate huge swings in
their favor when elections are held under bad economic conditions. Junior members
of a coalition government may be accountable to voters for a different set of outcomes
than are their senior counterparts (Meguid, 2005). For example, after the FDP left
its coalition with the SPD to form a CDU-CSU led German government in 1982, the
CSU was eager to call elections immediately both to gain an electoral mandate for
the government taking the helm during a period of stagnant economic performance
and because it anticipated a relative increase in power within the CDU-CSU (Kaase,
1983). This, however, would have been disastrous for the FDP, which was facing
significant losses in the polls for abandoning the coalition that they had campaigned as
a part of in the 1980 election. Ultimately, the CSU was unable to force an immediate
election due to this disagreement in the coalition government and the legal limitations
Chancellor Kohl’s faced in dissolution, and elections were held off for nearly nine
months.
In the most simple case of a two-party system where the parties’ electoral and
governing prospects are zero sum, a good moment for the government to call an
election is by definition a bad moment for the opposition and vice versa. While most
early elections are called at the behest of the head of government, the endogenous
election timing literature assumes that all early elections in premier-timed systems
are evidence of the prime minister’s opportunism. However, within premier-timed
countries, early elections are sometimes forced on the prime minister by coalition
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partners4, by a breakdown of party discipline,5 or a simple loss of the parliament’s
confidence in minority governments.6 Treating early elections in a premier-timing
system as a priori evidence of prime ministerial opportunism is therefore problematic.
Looking beyond premier-timed systems to a broader set of industrialized par-
liamentary democracies, these same incentives exist for both prime ministers and
oppositions, but the institutional means by which they can act on those incentives
differs markedly. Premier-timing systems are defined as countries in which the prime
minister has significant leeway in choosing when parliamentary elections will take
place.7 Many of these countries also tend to produce single party governments, so
that the cabinet has similar preferences over the timing of elections because their
electoral fates are so strongly tied.8 They are also characterized by few institutional
opportunities for opposition parties to force a parliamentary dissolution. In the par-
lance of the economic voting literature, these countries have generally high clarity of
responsibility. Non-premier-timing countries, however, tend not to privilege the head
of government in this way and often empower opposition parties in parliamentary dis-
solution. In many cases, early dissolutions require broader cabinet agreement (e.g.,
Belgium), a loss of confidence by the parliament and a failure to invest confidence
in a new government (e.g., Germany), or require parliament to approve of its own
dissolution (e.g., Italy). Prime ministers in these countries have more difficulty tim-
ing elections opportunistically than those in premier-timing systems. These countries
also tend to have strong second chambers of parliament, produce coalition and/or
4As in Austria in 1995 when the ÖVP withdrew from the government (Müller, 1996). The
coalition agreement between the SPÖ and the ÖVP explicitly tied the parliamentary term to the
government’s survival. The ÖVP believed that its improved polling after the 1994 election put it
in a position to form a government with themselves holding the Chancellorship and the FPÖ as a
junior coalition partner. See Section 3.2 for further details.
5The Japanese election of 1980 resulted from the abstention of 69 members of the ruling LDP
from a vote of confidence brought about by the opposition Japan Socialist Party (Keesing’s, N.d.).
6The Canadian elections of 1974, 1980, and 2004 were all called when the minority government
lost a confidence vote tabled by members of the opposition.
7Alternatively, an independently elected president may have this power, as in the case of France.
8Often, these are single party majority governments.
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minority governments, and have various means for parties outside of government to
affect the policies adopted. That is, those countries where opposition parties have
more opportunities to influence the timing of elections typically also have lower levels
of clarity of responsibility.
The opposition in non-premier-timing systems may have more institutional power
to determine election timing than their counterparts in premier-timed countries. In-
dependently elected presidents, such as those in the semi-presidential systems such
as France and Finland, have the right to unilaterally dissolve parliament. When an
opposition party member controls the presidency, he can use this post to call elections
in an effort to bolster his own party’s numbers in parliament.
The leaders of coalition and minority governments–the modal forms of government
in all of the non-premier-timing countries–are also susceptible to opposition-timed
elections through the vote of no confidence. While opposition parties are likely to
undertake a vote of no confidence during periods of scandal and government failure,
they do so with an eye toward their parties’ and the lead party’s electoral prospects.9
Unlike dissolutions orchestrated by a president, parliamentary votes of no confidence
require that multiple parties agree that the current moment is an acceptable moment
for new elections. This would require, at minimum, that a set of parties controlling a
majority of seats each expect the value of elections held immediately to be no worse
than the value of elections held at the end of the parliament’s term. Given the office-
seeking assumption described above, this indicates that parties expect a sufficiently
higher likelihood of joining the cabinet following an election held immediately than in
one held later to incentivize them to dissolve parliament, net of any expected costs.
The literature’s focus on premier-timed elections makes sense given that the gov-
ernment typically holds institutional powers to initiate elections, with many countries
allowing the prime minister or the cabinet as a whole to call elections at will (Inter-
9Opposition parties are broadly defined to encompass all parties other than the prime ministerial
party.
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Parliamentary Union, 2015; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009). These cases allow
for the identification of opportunistic behavior by prime ministers. However, other
parties within the parliament may also have means by which to force elections at
politically opportune moments. Minority governments must retain the confidence of
opposition parties and as such face the threat of early dissolutions if enough of the
opposition perceives immediate elections to be in their interests. The Austrian and
Italian parliaments must vote to dissolve themselves, while since 1991 the Finnish
president had to agree to an early dissolution of parliament, limiting opportunities
for prime ministers to engage in opportunism when another party holds the presi-
dency.10 These avenues for opposition timing of elections may exist alongside other
formal and informal institutions that empower the prime minister to dissolve parlia-
ment. The ability of parties to engage in opportunism may thus be more widespread
within parliament than described by the endogenous elections literature, encompass-
ing a wider set of parties than previously evaluated. Further, the choice to hold an
early election is a product of expectations of likely future outcomes: will the economy
improve/decline before the end of the term? Is the prime minister (opposition) likely
to force elections in the near future during an even worse situation? In the next
section I describe a simple model of paths to elections and describe the factors that
influence the path ultimately followed.
4.2 A model of elections
Within parliamentary democracies, the decision of when an election is held is
inherently strategic. The literature on endogenous elections has typically considered
it as a simple choice model in which a prime minister makes a decision to call an
early election or to wait until the end of the parliamentary term, illustrated in Figure
10Prior to the constitutional changes of 1991 the independently elected president had the sole
power to dissolve parliament and would frequently dissolve parliament early when the cabinet was
not agreeable to him (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009).
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4.1. The decision of whether to hold an early election or not comes down to a simple
cost-benefit analysis for the prime minister: are the costs of foregoing the remainder
of the parliamentary term exceeded by the expected benefits of holding an election
now (and presumably winning another full term). This is a special case of early

















Figure 4.2: Elections as a strategic choice
The general form is only slightly more complex. As depicted in Figure 4.2, the
prime minister still has a first mover position and decides whether to call an early
election or not. If she decides to call an early election then a premier-timed election
is observed. If she decides not to call an early election the opposition has the op-
tion of forcing one (leading to an opposition-timed election) or not (resulting in an
end-of-term election). The prime minister’s choice over whether or not to call early
elections is therefore based on her beliefs about the opposition’s likely behavior as well
as her expectations about her party’s prospects in an end-of-term election. It may be
better for the government to call an early election rather than face an embarrassing
loss of parliamentary confidence, even if waiting until the end of the parliamentary
term would be preferred. In many cases, however, it is unclear–even to the opposition
itself–if it can stage an opposition-timed election. As described below, opposition par-
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ties, broadly defined, face significant impediments to parliamentary dissolution that
likely produce significant uncertainty for the prime minister about the opposition’s
preference for new elections.
As stated above, there is considerable variation in the capacity of both the prime
minister and the opposition to bring about early elections. Numerous factors can
hinder or empower an actor in its ability to opportunistically time elections. The
prime minister is obviously empowered if she is the only actor legally capable of
dissolving parliament or simply requires the consent of a non-partisan head of state
(such as the British monarch). Institutions requiring the consent of a partisan head
of state or the cabinet as a whole (particularly in countries that tend to produce
coalition governments) would hinder her (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009).
The opposition is impeded by coordination problems when there are multiple
parties that need to agree on ending the term. If opposition parties’ electoral fortunes
are differentially affected by economic performance, for example, or some are fairing
poorly in the polls, they may be unwilling to bring down the current government
because they would be in a worse position after the election than they are currently
and that diminished position would stand for another full term. However, opposition
parties are empowered by access to other political institutions that have a say in the
dissolution of parliament, particularly an independently elected presidency. They are
further empowered if the opposition faces a minority government because they do not
have to attract members of the governing coalition to end the parliament.
The type of election that occurs in a parliamentary system is not simply a function
of the capacity of actors to call elections, but of their incentives to do so. Economic
performance does in fact tend to be better in premier-timed election (median unem-
ployment is 1 percentage point below the OECD’s average rate) than in opposition-
timed (median unemployment 0.05 percentage points above the OECD’s average rate)
or end-of-term elections (median unemployment is 0.8 percentage points below the
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OECD’s average rate). As discussed above, the prime minister faces a tradeoff be-
tween the certainty of current office and the prospect of another full term. As the
maximal term length shrinks the relative value of the remainder of the current par-
liament is likely to fall when compared to another full term. Thus, premier-timed
elections are more likely in the end of a parliament than in its early days (Warwick,
1994). However, when longer parliamentary mandates reduce the value of any fixed
unit of time. For example, the final year of New Zealand’s three-year term is relatively
more valuable than the final year of a parliament in the UK where the maximum term
is five years.
Central to this dissertation, a strong economy increases the incentive to call an
early election for the premier. Meanwhile, a faltering economy reduces the prime min-
ister’s likelihood of returning to office and so reduces her value of the post-election
parliament, thereby increasing the incentive for opposition parties to dissolve parlia-
ment. Ruling in coalition is likely to reduce the value of both the current government
and potentially of governing in a post-election parliament (Warwick, 1994). Coali-
tions have potentially mixed effects on the incentive to call a premier-timed election.
Coalitions reduce the value of ruling today because the prime minister’s party can-
not implement its ideal policy package, but must instead compromise with the junior
coalition partners and provide them with valuable cabinet portfolios. However, if
coalitions are common to the country’s politics, then the post-election parliament
may fail to produce an arrangement of power that leads to a government in which
the prime minister is more able to implement her policy goals, and may even result
in a less desirable distribution of power. Long-term cooperation within party families
may be harmed by calling elections against the wishes of a coalition partner. Further,
as coalition size increases, it is likely that future government formation negotiations
will be costly, further reducing the incentive to give up today’s hard-won cabinet for
tomorrow’s uncertain and costly one.
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Opposition parties do not face the same set of tradeoffs that the prime minister
does when deciding to call early elections. The continuation value of the parliament
is much lower for parties that lack access to the main tools of policymaking. Since
elections are essentially zero sum games in which one party’s electoral gains must
come at the expense of another party’s losses, poor economic performance ought to
increase the value of new elections for at least some opposition parties. This incentive,
however, should be weaker in more fractionalized parliaments. In politics, a rising
tide does not necessarily lift all ships. Some parties are more likely beneficiaries of the
lead party’s misfortune than others. Those parties that do not receive support from
former prime ministerial voters may face worse electoral prospects from an immediate
election than they anticipate from one further down the line. Alternatively, they may
anticipate a less desirable cabinet forming after the election than the one currently
sitting and so prefer to wait for the parliament’s expiry. The latter would be most
likely for junior members of a ruling coalition who might expect to be punished harshly
for abandoning the government or would receive fewer and less valuable portfolios in
a post-election government.
The preferences of the prime minister and the opposition over the various types
of elections are contingent both on their capacities and their expectations for elec-
toral outcomes under each scenario. The prime minister would prefer an end-of-term
election in which she wins to a premier-timed election with the same outcome as it
maximizes her time in office. She would prefer a premier-timed election over an end-
of-term election with an uncertain outcome. However, an uncertain election outcome
is still preferred to an election brought about by the opposition. Parties from the
opposition prefer to choose their own election timing to end-of-term elections which
are in turn preferred to premier-timed elections.
The capacities that the prime minister and the opposition possess to time elections
strategically mediate the effects of any incentives they have to dissolve parliament. It
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does not matter how good a party’s electoral prospects are today if they have no means
of forcing early elections. Hence, these are conditional relationships. In particular,
economic performance’s effect on election type is dependent on the constraints that
the prime minister and opposition face. In the next section I describe the data and
method used to test this simple model of strategic election timing.
4.3 Methods and Data
The data generating process described in Section 4.2 does not lend itself to typical
discrete choice estimation strategies such as multinomial logit. The strategic nature
of the relationship requires alternative modeling choices.
4.3.1 Strategic Probit Estimator
The game described in Figure 4.2 is a strategic discrete choice model. Each
player has a choice over two actions and receives a payoff that is dependent on both
their own choice and the choice made by their opponent. I follow Signorino (1999,
2003) by considering the election type outcome as a quantal response equilibrium
(QRE). QRE assumes that players have bounded rationality–that is it allows them
to make mistakes–by assigning a non-zero probability to every possible path, but
making the probability of choosing any particular action an increasing function of the
expected payoff of that choice (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998). The extant literature on
endogenous election timing assumes that the only elections in premier-timed systems
are early elections chosen by the prime minister and end-of-term elections, suggesting
that any opposition-timed elections would be off-equilibrium outcomes were we to use
a subgame perfect equilibrium concept, i.e., errors on the part of one or both actors.
Within the larger set of parliamentary democracies there is reason to believe that
prime ministers who are forced into early elections by the opposition are uncertain of
the likelihood that a failure to call elections themselves will result in an end-of-term
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rather than an opposition-timed election. The non-zero probabilities on each path is
what allows us to estimate the effects of our covariates on election timing.
In order to empirically model the relationship, I used the strategic probit estimator
developed by Signorino (1999, 2003). The strategic probit model regresses a set of
variables that enter the players utilities at the different nodes of the game on the
observed discrete outcomes to provide estimates of the effects of the covariates on
the utility of the actors for each outcome. Strategic probit requires that the prime
minister’s utility over all three outcomes shown in Figure 4.2 be explicitly modeled
and that the opposition’s utility over the opposition-timed election be defined. This
estimation strategy uses the QRE framework to estimate the interdependence of the
actors in arriving at a particular outcome. The strategic probit model requires that
no variable (including the constant) can be included in all utility functions to ensure
that the parameters’ influence at each node can be identified (Lewis and Schultz,
2003; Signorino, 2003). In order to estimate this model I used the games package in
R.
Signorino (2003) shows that incorrect assumptions about the source of error (i.e.,
the source of the non-equilbrium outcomes) has important implications for the esti-
mation and interpretation of the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. While
incorrectly assuming that errors arise from agent error and private information tend
to produce relatively similar standard errors in Monte Carlo simulations, regressor
errors (e.g., omitted variables) can produce very different estimated standard errors.
Specifically, the signal to noise ratio increases. Because of the relative parsimony of
the models presented below, I do not believe that there is much reason to expect
particularly large signal to noise ratios. In the models presented below, I estimate
errors assuming actors have private information over their utilities for the various out-
comes, but results are substantively similar when assuming agent error.11 Because
11Estimates are available from the author upon request
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of the small sample size standard errors are bootstrapped. Finally, I used statisti-
cal backwards induction to calculate the starting values for the optimization of the
maximum likelihood estimation.
4.3.2 Data
The dependent variable is the type of election that occurred and it is ordered from
left to right along the end-points of Figure 4.2, with zero indicating a premier-timed
election, one indicating an end-of-term election, and two indicating an opposition-
timed election. As described in Chapter III, elections were coded as end-of-term if
they occurred within the final 3 months of the maximum parliamentary term; elec-
tions categorized as other early elections were combined with the end-of-term elec-
tions. Elections held more than three months prior to the end of the term where the
prime minister dissolved parliament are coded as premier-timed elections; those early
elections in which the prime minister lost a vote of confidence tabled by another party
in the parliament, where an opposition party head of state calls early elections, or
those otherwise forced on the prime minister are coded as opposition-timed elections.
The games package requires researchers to state which variables enter into each
players utility function over each outcome. To simplify the analysis I have assigned
the prime minister a utility of zero to the default end-of-term outcome. Because there
is a specific end date to any parliament, I use this outcome as a baseline utility for
the player to evaluate the other outcomes against.
Following the results of both the economic voting and endogenous election timings
literatures, I use prior economic performance as a central predictor of premier-timed
elections. In order to better differentiate between “good” economic performance and
“bad,” I use Kayser and Peress’ (2012) benchmarked measure of both growth and
unemployment. Kayser and Peress (2012) decompose growth and unemployment
into global and local components. They argue that voters respond more strongly to
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the local component at the polls than to the global one because the local component
provides information about the government’s performance. The global component
then serves as the benchmark against which incumbent performance is evaluated.
They find that the principle components measure of the benchmark performs best in
predicting the economic vote and so this is the measure used below. If politicians are
anticipating that voters respond more strongly to the local components of economic
performance than to the global portion, then their utilities over the various types of
elections ought to be more strongly predicated on the local components as well. The
local components of growth and unemployment are the main indicators of economic
activity included in the models, though the global components are also included to
guard against omitted variable bias. Given the findings from the meta-analysis in
Appendix B, I expect that the local component of unemployment will be particularly
important to both the prime minister and the opposition when considering the utility
from immediate elections. Furthermore, if performance is very good compared to the
benchmark (i.e., unemployment is significantly below or growth significantly above
the benchmark) the prime minister has little to gain from calling elections early if she
expects this relationship to persist, so at both extremes of the economic performance
scale we would not expect premier-timed elections (Smith, 2004).
The relationship between the incentive of economic performance and the depen-
dent variable of election type is mediated by the capacity of the actor to capitalize on
economic performance. For premier-timed elections the local growth and unemploy-
ment variables are therefore interacted with the prime minister’s dissolution powers;
for opposition-timed elections I consider the both the ability of the head of state to
unilaterally dissolve parliament and whether the opposition holds a parliamentary
majority. In order to measure the prime minister’s capacity to call elections I include
a dummy variable for the prime minister’s dissolution powers. This variable is coded
1 if the prime minister can unilaterally or with the consent of a non-partisan head
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of state dissolve parliament and zero otherwise. A similar variable coding the power
of the president to unilaterally dissolve parliament is also used.12 Finally, there is an
additional variable taking the value of one for minority government. I expect that
local economic performance will only affect the likelihood of either type of election
when the relevant actor is sufficiently empowered to determine the timing of elections.
I include the maximum term length and coalition size to account for additional
costs to the prime minister for early elections. I expect that longer parliamentary
terms increase the likelihood of a premier-timed election; more parties in a coalition
ought to decrease the incentive to call early elections for the reasons outlined above.
The prime minister’s value from an opposition-timed election is likely to be much
less than the value of an end-of-term election. While the prime minister may expect
the opposition to force snap elections, she is unlikely to call early elections herself as
the chance of an inopportune election is better than the certainty of one by calling it
herself. I thus expect her utility to be largely unexplained by the covariates. However,
since opposition-timed elections are more likely to occur under minority governments
and when the head of state can unilaterally dissolve parliament I include both in the
prime minister’s utility over opposition-timed elections as they are likely to factor
into her decisions about calling early elections relative to these.
As argued above, an independently elected head of state with the right to dis-
solve the parliament unilaterally or a minority government both serve to significantly
empower the opposition and be strongly related to its utility over opposition timed
elections, as lacking both of these would significantly add to the costs of forcing early
elections. The economy ought also to matter, but it will not significantly affect the
utility over opposition-timed elections when the opposition does not have the capac-
ity to call elections, i.e., its effect will be mediated by the capacity variables. Due
to the consistently weak findings of models that include the domestic component of
12The original data came from Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009), Table 1.
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Table 4.1: Variable coefficient sign expectations
Premier-timed Elections Opposition-timed Elections
Unemployment rate (-) Unemployment rate (+)
Growth rate (+) Growth rate (- or 0)
PM Dissolution power (+) Head of state Dissolution power (+)
PM Dissolution X Unemployment (-) Head of state Dissolution x Unemployment (+)
PM Dissolution X Growth (+) Head of state Dissolution x Growth (- or 0)
Coalition size (-) Effective number of parliamentary parties (-)
Minority Government (-) Minority Government (+)
Term length (+) Minority government x Unemployment (+)
growth in the opposition’s utility as well as the meta-analysis in Appendix B, the
analyses below focus solely on unemployment. Finally, I include the effective number
of parliamentary parties as a control for the difficulty the opposition faces in coor-
dinating on the timing of early elections when they have the ability to bring them
about (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2011). Table 4.1 lists the variables that enter into the
prime minister’s and the opposition’s utilities and their expected signs.
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 shows the results of the strategic probit models. The first and third
columns show the full models while the second and fourth show slightly reduced
forms in which the interactions between local unemployment rate and the measures of
opposition power to dissolve parliament are excluded. The first two columns account
for the head of government’s capacity to call elections at will in the opposition’s utility
over opposition-timed elections while the latter two instead consider the impact of
majority oppositions/minority governments.
Table 4.2 is divided to show the utilities of the government and opposition over the
outcomes, depicted in Figure 4.2. The top block of coefficients show how the prime
minister’s utility over a premier-timed election is affected by changes to the electoral
context. The second block provides the same information about how an additional
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Table 4.2: Strategic Probit Model of Election Type
PM UtilityPremTimed (1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Unemployment 0.160 0.131 0.189 0.178
(0.164) (0.125) (0.311) (0.319)
Local Growth 0.059 0.055 0.002 -0.005
(0.164) (0.169) (0.159) (0.169)
PM Dissolution Powers 1.747** 1.687*** 1.474* 1.429**
(0.587) (0.431) (0.710) (0.479)
Local Un*PM Dissolution -0.383* -0.298** -0.300* -0.320**
(0.158) (0.106) (0.140) (0.122)
Local Grow*PM Dissolution 0.005 0.009 0.061 0.061
(0.225) (0.178) (0.190) (0.188)
Global Unemployment 0.103† 0.107† 0.107† 0.107†
(0.062) (0.057) (0.062) (0.059)
Global Growth -0.041 -0.028 -0.031 -0.032
(0.113) (0.089) (0.082) (0.074)
Term Length 0.688† 0.668* 0.808* 0.820*
(0.380) (0.297) (0.324) (0.350)
Coalition Size -0.340 -0.309† -0.212 -0.191
(0.216) (0.181) (0.236) (0.214)
Intercept -2.110 -3.060† -2.745 -1.203
(3.367) (1.728) (3.842) (5.132)
PM UtilityOppTimed
Head of State Dissolution Powers -15.968 -10.983 -0.420 0.349
(21.250) (24.565) (9.620) (8.100)
Minority Government 1.613 2.051 -5.630 -11.551
(4.155) (2.642) (18.846) (19.376)
Intercept 19.901 11.502 15.259 27.301
(28.192) (11.321) (24.479) (30.218)
Opposition UtilityOppTimed
Local Unemployment -0.079 -0.109† -0.040 -0.026
(0.071) (0.055) (0.106) (0.083)
Head of State Dissolution Powers 1.064 1.709*
(1.703) (0.693)
Local Un*HoS Dissoloution 0.151
(0.661)




Effective No. of Parties -0.148 -0.291 -0.064 -0.033
(0.252) (0.180) (0.183) (0.207)
Intercept -1.173 -0.670 -1.265 -1.409
(0.901) (0.708) (0.788) (0.915)
N 182 182 182 182
Log-Likelihood -146.975 -147.405 -151.548 -151.731
AIC 329.950 328.811 339.096 337.462
† indicates significance at the 0.10 level, * significance at the 0.05 level, ** significance at
the 0.01 level, *** significance at the 0.001 level. All tests two-tailed.
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set of covariates affects her utility over an opposition-timed election. The third block
shows how context affects the opposition’s utility over an opposition-timed election.
The models are somewhat sparse, with covariates that could be included in multiple
nodes, but add little explanatory power in some of those nodes, dropped. This is done
because estimates of strategic probit models can be quite sensitive in larger models















Figure 4.3: Predicted probability difference of prime ministerial dissolution powers
as local unemployment changes.
As expected, local unemployment and growth both fail to predict premier-timed
elections when the premier is constrained in her ability to call elections. The ability
to call early elections is a positive and significant predictor of premier-timed elections
when growth and unemployment are at the international benchmark level (i.e., when
the local components take on a value of zero). The coefficient on the interaction
term between prime ministerial dissolution power and local unemployment is negative
and significant in all models. This suggests that when the prime minister has the
power to unilaterally dissolve parliament, she is even more likely to do so when
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national unemployment is outperforming the OECD’s average rate of unemployment,
as expected. The interaction with the local component of growth is positive but
indistinguishable from zero and has no substantive effect at any level of growth on the
predicted likelihood of a premier-timed election. Higher rates of global unemployment
produce higher utilities from premier-timed elections at a marginally significant level,
while higher global growth rates reduce the utility to the premier of early dissolution.
These coefficients suggest that prime ministers may call (or hold off on) elections
based on international trends: when the international economy is performing poorly,
it might be prudent to go to the polls before its full effects are felt domestically,
whereas when the international economy is rising, the prime minister may hope that a
rising tide lifts her boat as well and delay elections. As expected, longer parliamentary
terms increase the likelihood of holding premier-timed elections at the 0.10 level in all
models, while larger coalitions decrease their likelihood, though only at a statistically
significant level in the second model.
In order to better understand the interdependent relationship between local unem-
ployment and the prime minister’s dissolution powers on the prime minister’s decision
to call early elections, Figure 4.3 shows the difference in the predicted probabilities of
a premier-timed election when moving from a constrained prime minister to a prime
minister with strong dissolution powers, using the model found in column 2. Results
are substantively similar using the estimates in column 1. The x-axis shows the local
component of the unemployment rate. The line indicates the average predicted pre-
dicted probability difference for a prime minister who can unilaterally call an election
compared to one who cannot for 1,000 draws from a multivariate normal distribution;
the inner light-blue band indicates the middle 50 percent of observed effects for those
draws; and the lightest blue band indicates the central 95 percent of estimated values.
For computational purposes the values of the other variables in the model are held at
zero. Recall that negative numbers mean that national unemployment is lower than
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the international trend in unemployment and so indicates better performance.
When unemployment is far below global levels, an empowered prime minister has
no incentive to end her term early since her party is very likely to win now and into
the future, and so behaves similarly to a constrained prime minister by not calling
elections. Similarly when the economy is fairing very poorly (when unemployment
is much higher than the international benchmark) an election is unlikely to be initi-
ated by the prime minister regardless of the institutional freedom she possesses. As
unemployment moves from slightly better than the benchmark to somewhat worse
that the rest of the OECD, the probability of an empowered prime minister calling
election increases significantly over her constrained counterpart. This is evidence of
the type of opportunistic election timing we would expect. It is when the economy
is performing at a somewhat middling level, the effects of institutions become most
clear. When electoral victory (or defeat) is certain, there is little incentive to lose the
opportunity to continue ruling, regardless of whether or not one has the legal right
to head to the polls. However, when one is likely facing the last best opportunity in
the term to go to the polls, the capacity to do so has substantial effects.
Considering the second block of results, none of the variables used to predict the
prime minister’s utility over opposition-timed elections turned out to be significant
in any specification. This suggests that these elections are a result of strategic errors
by the prime minister. There is no reason to expect the prime minister to ever
want an opposition-timed election because it is specifically timed to harm the prime
minister’s party. One can imagine that given the inopportune circumstances under
which a prime minister is likely to face an opposition-timed election, there would be
few better alternatives than rolling the dice to see whether the opposition is able and
willing to dissolve parliament rather than let the full term expire. The unique factors
that are likely to identify this outcome are more likely to show up in the opposition’s
utility, to which we now turn.
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The opposition’s utility from an election it chooses are largely explained by its ca-
pacity to call elections. In column 1 the effect of higher than international rates of un-
employment is to decrease the utility of opposition-timed elections for the opposition
when the head of state cannot unilaterally dissolve parliament, though this coefficient
is statistically insignificant. However, the head of state’s capacity to dissolve parlia-
ment has the expected positive effect when the local unemployment rate does not
differ from the international baseline (i.e., local unemployment is zero), but it too is
statistically insignificant. The interaction between local unemployment and the head
of state’s dissolution power is positive, indicating that as the national unemployment
rate rises compared to the global benchmark the likelihood of an opposition-timed
election increases. While this relationship is in the expected direction, unfortunately,
it too is statistically insignificant. Due to the limited number of opposition-timed
cases, the interaction term may be spreading the data too thin, hindering our ability
to detect any relationshipo between these variables and the choice of election type.
Column 2 omits the interaction between head of state dissolution power and the
local component of unemployment. It shows that the ability of the head of state
to dissolve parliament significantly and substantively reduces the likelihood that the
end of the parliamentary term will be reached, i.e., there is a much higher likelihood
of opposition-timed elections. Unexpectedly, higher national unemployment has a
negative and marginally significant effect on the utility of opposition parties over
opposition-timed elections. Given the results in model 1, this may be due to the
omission of the interaction term rather than the true effect on incentives to force early
elections for the opposition. More parliamentary parties increases the likelihood of
an on-time election. In numerous specifications, the interactive relationship between
the head of state’s dissolution powers and local unemployment generally fails to reach
statistical significance, though they tend not to be in the expected direction.
Models 3 and 4 present results when minority government is used to measure
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the opposition’s capacity to initiate early elections. Model 3 includes an interaction
between the local component of unemployment and minority government status, while
the model in the last column omits this interaction. The presence of the minority
government never has a significant effect on the opposition’s utility over opposition-
timed elections, though the coefficients on both minority and its interaction with local
unemployment are signed in the expected direction. This suggests that the various
costs, particularly the number of parties that need to coordinate on the timing of
an election, overwhelm the strength in numbers the opposition holds. Finally, in all
models the coefficient on the effective number of parliamentary parties is negative
but fails to each standard levels of statistical significance.
Overall, these results support for the theory put forward in this dissertation.
The opportunities and incentives that parties both in and out of government face
to call early elections determine the dynamics of election timing. In particular, the
prime minister’s behavior is strongly shaped by the unemployment rate when she
has the constitutional right to unilaterally dissolve parliament. Opposition-timed
elections are most strongly affected by access to a means of forcing early elections
with some evidence that higher unemployment makes this type of early election less
likely, though a majority opposition has no significant effect on the opposition’s ability
to call an early election.
4.5 Discussion
While the tests above model the dynamics of the strategic interaction between
premiers and oppositions, they are also limited in their ability to account for the
repeating nature of this interaction over time. The interaction described above ad-
dresses how politicians, anticipating the behavior of others, respond to the incentives
and capacities to go to voters at a particular moment in time or face potentially
worse outcomes beyond their control. However, the strategic probit model does not
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allow for repeated interactions between these actors over time. Prime ministers and
oppositions choose daily whether or not to head to the polls, evaluating the expected
benefits and costs of waiting versus going. Most days, both sides choose not to ini-
tiate elections and instead continue with the work of governing. Thus, the options
faced by parties are to call an election today or not, knowing that a failure to do so
may result in the parliament’s early dissolution by others or time running out when
circumstances are not favorable.
Given this alternative view of a repeated interaction between incumbents and
oppositions, a competing risks event history framework could be employed in future
research to provide clarification of how politicians arrive at different types of elections.
The competing risks framework examines the likelihood of a parliament experiencing
dissolution in any given period. Unlike traditional event history models, this com-
peting risks models allow for the parliament to experience ‘death’ due to multiple,
mutually exclusive causes (Andersen, Abildstrom and Rosthø, 2002; Fine and Gray,
1999; Gandrud, 2014; Putter, Fiocco and Geskus, 2007). In any period T a parlia-
ment is at risk of being dissolved due to one of C > 1 causes. In our case, there are
two potential causes of dissolution: premier-timed and opposition-timed elections. If
the parliament ends in a premier-timed election, we cannot directly observe its si-
multaneous risk of an opposition-timed election because that parliament cannot end
in multiple ways–the outcomes are mutually exclusive. Drawing on the notation in
Bakoyannis and Touloumi (2012), in order to find the jth cause-specific hazard in
period t, we must solve
λj(t) = lim
h→0
Pr(t ≤ T < t+ h,C = j|T ≥ t)
h
(4.1)
This represents the instantaneous failure rate from cause j in period t given the
other potential causes of failure. If dic is the indicator that subject i has failed from
cause c and ti is the minimum event failure time or censoring of the subject, the
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The probability of failure from cause j before time t when all other causes of failure
are present is the cumulative incidence, and defined as a function of the cause-specific
hazards for all causes of failure:











Unlike other means of estimating hazards of failure when there are multiple means
of failing, the competing risks estimation method focuses solely on observables in the
data, and does not require untestable assumptions.13
Beyond providing a means to addressing the alternative of continuing the parlia-
ment, a competing hazards model would allow for me to test additional implications
of the theory developed in this dissertation. In particular, it would allow the exami-
nation of questions about the effects of time remaining in office on the likelihood of
parliaments ending by premier- or opposition-timed elections and examine the possi-
bility of “missed” opportunities. This type of analysis is not possible with the dataset
used in this chapter, for which the unit of analysis is the country-election. While each
observation contains information about previous economic and electoral outcomes, its
current structure does not allow for a decision to go to the polls to occur at any earlier
moment.
I am currently creating a dataset organized at the parliament-quarter level that
will allow me to model the competing risks parliaments face from premier- and
13Alternative models assume latent failure times for each type of possible failure. Unfortunately,
neither the joint distribution of failure times nor corresponding marginal distributions can be iden-
tified from the data without untenable assumptions for this application, such as the different latent
failure times being independent. See Bakoyannis and Touloumi (2012), Prentice et al. (1978), and
Putter, Fiocco and Geskus (2007) for more details.
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opposition-timed elections. Each quarter in which the parliament is convened it risks
dissolution from either a premier-timed, opposition-timed, or end-of-term (censored)
election. The new dataset requires quarterly observations on all other relevant vari-
ables, such as economic performance, and coalition and minority government status.
Quarterly economic data, particularly for unemployment rates, has been difficult to
gather for the full set of parliaments included in this dissertation. Upon completing
its collection, this data will also permit the use of finer grained lag structures on the
economic variables to determine how changes in the trajectory of the economy affect
the likelihood of different types of elections being called.
It is important to note, however, that the competing hazards model does not
account for the strategic component of the choice to go to the polls early. Unlike
the strategic probit model used above, competing risks event history models do not
allow the observed outcome to be a function of the likelihood of failure by alternative
means in the future. The strategic probit model explicitly includes the value of other
outcomes to each actor in their utility over the option at hand; the competing risks
framework allows us to evaluate the likelihood of one outcome given that the other
outcome has not occurred, but, because it is not a decision theoretic model, cannot
include the type of strategic behavior inherent in the timing of elections. The use of
both the competing risks model with the existing strategic probit model will improve
our understanding of the findings above and provide additional insights in the factors
that lead to different types of elections being held.
4.6 Conclusions
The findings of this chapter support the theory that the factors that lead to
premier-timed, opposition-timed, and end-of-term elections differ significantly. The
motivations and constraints that actors face in pursuing their electoral goals lead to
systematically different types of elections. Premier-timed elections are more likely
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to occur during relatively good economic times and within a context of a strong
prime minister upon whom voters focus accountability. The presence of a head of
state with the constitutional prerogative to dissolve parliament is the most significant
factor in opposition-timed elections. Opposition-timed elections are likely to occur
in less fractionalized parliaments (again, implying easier accountability) but under
more dire economic circumstances. Unemployment in particular seems to be the key
to understanding what drives all types of early elections.
This chapter goes beyond the current endogenous election timing literature’s fo-
cus on the most likely cases by considering how numerous partisan actors use the
opportunities afforded them to engage in opportunism through early elections. It
uses novel data on election types within industrialized democracies to evaluate how
the strategic interaction of government and opposition produces the different electoral
contexts that voters face at the polls.
Chapter V examines the next step in the sequence described in Chapter II to
determine if these attempts at opportunism really work: do prime ministers who
choose their own election date fare better at the polls and increase their probability of
a return to government? Are those who run in opposition-timed elections more likely
to lose office? Initial evidence from Samuels and Hellwig (2010) suggests that this
opportunism doesn’t pay off: prime ministers competing in premier-timed elections in
high clarity of responsibility contexts experience a negative and significant economic
voting effect on partisan retention of the cabinet, while those facing all other early
elections experience a positive economic voting effect. This work, however, does not
to address the relationship between clarity of responsibility and the type of election
voters face. As shown here, voters are likely to be in the midst of very different
economic contexts when an election is called on time, by the prime minister, or by
the opposition. In Chapter V I estimate the economic vote as a function of the
strategic choice over election timing examined here.
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CHAPTER V
Strategically Timed Elections as a Causal
Mechanism for the Economic Vote
This chapter builds on the findings in Chapter IV that the institutional and eco-
nomic circumstances surrounding elections held at the end of a parliamentary term
differ from those called early by either the premier or the opposition. Premier-timed
elections are called when prime ministers have significant institutional powers to uni-
laterally dissolve parliament and unemployment is low, while opposition-timed elec-
tions are called when unemployment is high and heads of state are able to call elections
on their own. That the circumstances in which these elections occur ought to differ is
premised on the idea that voters will treat incumbents differently at the polls when
the economy is performing well than when it is struggling. Because voters punish
incumbents for a poor economy, a prime minister will not call for an early dissolution
of parliament during an economic downturn, but is likely to do so when the economy
is strong to avoid punishment; likewise, opposition parties–expecting to benefit from
the incumbent government’s losses–are likely to force a dissolution when the economy
is performing poorly if they have the political and institutional capacities to do so.
What is left to be seen is whether these actions produce their desired results.
Do incumbent governments perform better at the polls when they choose the timing
of elections themselves? Are they punished more harshly when elections are forced
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upon them by opposition parties? Are they more (less) likely to retain the post of
prime minister in premier (opposition) timed elections? This chapter answers these
questions by considering the direct and indirect effects of the economy on election
outcomes. The goal is to establish the mechanism through which the economy affects
election outcomes in parliamentary countries. Building on earlier findings in this dis-
sertation, I argue that the economy has a strong indirect effect on election outcomes
through the strategic timing of elections in addition to any direct economic voting
effects. In doing so, I challenge the assumption in the economic voting literature
that the way the economy matters in election outcomes is solely through its effects
on voters’ evaluations of incumbents. Instead, I show that much of the economy’s
effect on election outcomes works through the incentives of incumbent and opposi-
tion politicians to strategically call elections, particularly with respect to the prime
minister’s retention of office.
Below, I describe the expectations and hypotheses for the direct and indirect
effects of the economy on three measures of electoral performance: incumbent prime
ministerial vote share, incumbent prime ministerial seat share, and retention of the
prime ministership. I then present the data and methods used to test these hypotheses
before turning to the results. An alternative theoretical mechanism in which the
type of election acts to modify the relationships between the economy and election
outcomes is pitted against the theory of a mediated relationship posited above is
also tested. The final section draws conclusions about both the various effects of the
economy on electoral outcomes and how successful political parties are in securing
political power through manipulation of election timing. There is strong evidence
that the economy has a positive and significant effect on every measure of electoral
outcomes through its effects on the type of election held.
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5.1 Direct and indirect effects of the economy on election
outcomes
The previous chapter described a model in which the state of the economy interacts
with the political powers of the prime minister and the opposition to produce elections
that are held early or at the end of the parliamentary term. The theory developed in
this dissertation is premised on the idea that early elections are called at moments that
are particularly advantageous for the actors who precipitate them. More specifically,
they are called under circumstances that maximize their likelihood of gaining a place
in the cabinet and, ultimately, holding the role of prime minister. Previous work
has shown that parties with larger seat (e.g. Gamson, 1961) and vote (e.g. Baron,
1993; Sened, 1996) shares are more likely to end up controlling the post of prime
minister. In this section, I describe the expected relationships between economic
performance, election type (end-of-term election, premier-timed early election, or
opposition-timed early election), and three measures of electoral success: capturing
the prime ministership following the election, maximizing seat share, and maximizing
vote share.
Much of the economic voting literature has focused on how economic performance
affects changes in the lead party’s vote share (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008, 2013;
Lewis-Beck, 1988; Powell and Whitten, 1993). This is due to its focus on how voters
respond to economic stimuli. Since voters directly affect the percentage of total votes a
party receives, this was the correct level on which to focus. However, this dissertation
argues that the focus ought to shift to evaluating elite goals and behavior. Voters
are assumed to respond to the state of the economy, but to care little about whether
the incumbent is responsible for that performance. Instead, voters can make their
choices at the ballot box based on the simple heuristic of the economy, punishing
incumbents during downturns and failing to punish (or even rewarding them) during
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upturns. While party elites are likely interested in the percentage of votes that they
receive from the citizenry, these votes only matter to the degree that they help them
achieve more the pertinent goals of cabinet entry and prime ministerial control. If an
election today results in a lower vote share but a higher probability of (re-)entering
government, it would still be optimal from the viewpoint of politicians in this model.
Recent work considering elite strategy and economic voting by Hellwig and Samuels
(2008) and Tavits and Schleiter (2014) consider not only vote share, but seat share
and retention of the prime ministership as well. By entering government, parties
receive significantly more benefits than by simply entering parliament. Parties in
cabinet are better able to pursue and implement preferred policies and have access to
perks of office not available to opposition parties. The cabinet post of prime minister
tends to have some additional powers beyond those of other cabinet ministers (e.g.
Laver and Shepsle, 1994), and the prime minister’s party is also likely to control
some of the other important portfolios, such as the finance ministry (Warwick and
Druckman, 2001), making the premiership even more attractive. Entering government
and controlling the office of prime minister are both positively related to a party’s
seat share in parliament, which in turn is positively related to a party’s vote share.
The degree to which election type and the economy have independent effects on the
success of an incumbent will vary by how success is measured. I turn to these expected
relationships below.
5.1.1 Prime Minister’s Vote Share
While entering government–or even better, holding the post of prime minister–
is the ultimate goal of most political parties,1 this goal is easiest to achieve when
a party can claim an electoral mandate by receiving the most votes. In countries
with effective two-party systems, receiving the most votes tends to produce a parlia-
1While there are some parties that are anti-system, they tend to be the exception to the rule of
office-seeking parties that want to enter government under the current set of institutions.
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mentary majority which ensures that party sole control over government.2 Countries
with multiparty system tend not to produce parliaments in which a single party con-
trols a majority of seats. However, the largest party tends to be invited to act as
formateur , increasing the likelihood of that party eventually ascending to the pre-
miership (e.g. Ansolabehere et al., 2005; Warwick and Druckman, 2006).3 Moreover,
most of the literature examining the economic vote has focused on voting and vote
share due to its assumption that voters are the relevant actors to examine. While
this dissertation treats voter support as incidental to politician and party goals, large
gains (losses) in votes provides parties with increased (decreased) bargaining leverage
in the government formation process. As such, the share of votes the prime minis-
ter’s party received is a good starting point to understand the degree to which the
economy and the type of election affect the electoral success of incumbents. Though
opposition-timed elections are expected to help opposition parties, in most cases pre-
cisely which parties among the opposition we would expect to benefit at any level of
analysis is unclear. However, because the ultimate goal is changing the identity of the
prime ministerial party, focusing on the outcome for the incumbent prime minister’s
party, which is expected to be inversely related to that of the opposition, is a best
approximation. While the type of election voters find themselves in is likely to be
correlated with economic performance, economic performance’s independent effect on
the outcome ought to be stronger for vote share than for either of the other dependent
variables. To the extent that an election is held for a reason orthogonal to the econ-
omy, we would expect vote share to have the most direct relationship to the economy.
Below I describe the expected relationships between incumbent’s vote share and the
2Of course, these systems tend to also have large distortions from a one-to-one relationship
between votes gained and seats allotted, meaning that sometimes the largest vote-getter does not
gain a majority–or even a plurality of–seats in parliament.
3Multiparty systems tend to see a stronger correlation of vote share to seat share, though the
degree of proportionality varies by the particular electoral formula used (Gallagher and Mitchell,
2011). Further, the rules of government formation sometimes give priority to the incumbent prime
minister to act as a first formateur regardless of their vote or seat share.
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mediating variables of election type as well as the economy’s direct effect.
Premier-timed elections are more likely to be those in which the prime minister
expects her party to have the best chance of retaining government power. Retain-
ing power depends on myriad factors such as the electoral performance of potential
coalition partners and norms of formatuer choice, but the ability to claim an elec-
toral mandate will provide strong pressures on the parliament to form a government
including the incumbent. To the extent that the expectation of retaining power is
driven by beliefs about her party’s vote share, premier-timed elections ought to return
higher vote shares for the incumbent prime minister than other types of elections.
Hypothesis 9. Premier-timed elections result in higher vote shares for incumbent
prime ministerial parties than both end-of-term and opposition-timed elections.
Opposition-timed elections are forced when the incumbent prime minister’s
party is most likely to lose its leading position within government. Opposition-timed
elections are called when the incumbent prime minister is in a weakened electoral
position. The hope of replacing the incumbent or having a stronger bargaining posi-
tion in a new parliament is the underlying cause of the opposition’s decision to force
early elections. Parties outside the government derive far fewer benefits from the
existing parliament than do parties represented in the cabinet, facing a less complex
decision regarding the relatively certain present parliament and the expected value of
an uncertain parliament following immediate elections. Opposition parties will call
elections when they can expect to gain substantial vote share; since the prime minis-
ter’s party receives attribution for the country’s performance, many of the new votes
to the opposition are likely to come from the prime minister’s party
It is important to note that parties in coalition with the lead party face additional
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costs when considering initiating early elections. Junior members of cabinet have
policymaking capacities in their ministries and access to other perks of office that
they may lose access to. Further, upon leaving the government, the prime minister’s
party may be unwilling to enter into new governing agreements with that party in
the future, worsening the party’s long-term governing prospects. These parties may
also fear blame from voters for withdrawing from their agreement and bringing down
a government, though there is little evidence that those who are likely to cast blame
for an early election on such a party would vote for it in an election anyways (Blais
et al., 2004).
However continuing to support the government may entail significant electoral
costs as well. Junior members of a coalition government are often forced to support
policies disliked by their base that may harm them in future elections. This problem
of ‘selling out’ could be a substantial problem for niche parties, particularly in systems
with high thresholds for entry into parliament (e.g., Meguid, 2005). The costs that
junior members of a coalition government face in the cabinet can be quite high,
which makes supporting an opposition-timed election more attractive. If faced with
losing representation in future parliaments and/or the potential to form alternative
attractive governments, junior coalition members may support an early election that
harms their current government partners.
To the extent that the incumbent’s vote share is associated with both seat share
and the likelihood of retaining or losing the prime ministership, opposition-timed
elections ought to be associated with lower incumbent vote share than other types of
elections.
Hypothesis 10. Opposition-timed elections are associated with lower incumbent vote
share than both end-of-term and premier-timed elections.
Again, to the extent that opposition-timed elections are driven by factors other
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than the economy, the economy may have additional indirect effects on vote share. In
fact, because the state of the economy is a relatively weaker predictor of opposition-
timed elections than it is of premier-timed ones, the direct effects of the economic
vote ought to be stronger in opposition-timed elections. Along the lines of Smith
(1996, 2003, 2004), if voters interpret opposition-timed elections as a signal of a
down economy’s imminent upturn, then one would expect that any residual effect
of the economy would be to increase the incumbent’s vote share. Since economic
performance in the period preceding opposition-timed elections are worse, on average,
than other types of elections, the relationship will be negative.
End-of-term elections do not convey expectations of election outcomes in the
consistent manner that elections called early by the opposition or prime minister
do. The set of end-of-term elections contains elections in which the incumbent can
expect to win, the incumbent can expect to lose, partisans were constrained in their
capacity to call elections, and those in which results were highly uncertain to the
actors fighting campaigns. Thus, the election type ought not predict incumbent vote
share very well. Because hypotheses 1 and 2 are defined in reference to end-of-term
elections, with vote shares for incumbents highest in premier-timed elections followed
by end-of-term elections, and lowest in opposition-timed elections.
However, the economy ought to have the strongest direct effect in end-of-term
elections. Because the indirect effect of the economy through the calling of an election
is expected to be nil, the economy’s direct effect on vote share ought to be strongest
in this type of election. This reasoning is in line with extant descriptions in the
economic voting literature where voters are holding politicians accountable (Duch
and Stevenson, 2008) or punishing them (Powell and Whitten, 1993), both of which
are built on the idea that elections are exogenous events, an assumption that can
only be true for on time elections. Better economic performance ought to increase
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the incumbents vote share (and vice versa) after accounting for the presence of an
end-of-term election.
Hypothesis 11. The effect of the economy, net of its effect on the decision to hold an
end-of-term election, on incumbent prime ministerial vote share is positive.
Direct effects of the economy – those effects that do not work through their
implications for the type and timing of elections – may also vary by election type.
Although prime ministers or opposition parties may call early elections because they
anticipate economic voting to drive the election’s outcome, we cannot state a priori
that the economy hasn’t any addition direct effects on incumbent support. The litera-
ture posits two potential directions for the direct effect on the economy on incumbent
vote share in premier-timed elections. In his examination of early elections in the UK,
Smith (1996, 2003, 2004) argues that voters understand early elections to signal the
incumbent’s expectations of a future economic downturn, leading them to discount
recent economic performance in their voting calculus. If voters facing either type of
early election understand politicians to be calling elections opportunistically. Then
we would expect economy’s effect on vote share net of its influence over the presence
of a strategically-timed election (premier- or opposition-timed) to be negative.
Hypothesis 12. The effect of the economy, net of its effect on the timing of elections
election, on vote share is negative.
Alternatively, to the extent that the choice to hold an election is driven by non-
economic factors, the standard economic vote ought to still hold. If the election
was called for some reason unrelated to the performance of the economy and voters
engage in näıve economic voting, then the economy’s direct effect on vote share may
be positive.
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Hypothesis 13. The effect of the economy, net of its effect on the timing of an election,
on vote share is positive.
5.1.2 Prime Minister’s Seat Share
While the prime minister’s retention of (or ouster from) her office is likely to be the
main motivator for calling early elections, this endeavor is aided by winning the most
seats following the voters’ return to the ballot box. In highly proportional electoral
systems, increased vote shares will translate more or less directly to increased seat
shares. As the electoral system becomes increasingly disproportional, the relationship
between votes and seats becomes uncoupled. To the extent that the decision to hold
an election is based on expectations of the number of seats a party will gain after the
votes are counted, then election types ought to better predict incumbent seat shares
than vote shares. The pursuit of the premiership is better achieved by maximizing
seat share than by simply attempting to improve overall vote share. Gamson’s law
suggests that parties with more seats are more likely to become the lead party in
a government (Gamson, 1961). Since total seat share (like vote share) is bounded,
any party’s gains come at the expense of another party. As such, I use of the prime
minister’s seat share as an additional measure for the success of strategic election
timing.
Premier-timed elections are called with the intent of maximizing the likelihood
of the prime minister continuing to hold office. Since the prime minister can expect
higher seat shares to improve her chances of holding onto power, premier-timed elec-
tions ought to be associated with higher incumbent seat shares than other types of
elections.
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Opposition-timed elections, on the other hand, are expressly timed to harm the
prime minister’s prospects of retaining power. Opposition-timed elections then ought
to be associated with lower seat share for the prime minister’s party than other types
of elections.
Hypothesis 14. Premier- (opposition-) timed elections result in higher (lower) seat
shares for incumbent prime ministerial parties than other types of elections.
The economy’s direct effects on seat share ought to be weaker than those found
for vote share. While the literature on economic voting produces expectations of pos-
itive (e.g., Powell and Whitten, 1993) and negative (e.g., Smith, 2004) relationships
between the economy and support for the incumbent, the theories focus on voters.
In countries where electoral system disproportionality is low, the relationships pre-
dicted about the economy’s direct effects on vote share ought to carry over to seat
share. However, because disproportionality varies across countries and over time, this
relationship ought to be weaker than the relationship for vote share.
Hypothesis 15. Any direct effects of the economy on seat share will be in the same
direction, but of smaller magnitude, than on vote share.
5.1.3 Prime Minister’s Retention
The ultimate goal of most political parties is to ascend to the office of prime minis-
ter following an election. This is particularly true for the party currently controlling
the office and its largest competitor in parliament. Both the prestige and policy-
making powers of the office make its retention a particularly important measure of
the incumbent’s electoral success. As politicians focus their efforts on attaining the
prime minister’s office and voters largely focus their attributions of responsibility on
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the lead party, the decision to hold an election ought to be driven by and related
to the subsequent government’s leadership (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). A failure to
find a mediating relationship between election type and prime ministerial retention
would be significant challenge to the theory posited in this dissertation.
Premier-timed elections trade off the relative certainty and value of rule in the
current parliament against the uncertainty of both future economic performance and
(the related issue of both potential current and future) electoral outcomes (Warwick,
1994). Incumbent prime ministers have much to lose in a poorly timed election and so
are expected to call one at the “last best opportunity” (Smith, 2004). Prime ministers
call elections when they cannot reasonably expect a more opportune moment for an
election to materialize during the remainder of the parliament’s term and when the
expected value of another term exceeds the value of the remainder of the current
one. Should a prime minister call an election before the parliament has reached its
maximum term length, this logic leads to the expectation that the likelihood of that
individual leader retaining the office of prime minister is significantly higher than in
end-of-term or opposition-timed elections (e.g. Kayser, 2006; Smith, 2004).
Hypothesis 16. Premier-timed elections are more likely to result in the prime minister
retaining her office than are other types of elections.
Opposition-timed elections entail far fewer trade-offs for opposition parties than
premier-timed elections do for lead parties. Parties outside of government have some
means of influencing policy, but generally derive far fewer benefits from the current
parliament than do cabinet members, and particularly less than the prime minis-
ter’s party (e.g., Powell and Whitten, 1993; Strøm, 1990). As such, the value of
ruling in a new parliament can generally be thought to exceed the value of the status
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quo. However, if the opposition calls an early election and is wrong in its estimates
of the incumbent’s likelihood of success they could face another full parliamentary
term with an unfavorable government. Opposition parties must be relatively sure of
their electoral success (or the prime minister’s party’s electoral failings) to call early
elections.
As discussed above, junior parties in a coalition government face a complex trade-
off when considering supporting an opposition-timed election. Junior partners of
a ruling coalition are only likely to support an opposition-timed election when the
incumbent prime minister’s likelihood of returning to power are very low (thereby
avoiding punishment during coalition negotiations immediately following the elec-
tion) and when they can expect either to benefit from the new government (e.g., the
most likely lead party is more ideologically similar to the junior partner on pertinent
dimensions than the current premier’s party) or to face severe (electoral) costs by
continuing with the coalition.
The logics of both junior partners of a coalition and opposition parties suggest
that only when the incumbent is not expected to retain the prime ministership that
opposition-timed elections will be called.
Hypothesis 17. Opposition-timed elections have a lower likelihood of incumbent prime
ministerial retention than other types of elections.
End-of-term elections are unlikely to strongly predict the prime minister’s reten-
tion. Similar to the logic described for end-of-term elections’ effects on incumbent
vote share, the set of end-of-term elections is likely to include those elections in which
the incumbent expects to return to her post as prime minister, elections in which she
expects to lose office, and others where the subsequent government compositions are
uncertain. Once again, since hypotheses 16 and 17 are both in reference to outcomes
137
of end-of-term elections, we know that the likelihood of retention in end-of-term elec-
tions lies between those of premier- and opposition-timed elections.
Direct effects of the economy While the logic that premier- (opposition-) timed
elections ought to favor (disfavor) incumbents’ retention of office is straightforwardly
drawn from the opportunistic elections literature, the direct effects of the economy
on their retention is less so. The expectation of an economic vote is the theoretical
basis upon which elections are called. As stated above, there may be additional direct
effects of the economy on vote share. Is there any reason to expect the economy to
have any direct effect on who ends up as prime minister in premier-timed elections?
The logic of additional direct effects on vote share is based on the idea that voters
make inferences about the competence of the incumbent based on the state of the
economy and/or the type of election voters face. Once the economy has had an effect
on the vote share, and those votes have been transformed into seats via the country’s
electoral formula, there is little reason to expect the parties negotiating government
formation to take the economy into special account at this stage. After controlling
for the type of election, there ought not be any additional direct effect of the economy
on retention of the prime minister’s post.
Hypothesis 18. The effect of the economy on the retention of the prime minister, net
of its effects on the type of election, is zero.
Figure 5.1 diagrams the expected relationships between election type, economic
performance, and both measures of electoral success. The economy (in conjunction
with the parliamentary institutions described in the previous chapter) has a strong
effect on the type of election that occurs. The type of election in turn has a direct effect
on the vote share received by the incumbent prime minister’s party. The economy











Figure 5.1: Relationship between economic performance and election outcomes
providing the incumbent with a further boost or leaving it even lower than would be
predicted by the type of election they faced. Electoral institutions then moderate the
relationship between vote share and seat share, with more disproportional systems
reducing the correlation between the two. Finally, in cases where there is no party
that holds a majority of seats in the parliament, the largest party will typically be
invited to form a government; their ability to do so will depend on the partisan
configuration in parliament.
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5.2 Data and methods
The theory presented in this chapter views elections as mediating the effect of the
economy on election outcomes. As seen in Chapter IV, the type of election voters
find themselves in is predicted by the institutional powers available to politicians to
call elections and the state of the economy. Mediation analysis attempts to estimate
whether the effect a treatment variable (Ti) has on an outcome (Yi) is through a par-
ticular causal mechanism (Mi) (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Imai, Keele and Yamamoto,
2010; Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010; Imai et al., 2011; Tingley et al., 2013; Zhao,
Lynch and Chen, 2010). This proposed relationship is shown in Figures 5.2, where
the independent variable of interest, economic performance, is shown affecting both
the type of election held (mediating variable) and the election’s outcome (outcome
variable). The type of election then also affects the election’s/prime minister’s out-
come. Including economic performance in a regression model of election outcome
without including the mediating variable of election type would then inappropriately
attribute the part of the economy that affects election outcomes through election type
to any direct effect of the economy.
Baron and Kenny (1986) claim that a mediating effect can be established by show-
ing that a) variations in the level of the independent variable significantly account for
variations in the presumed mediator; b) variations in the mediator significantly ac-
count for variations in the dependent variable; and c) when both the independent and
mediating variables are controlled for, a previously significant relationship between
between the independent and dependent variable is no longer significant. Zhao, Lynch
and Chen (2010) argue that Baron and Kennedy’s (1986) tests are too limiting. Zhao
et al. suggest that scholars ought to evaluate support for a mediation theory based
only on the significance and alignment with expected sign on the mediation effect (a
x c in Figure 5.2), ignoring the effects of the independent variable (pathway b) on








Figure 5.2: Economic vote mediated by election type
election outcomes in my theory, I follow Zhao et al. in this chapter, evaluating the
support for the theory of election type mediation based on the hypotheses posited
above.
To test the mediation of election type on the economy’s effect election outcomes,
we must first establish that the economy affects the type of election held. I estab-
lish this in Chapter 4, where I find that higher levels of unemployment reduce the
likelihood of premier-timed elections when prime ministers have the capacity to dis-
solve parliament unilaterally and that opposition-timed elections are less likely to be
called at higher levels of unemployment, but there are indications that when opposi-
tions have the ability to dissolve parliament they are more likely to do so when the
unemployment is higher, showing the presence of relationship a above.
The second step is to establish that the type of election significantly contributes to
election outcomes. This requires the estimation of models predicting the three levels
at which we expect the relationship to function: incumbent vote share, incumbent
seat share, and incumbent retention of the prime ministership. For both models in
which incumbent vote or seat share is the dependent variable, I estimate OLS regres-
sions with panel-corrected standard errors. The models considering prime ministerial
retention employ a random-effects logistic regression estimator.
Before continuing to a description of the data, it is worth mentioning the causal
mediation analysis method developed by Imai and co-authors (e.g. Imai, Keele and
Yamamoto, 2010; Imai, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2013; Tingley et al., 2013). This
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method uses a potential outcomes framework in which a mediating variable takes on
a potential value Mi(t) for unit i under treatment Ti = t, where Yi(t,m) denotes the
potential outcome that would result if the treatment and mediating variables take on
values of t and m, respectively. Causal mediation analysis was developed to address
the degree to which a treatment variable produces an observed effect through a di-
rect rather than a mediated pathway in political psychology and provides a strong
test of a posited causal relationship between variables. It requires the fulfillment of
the assumptions of strong ignorability of the treatment and sequential ignorability.
Strong ignorability requires that the treatment be randomized, which allows us to
estimate the average total effects of the treatment variable. While the state of the
economy is not randomly assigned by researchers, the ebbs and flows of business
cycles among the countries in the sample are largely random, providing reasonable
fulfillment of this assumption. Sequential ignorability requires that the treatment be
independent of the outcome (ignorable), given pre-treatment covariates; and that,
given that the treatment is ignorable, the mediating variable is also independent of
the outcome (ignorable) given treatment and the pre-treatment covariates. Imai,
Keele and Yamamoto (2010) show that the ignorability of the mediator must hold
without conditioning on post-treatment confounders. Unfortunately, sequential ig-
norability cannot be assumed given the theoretical model given above. The observed
value of the mediating variable is assumed to be a function of the expected value of
the outcome variable, given the treatment. Hence, it is unlikely that this method
is appropriate to test the mediation theory proposed in this dissertation. However,
in Appendix D, I provide estimates that use this causal mediation analysis method,
along with associated sensitivity analyses as a robustness check. These results sup-
port the findings below that the effects of the economy on the type of election held




In order to test the theory posited above that the type of election voters face
mediates the effects of the economy, I consider three dependent variables: the vote
share, seat share, and retention of high office for the prime minister’s party. Although
the theory developed in this dissertation has implications for both the prime minister’s
party and opposition parties, all three dependent variables focus on the performance
of the incumbent prime minister’s party. There are three reasons for this measurement
strategy. The first is theoretical: since politicians of all stripes are focused on who
holds the prime ministership, they will be highly attuned to how elections held in
a particular moment are likely to affect the prime minister’s electoral support, as
major losses of support weaken the incumbent’s bid to retain their office. The second
is practical: while researchers cannot be certain in every case which opposition parties
are likely to ascend into government from a particular election, we have very clear
expectations about how the different types of elections are likely to affect the prime
minister’s vote share. Thirdly, the literature on accountability indicates that many
voters focus their attention on the prime minister and that less attention is paid
to considering alternatives (e.g. Duch and Stevenson, 2008).4 To measure electoral
support, I take the difference in the prime minister’s party’s vote share in the current
election from the party’s vote share in the previous election (V otet − V otet−1). This
measurement takes into account that few voters tend to switch parties from one
election to the next. Since parties can rely on some stable base of support, it is thus
the swing that they are most concerned with.
Following Hellwig and Samuels (2008) and Tavits and Schleiter (2014), I include
the incumbent prime minister’s seat share as an alternative dependent variable to as-
sess the effects of economic voting. This measure, though correlated with vote share,
4In France, the presidency is the locus of political power and the focus of voters attributions.
However, because the prime minister is aligned with and chosen by the president, and the president
can call early elections, I continue to focus on how the prime minister’s party fares.
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will differ from vote share due to electoral institutions that are likely to be correlated
with those political characteristics contained in measures of clarity of responsibility
(Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999). Further, seat share is the-
oretically more closely tied to the assumed end goal of holding power than is vote
share. This is measured as the difference between the prime minister’s seat share in
the previous parliament and the new parliament, (Seatt − Seatt−1).
The final dependent variable needed to test the implications of the theory of
election type mediation is whether the incumbent prime minister retains her post
after the election. Much of this data came from Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008),
while recent years were coded using a variety of news and online sources. For reasons
similar to those given above, determining whether an opposition party’s attempts to
enter government were successful is subject to large errors, so I again focus on the
fate of the incumbent prime minister’s party. This is a dichotomous variable taking
on a value of 1 when the prime minister (or her party) is returned to the position
following the election and zero when any other party holds the prime ministership
following the election.
The independent variable is economic performance. Following Kayser and Peress
(2012) and in keeping with the results from Chapter 4, I measure economic per-
formance as the principal components measure of the difference between domestic
unemployment rates and the global average in the year preceding the election as the
main economic measure (Local Unemployment). The difference between the domestic
unemployment rate and the global average indicates how much better the national
economy is performing relative to an international benchmark. I also include the
global component of unemployment (Global Unemployment).5 The data from Kayser
and Peress (2012) uses global unemployment rates, weighted by their degree of co-
variance with the country of interest, as the comparison that voters (and thereby
5See Chapter 4 and Kayser and Peress (2012) for details on the logic of including both components.
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politicians) use to assess the economy. Kayser and Peress show that news reports
often make cross-national comparisons for voters, making this a reasonable approxi-
mation of how voters may judge the economy. As a robustness check, I use a related
measure of unemployment performance specific to the countries in this dataset: the
simple difference between national unemployment and the OECD average rate in the
year prior to the election (National Unemployment). Because of missing observa-
tions in the Kayser and Peress (2012), particularly of recent elections after the 2008
global financial crisis, this approach ensures broader coverage. The OECD average
unemployment rate is also included (OECD Unemployment).
The mediating variable is the type of election. Chapter 3 described the three main
types of elections: end-of-term elections, premier-timed elections, and opposition-
timed elections. End-of-term elections are those held within 90 days of the maximal
parliamentary term;6 premier-timed elections are elections held more than 90 days
prior to the expiry of the parliament and were called by the prime minister; and
opposition-timed elections are those held more than 90 days prior to the parliament’s
expiry that were forced by non-prime ministerial parties.7 The two dichotomous indi-
cators of premier-timed and opposition-timed elections are included in the analyses.
A number of control variables are included in the estimations as well. All models
include the effective number of parties in parliament to account for the fractional-
ization of the party system and the complexity of the bargaining environment when
it comes time to form a government. (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2011; Laasko and
Taagepera, 1979). The model of seat share change controls for the disproportional-
ity of the electoral system to account for the boost that large parties (which often
contend for the prime ministership) may be able to exploit through timing elections
6Elections categorized as “other” early elections are treated as end-of-term elections in the anal-
yses below.
7In semi-presidential systems, elections called by the president during which there was no cohab-
itation are considered premier-timed; during periods of cohabitation, presidentially dissolutions of
the parliament are considered opposition-timed.
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when their support in marginal seats improves. The model of changes in vote share in-
cludes whether the government was composed largely of left-wing parties (Grafström
and Kayser, 2014). The models of both changes in vote share and prime ministerial
retention include dummies for minority and coalition government status. The model
of seat share changes incorporates electoral system disproportionality (Gallagher and
Mitchell, 2011). The data includes up to 222 elections held in 19 countries from 1967
through 2010.
5.3 Results
Table 5.1 shows the baseline model of economic voting without the inclusion of
our mediating variables of election types. The first two columns show the models
of incumbent vote share change, the third and fourth columns model changes in
incumbent seat share, and the final two columns model the prime minister’s retention.
The local and national unemployment components are both negative but statistically
insignificant, while the global and OECD components are negative and significant
for the models of changes in vote and seat shares. Coalition governments have a
positive and significant effect on the change in the prime minister’s vote share, but a
negative and marginally significant effect on her retention when the Kayser and Peress
measures of unemployment are used. This suggests that those ruling in coalition are
punished less by voters, but face higher hurdles in forming a government following an
election. Lead parties of minority governments also receive a marginally significant
positive impact on vote share.
Table 5.2 provides estimated regressions for the three dependent variables de-
scribed above. Once again the first two columns show regressions in which change in
incumbent vote share is the dependent variable, the third and fourth columns show
regressions in which change in seat share is the dependent variable, and the fifth and
sixth columns regress prime ministerial retention of office on the regressors.
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Table 5.1: Baseline Economic Voting Relationship
Vote Vote Seat Seat Retention Retention
Local Unemployment -0.10 -0.21 -0.03
(0.15) (0.20) (0.05)
Global Unemployment -0.40* -0.55* -0.04
(0.16) (0.25) (0.05)
National Unemployment -0.01 -0.26 -0.05
(0.14) (0.22) (0.04)
OECD Unemployment -0.66** -0.78* 0.09
(0.23) (0.35) (0.08)
Effective Number of Parl. Parties -0.21 -0.02 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.02
(0.34) (0.39) (0.37) (0.40) (0.13) (0.13)
Coalition Incumbent Government 2.39* 1.17 -0.66† -0.39
(1.03) (1.03) (0.35) (0.37)
Minority Incumbent Government 1.51 1.97† 0.24 0.22
(1.01) (1.06) (0.35) (0.77)
Left Incumbent Government 0.16 -0.63
(0.88) (0.97)
Electoral System Disproportionality -0.78*** -0.79***
(0.16) (0.15)
Constant 1.05 -0.33 4.70† 3.33 -0.32 0.78
(1.81) (1.86) (2.84) (2.49) (0.63) (0.56)
N 217 191 216 191 217 191
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
Neither Local Unemployment nor National Unemployment are have statistically
significant effects on any of the dependent variables. However, high levels of Global
Unemployment produces significantly negative changes in both the vote and seat
shares of incumbent prime ministerial parties. It does not, however, have any effect
on the likelihood the prime minister retains her post. OECD Unemployment also has
a significant negative effect on the change in lead party vote share, a negative but
statistically insignificant effect on changes in seat share, and an unexpected positive
and marginally significant effect on her likelihood of retaining office. I expected
that the direct effects of the economy would be strongest in changes in vote share
and would wane as we moved further from the voter, and this is precisely what we
find. Kayser and Peress (2012) would likely find the lack of significance of the local
component of unemployment puzzling, as they find it to have the strongest impact on
incumbent vote shares. However, given the finding in Chapter 4, we know that local
147
Table 5.2: Election Type as Mediator of the Economic Voting Relationship
Vote Vote Seat Seat Retention Retention
Local Unemployment -0.12 -0.25 -0.03
(0.15) (0.19) (0.05)
Global Unemployment -0.45** -0.68** -0.06
(0.16) (0.24) (0.05)
National Unemployment -0.06 -0.36† -0.06
(0.14) (0.22) (0.05)
OECD Unemployment -0.67** -0.73* 0.08
(0.23) (0.34) (0.08)
Premier-timed 2.75** 2.98** 5.61*** 6.48*** 0.74* 0.88*
(1.00) (1.02) (1.36) (1.34) (0.34) (0.37)
Opposition-timed -0.04 -0.13 0.14 0.87 -0.68 -0.67
(1.37) (1.52) (1.79) (1.98) (0.44) (0.48)
Effective Number of Parl. Parties -0.23 -0.05 0.19*** 0.16 0.11 0.02
(0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.42) (0.13) (0.14)
Coalition Incumbent Government 2.82** 1.55 -0.51 -0.28
(1.02) (1.02) (0.36) (0.39)
Minority Incumbent Government 1.37 1.74 0.34 0.28
(1.02) (1.07) (0.39) (0.41)
Left Incumbent Government 0.51 -0.10
(0.87) (0.95)
Electoral System Disproportionality -0.84*** -0.84***
(0.15) (0.14)
Constant -0.17 -1.45 2.87 1.98 -0.49 0.64
(1.91) (1.86) (2.87) (2.47) (0.66) (0.58)
N 217 191 216 191 217 191
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
unemployment has an additional route by which it can affect electoral outcomes: its
impact on the type of election.
Premier-timed elections have a positive and statistically significant effect on all
measures of electoral success. Lead parties can expect to improve their vote shares
by nearly three percentage points and their seat shares by five percentage points!
When holding all other covariates at their median values, a incumbent is up to 25
percent more likely to return to the prime ministership following a premier-timed
election than she is following an end-of-term election.8 These are substantial effects
and provide clear evidence that the capacity of prime ministers to choose when they
face voters does help them stay in office longer.
8Change in predicted probability calculated using estimates from column 5.
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Opposition-timed elections have the expected negative relationship to both changes
in vote share and retention of the premier. While the z-ratios of the coefficients shrink
as one moves across the table from change in vote share to retention, and approaches
marginal levels of significance in the fifth column, opposition-timed elections do not
have a significant effect on incumbent electoral performance compared to end-of-term
elections. When the model in Column 5 is re-estimated excluding the “Early Other”
elections, opposition-timed elections have a negative and statistically significant ef-
fect at the 0.08 level. However, this result is not replicated in re-estimations of the
model in Column 6 that uses Local and Global Unemployment as measures of eco-
nomic performance, casting doubts on the reliability of this sole significant coefficient
estimate. This is a disappointing result, but not an entirely unexpected one. With
only 34 cases of opposition-timed elections observed there is scant statistical power
with which to calculate effects. The consistency of the direction of the relationship be-
tween opposition-timed elections and incumbent electoral outcomes is suggestive that
these elections are a somewhat effective tool for opposition parties to move the locus
of governmental power. The descriptive statistics suggest that there is an important
difference in the prime minister’s retention between premier- and opposition-timed
elections: over 70% of prime ministers return to their office following premier-timed
elections, but only 35% of them do following opposition-timed elections.
While we would ideally estimate the indirect effect of domestic unemployment by
combining the results from Chapter 4 with those above, this is not possible. The
strategic probit model used to estimate the utility functions of the prime minister
and opposition over different types of elections does not readily translate to the type
of effects envisioned by Zhao, Lynch and Chen (2010). The strategic probit results
do indicate that when the prime minister can unilaterally dissolve parliament, higher
levels of Local Unemployment reduces her incentive to do so. This means that higher
Local Unemployment reduces the likelihood of being in a premier-timed election,
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thereby leading to smaller increases in vote share, seat share, and the likelihood of
re-entering the prime ministership.
The effects of Local Unemployment on election outcomes through opposition-
timed elections is more tenuous. While the coefficient on the interaction between
the head of state’s unilateral capacity to dissolve parliament and unemployment was
signed such that increased unemployment increased the incentive to bring about an
opposition-timed election, this was insignificant. Instead, the only instance in which
Local Unemployment had a statistically significant impact on the opposition’s utility
over forcing an election was when the interaction with the head of state’s power was
omitted. In this instance, higher domestic unemployment reduced the incentive to
bring about opposition-timed elections. If this relationship reflects the true data gen-
erating process, then the indirect effect of Local Unemployment on election outcomes
is to mildly improve the incumbent’s electoral prospects, though not significantly so,
in contrast to theory. In all likelihood, the same problems of low statistical power for
the opposition-timed elections discussed above produced the insignificant results in
Chapter IV.
Considering the effects of the control variables, the effective number of parties in
the parliament has an unexpected positive and significant effect on changes in seat
share for incumbents, but no statistically significant effect for either changes in vote
share or control of the prime ministership. An incumbent who was a member of a
coalition government experiences an increase in their vote share, significantly so in
the first column, but this has no statistically significant effect on their likelihood of
retaining their post (the final two columns). Neither minority nor left-wing incum-
bent governments have no effects in any estimation. As expected, increased electoral
system disproportionality has a tendency to harm incumbents’ seat shares.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 align with many of the literature’s findings: that the economy’s
direct effects on election outcomes are small. However, the type of election has a large
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and significant effect on who wins an election. From Chapter IV we know that the
economy has an important effect on which type of election voters find themselves in.
Combined, this strongly suggests that an important way in which the economy affects
elections is through the calling of elections themselves. Most importantly, the type of
election strongly predicts the retention of the prime minister, a key finding in support
of this dissertation’s theory.
5.4 An alternative relationship: elections as a moderating
variable
While there is evidence in favor of the theory that elections act as a mediating
variable of the economic vote, there is an alternative relationship between economic
performance, election type, and election outcomes that merits exploration: elections
as a moderating variable on election outcomes. Moderators alter the level of an exist-
ing relationship between two variables (e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986; Brambor, Clark
and Golder, 2006). It could be that there is a baseline level of economic voting that
is moderated by the type of election. If, for instance, voters observe an early election
and discount their use of economic performance in their vote decision, as proposed
by Smith (2004), this might be observed by negative coefficients on an interaction
between premier-timed elections and unemployment or a positive coefficient on an in-
teraction between unemployment and opposition-timed elections. Alternatively, if the
salience of the economy falls when the economy improves as Bloom and Price (1975)
argue, then, if prime ministers (oppositions) call elections when the economy is up
(down), we would expect a negative coefficient on the interaction with opposition-
timed elections and a positive sign on the interaction with premier-timed elections.
The latter is consistent with the assumption of low-information voters adopted here.
To test this alternative view of elections as moderating variables, I have repro-
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Table 5.3: Election Type as Moderator of the Economic Voting Relationship
Vote Vote Seat Seat Retention Retention
Local Unemployment -0.12 -0.10 -0.06
(0.21) (0.27) (0.07)
Global Unemployment -0.43** -0.63** -0.07
(0.16) (0.24) (0.06)
National Unemployment -0.03 -0.56 -0.12†
(0.19) (0.37) (0.07)
OECD Unemployment -0.67** -0.76* 0.07
(0.23) (0.33) (0.08)
Premier-timed 2.50* 2.82** 5.33*** 6.48*** 0.64† 0.85*
(1.02) (1.02) (1.39) (1.33) (0.34) (0.37)
Opposition-timed 0.32 0.32 0.43 1.41 -0.65 -0.64
(1.38) (1.43) (1.83) (1.97) (0.45) (0.50)
Unemployment*Premier 0.15 0.20 0.50 -0.13 0.17 0.09
(0.31) (0.30) (0.48) (0.40) (0.11) (0.10)
Unemployment*Opposition -0.37 -0.46 0.03 -0.55 0.04 -0.04
(0.40) (0.48) (0.57) (0.59) (0.12) (0.14)
Effective Number of Parl. Parties -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.08 0.10*** 0.02
(0.35) (0.40) (0.41) (0.44) (0.13) (0.14)
Coalition Incumbent Government 2.88** 1.67† -0.50 -0.25
(1.02) (1.01) (0.36) (0.39)
Minority Incumbent Government 1.75† 2.13† 0.40 0.37
(1.06) (1.09) (0.41) (0.42)
Left Incumbent Government 0.41 -0.21
(0.88) (0.95)
Electoral System Disproportionality -0.83*** -0.85***
(0.15) (0.14)
Constant 0.10** -1.48 2.93 2.04 -0.46 -0.63
(1.93) (1.84) (2.93) (2.48) (0.67) (0.59)
N 217 191 216 191 217 191
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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duced the second stage regressions from Table 5.2, but include interaction terms
between the type of election and domestic unemployment in Table 5.3. In these
regressions, the coefficients on Local Unemployment and National Unemployment de-
note the effects of these local components of the economy electoral outcomes during
end-of-term elections. In only the fourth column (changes in seat share with Na-
tional Unemployment measuring economic performance) does this estimate approach
statistical significance. In the first two columns, the coefficients on the interaction be-
tween both Local and National Unemployment is positive for premier-timed elections
and negative for opposition-timed elections, though both interactions are statistically
insignificant. The marginal effects increased domestic unemployment are likewise sta-
tistically insignificant, though they approach significance (p=0.16) for the interaction
with Local Unemployment. While the signs on the interaction effects are consistent
with the economically contingent salience argument, there is insufficient evidence here
to suggest that the weak effects of the domestic economy for voters found in Table
5.2 are due to moderating relationship. The interaction between Local Unemployment
and premier-timed elections changes sign when seat share change is the dependent
variable, while the interaction with National Unemployment and opposition-timed
elections also switches for this analysis. None of these coefficients, nor the marginal
effects, were significant when change in seat share is the dependent variable. Fi-
nally, the coefficients on the interactions when retention is the dependent variable are
generally aligned with those of vote share, namely in the direction of economically
contingent salience. However, again, they are highly insignificant.
Once again, higher Global Unemployment produces falls a decrease in both vote
and seat share. Increased OECD Unemployment produces a negative change in vote
share, but has a positive and marginally significant effect on the prime minister’s
retention, as in Table 5.2.
Premier-timed elections continue to have positive and statistically significant ef-
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fects on all dependent variables at broadly similar magnitudes to those found in Table
5.2. Opposition-timed elections are statistically insignificant across the board. Taken
as a whole, there is no support for the economic vote’s moderation by election type.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter takes the final step toward determining the primary path through
which elections shape electoral outcomes. The results above show that election types
mediate the effects of unemployment on incumbent electoral success. While the econ-
omy still has direct effects on election outcomes, particularly through the international
components of unemployment on changes in incumbent vote and seat share, it also
has important indirect effects through its influence on the type of election. Premier-
timed elections have a significant positive effect for all three measures of electoral suc-
cess. Opposition-timed elections produce consistently negative coefficient estimates
for both vote share and, importantly, prime ministerial retention. In Chapter IV I
demonstrate that Local Unemployment is an important factor affecting the utilities
of both prime ministers and oppositions in their decision to initiate early elections.
In combination, these two sets of findings support the argument that an important
avenue through which the economy affects electoral outcomes is through its effects
on who calls an election and when. Elections called by the prime minister are signif-
icantly more likely to return her to power, while those called by the opposition may
lead to increased turnover in control of the cabinet.
This chapter also tested an alternative hypothesis that election types moderate
the effects of the economy. The evidence resoundingly rejects this argument. The
effects of the domestic components of unemployment are not contingent on the type
of election. While the signs on the interaction effects were generally supportive of an
economically contingent salience argument, these coefficients and the marginal effects
of unemployment never reached statistical significance. This leaves only the election
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type as mediator hypothesis standing.
These findings have significant implications for our understanding of economic
voting as a proxy for democratic accountability. Though the economy still has some
direct effects on changes in vote share, it also has important effects on when voters go
to the polls. Earlier contributions to the macro-level economic voting literature argued
that the state of the economy has a larger impact when institutions concentrate power,
and that this larger impact improved accountability (e.g., Powell and Whitten, 1993).
The politician centered theory of economic voting propagated in this dissertation
suggests that, in fact, the opposite may be true: if the economy matters more for
election outcomes in contexts with higher concentrations of power it is because these
institutions allow for more opportunistic election timing. If voters are myopic and
are not paying particularly close attention to how an election came about, then this




This dissertation was inspired by a troubling puzzle: why is there such little
support for the idea that the state of the economy affects electoral support for in-
cumbents? The existing literature on macro-level economic voting has tended to find
very little, highly-contingent support that is often built on unpersuasive empirics.
I argue that by focusing on the behavior of politicians, we can better understand
how the economy affects who wins elections. Analyzing novel data that categorizes
elections by which political actor precipitates them, I show that an important avenue
through which the economy influences who governs is through its effects on the timing
of elections by those both in and out of government.
In Chapter 1, I substantiate that early work on the foundational clarity of respon-
sibility hypothesis suffers from significant estimation and inferential errors. After
correcting for those errors, there is little evidence that institutions that concentrate
power (thereby clarifying who is in charge) moderate the economy’s effects. The
economic voting literature at the macro- and micro-levels is built in part around the
clarity of responsibility hypothesis’ assumption that voters are aware not only of the
state of the economy, but also the degree to which individual political parties are
responsible for its state (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993;
Whitten and Palmer, 1999). The lack of support for the clarity of responsibility hy-
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pothesis serves as my point of departure in a discussion of how alternative frameworks
for evaluating how the economy matters in elections can produce additional empirical
implications based on simpler assumptions of voters and politicians to differentiate it
from the clarity of responsibility theory.
The theory introduced in Chapter 2 and further developed in Chapters 4 and 5, is
built on a simpler set of assumptions about voters and brings in a heretofore neglected
actor in the economic voting literature: political parties. I assume that voters use the
economy to help determine their vote choice and focus their attributions for economic
performance on the prime minister’s party, but otherwise pay little attention to the
finer details of how power is distributed. Politicians, on the other hand, are both
highly attuned to the nuances of political power and institutions, and are incentivized
to use voters’ economic performance heuristic to further their goal of gaining office
whenever they have the opportunity. In order to secure high office, politicians in most
parliamentary countries will try to dissolve parliament at economically opportune
moments. This is an incentive shared by those in the prime minister’s party and in
the opposition. The capacity of any actor to precipitate early elections varies. I show
that there are both theoretical and empirical connections between measures of clarity
of responsibility and the capacity to call early elections.
I identify a categorization scheme that divides elections into four mutually exclu-
sive types: end-of-term, premier-timed, opposition-timed, and other-early elections.
While the frequency with which parliaments end before their full mandate is reached
is a topic of extensive scholarship, the category of opposition-timed elections is a new
one. Previous studies had either ignored it or lumped it in with elections brought
about by the prime minister. The theory advocated in this dissertation demonstrates
that opposition-timed elections ought to come about under different institutional and
economic contexts than premier-time elections, and should have much more dire con-
sequences for incumbents. Chapter 3 details all elections included in the data used in
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this dissertation and discusses the multiple ways that elections in each of these general
classes manifest themselves. I go on to describe regularities in the types of elections
held across countries with similar institutions. Countries in which the prime minister
can unilaterally dissolve parliament have a high proportion of premier-timed elections.
Those countries with a head of state who can dissolve parliament without the prime
minister’s approval have a relatively high proportion of opposition-timed elections.
When dissolution requires the assent of multiple actors, very few parliaments end
early.
The regularities between the institutional capacity to dissolve parliament and the
types of elections countries tend to experience is scrutinized in Chapter 4. Having
the ability to dissolve parliament at any moment does not mean that an actor has the
incentive to do so: economic performance shapes the will to use the tools of election
timing. Using a strategic probit model, I find support for the argument that having
the institutional means to force early elections increases the instances of calling early
elections, but this effect is moderated by economic performance. There is significant
evidence of this effect for premier-timed elections, though less substantial evidence
for the moderating effects of the economy on opposition-timed elections.
Chapter 5 uses the findings from the analyses in Chapter 4 to determine whether
elections called by prime ministers rather than oppositions, or being held at the end
of the term, produce different outcomes. Using three measures of electoral success–
change in prime ministerial vote share, prime ministerial seat share, and retention of
the office of prime minister–I find that the type of election has a significant impact on
electoral outcomes. Elections called by the prime minister result in positive swings
in vote and seat share, and substantially improve the likelihood of heading the post-
election government. Opposition-timed elections are associated with negative swings
in vote and seat share, and depressed chances of returning to the prime ministership,
though none of these relationships are statistically significant. The importance of
158
economic performance in determining which type of election voters find themselves
in, however, means that one of the important ways in which economic performance
affects who wins elections and who governs is through its effects on election type.
These findings have important implications for our understanding of economic
voting as a proxy for democratic accountability. While the economy directly affects
changes in vote share and seat share, it also has important effects on when voters go
to the polls. Much of the macro-level economic voting literature has viewed the econ-
omy’s increased importance in election outcomes when institutions concentrate power
as indicative of higher levels of democratic accountability (e.g., Powell and Whitten,
1993). The politician-centered theory of economic voting propagated suggests that
the opposite is true: if the economy matters more for election outcomes when power
is concentrated, it is because these institutions allow for more opportunistic election
timing. If voters are myopic observers of the economy and are not paying particu-
larly close attention to how an election came about, then this opportunism diminishes
democratic accountability. Thus, one of the purported benefits of concentrated power
cuts the other way, providing politicians the opportunity to skirt accountability to
voters that would be less available in more constrained systems.
There are a number of potential avenues for future research in this field. The spar-
sity of opposition-timed election observations is likely limiting our ability to clearly
identify the effects of this type of election. Expanding the dataset is thus a natu-
ral first step. In particular, coding earlier elections in the countries considered in
the dissertation could provide additional cases of opposition-timed elections, though
expanding the dataset to other democracies is an additional possibility.
Chapter 4 described an alternative framework for determining what factors pro-
duce the different types of elections. I am currently creating a parallel dataset or-
ganized at the country-quarter level, rather than the country-election level, that will
allow me to employ a competing risks event history model to answer this question.
159
This method will allow me to test additional implications of my theory and provide
a robustness check to the main results of Chapter 4.
Finally, this dissertation has assumed that economic performance is an exogenous
contextual attribute to which politicians respond. However, the political business
cycle and political budget cycle literatures argue that politicians attempt to, and
are sometimes successful in, manipulating the economy (e.g., Clark, 2003; Franzese,
2002; Shi and Svensson, 2006). This has a number of potential implications for my
theory. If election timing manipulation and economic policy/outcome manipulation
are two potential tools that politicians can use to improve their electoral prospects,
they may be used as substitutes. While fixed-term electoral systems such as the
US and Norway have only economic policy/outcomes manipulation to work with,
parliamentary systems may have both. When election timing is easy to manipulate,
it is likely to be used. However, as mandatory elections near, there is likely to be
a greater incentive to use policy manipulation to produce an economic boost in the
run-up to elections. Further, these manipulations, because they do not happen often,
may come as a ‘surprise’ to markets, producing a relatively larger effect on short-
run output than a similarly sized stimulus in countries that use policy manipulation
more often. Additionally, as the capacity of politicians to manipulate policy has
diminished over time with the floating of exchange rates, increased capital mobility,
and increased independence of central banks, governments that may have waited to
call elections, knowing they could manipulate the economy, will become increasingly
likely to call earlier elections, to do so under relatively worse economic circumstances,
and/or earlier in their terms.
This project has performed the preliminary work necessary to explore such pos-
sibilities. The next step is to consider how the additional (and varyingly effective)
tool of macroeconomic manipulation coupled with the ability to time elections affects
both economic and political outcomes. At what point do politicians with the capacity
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to call elections at will instead choose to alter short-run output? Do countries more
at the mercy of international markets experience more opportunistic elections? Do
their leaders still attempt to manipulate the economy (with little expected effect)
when they cannot easily call elections? Is one form of manipulation more effective
than the other? While this dissertation can say that the state of the economy affects
the type, and thereby, outcome of elections we still need to better understand the
tradeoffs that politicians make in their attempts to hold power and how these choices
affect their national economies. The weak support for economic voting at the level of
election outcomes is largely due to a theoretical and empirical oversights in the liter-
ature that are addressed in this dissertation. The reason that evidence of economic
voting has been “intermittent, highly contingent, and substantively small, is that the
scholars have looked to voters instead of politicians to do the work of interpreting the
accountability of incumbents for the state of the economy (Anderson, 2007, pg. 286).
When politicians are strategic but potentially constrained, we see that they choose






Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Government Vote ShareW&P 46.28 12.15 10.6 91.6 138
Government Vote ShareFullSample 45.43 13.03 6.8 95.8 253
Percentage Change in Gov’t Vote Share -0.008 0.87 -0.80 0.82 253
Comparative Growth -0.30 1.66 -6.48 4.46 138
Comparative Inflation -3.28 3.74 -14.33 7.72 138
Comparative Unemployment 0.14 3.53 -6.93 13.91 138
Relative Growth -0.14 2.27 -8.87 7.20 245
Relative Inflation 0.55 2.78 -9.99 -11.28 245
Relative Unemployment 0.32 1.53 -5.41 6.15 252
Minority Duration 5.92 13.26 0 58 253
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for Ordinal Variables
0 1 2 3 4 5
Minority 192 68 - - - -
Coalition 128 126 - - - -
# Gov Parties - 77 28 7 23 3
Clarity (3 categories) 65 120 75 - - -
ClarityW&P 8 57 120 75 - -
ClarityMine 15 51 144 50 - -
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APPENDIX B
Meta-Analysis of Clarity of Responsibility Support
Some might argue that the models above are cherry-picked to undermine the
clarity of responsibility theory. While the evidence above draws on the insights of
some of the most cited work in the field, these weak results may stem from particular
measurement choices. In order to ensure that we know whether the results above are
representative of larger trends, I estimated 1,620 regression coefficient combinations
that employ various measures of both the independent and dependent variables. The
direction and significance of each variable of interest is noted in the tables below, as
well as the joint significance of the marginal effects for each regression. Instead of
reporting all of the coefficients in a (seemlingly endless) series of tables, I present an
aggregation of the results for each general measure of economic performance (growth,
inflation, and unemployment) as they relate to institutional attributes that serve to
reduce clarity of responsibility.
The estimates shown below include five measures of clarity of responsibility. Namely,
these are the five constituent attributes of the indices used above: an upper house
of parliament controlled by opposition parties, coalition government, minority gov-
ernment, opposition control of committee chairmanships, and weak party cohesion.
While various institutional attributes have been posited by the literature to impede
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voters’ attributions of responsibility for policy outcomes, the arguments underlying
these measures do not imply any interactive effect on the presence of a particular
combination of institutions. As such, they ought to each have an independent effect
on the economy’s impact on election outcomes. One useful attribute of dividing the
moderating variable into its constituent parts is that the interaction terms are much
easier to interpret. Because the clarity of responsibility measures only take on a value
of zero or one, the statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term
can tell us whether the presence of the moderating variable produces a statistically
significant difference on the effect of the economic variable compared to its absence.
Tables B.1 through B.5 are arranged by the institutional attribute interacted with
the various measures of economic performance.
The regressions described in the tables below use a variety of different measures of
incumbent vote support. The first potential means of dividing the dependent variable
is by the focus of voter attributions. While Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whit-
ten and Palmer (1999) consider total government vote share, the political behavior
literature indicates that voters will focus on a single, highly visible actor when at-
tributing responsibility and blame (e.g., Blais et al., 2009; Duch and Stevenson, 2008;
Gerber and Hunter, 2009). More recent work as focused the vote share of the prime
minister’s party or the finance minister’s party (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). The
regressions described below consider these three partisan actors (government, prime
minister, and finance minister) as potential loci of voter ire or reward. Further, there
are multiple ways in which support can be measured. Total vote share (used above)
is one measure. However, the change in vote share or the percentage change in vote
share could also be considered reasonable metrics. Combining these two dimensions of
dependent variable measurement, we end up with a total of nine dependent variables
used for each table below.
Furthermore, the appropriate measurement of our three economic variables is not
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self-evident. The regressions above employ two measures of economic performance:
comparative1 and relative.2 Two additional measurement strategies are added below.
First the percentage change in the economy in the year leading up to the election
compared to the previous year is used. This measure accounts for large, noticeable
swings in economic performance that may be particularly notable to less politically
engaged voters (Lupia et al., 2011). Finally, in line with numerous studies, the simple
growth, inflation, and unemployment rates in the year prior to the election are used
(e.g., Clagget, 1986; Pacek, 1994).
Each regression included only one of the three economic variables (i.e., if un-
employment is included, neither inflation nor growth effects are estimated). Earlier
estimates that include all three measures are likely to suffer from problems of multi-
colinearity, as growth and employment tend to move in tandem, while theory suggests
a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (Achen, 1982; Clagget, 1986). The
economic measure is then interacted with a single institutional attribute (e.g., weak
party cohesion) and the marginal effects of the institutional attribute on each eco-
nomic measure is then estimated, along with the significance of the marginal effect.
Finally, a standard battery of controls is included. Regressions estimate panel cor-
rected standard errors as above. The general form of the regressions described in the
tables below is:
Support = β0 + β1Economy + β2Clarity + β3Economy ∗ Clarity + βNX (B.1)
Because of the large number of estimates3 (108 for each measure of the economy
in each table), instead of discussing the results of the regressions individually Tables
1Comparing current economic performance to the OECD average for the year prior to the election.
2Comparing current national economic performance to the average national economy over the
four previous years.
3Data and do-files to replicate all estimates can be found on the author’s website.
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B.1 through B.5 provide information on the number of sets of coefficients that showed
particular characteristics. The tables each report on the coefficients for the economic
variable and its interaction with a single moderating variable (for example, Table B.4
specifies the relationship between the economy and the proportional distribution of
committee chairmanships, which indicates that some committees are chaired by mem-
bers of opposition parties). Specifically, each table provides information on how many
coefficients on growth, inflation and unemployment, measured in four different ways,
were correctly signed for the economic constitutive term, the interaction term, both
the constitutive term and the interaction term, or neither coefficient. The number in
parentheses shows the number of those cases in which the coefficient was statistically
significant at the 95 percent confidence level (or in the cases considering both the
constitutive and interactive terms, the interactive term was statistically significant).
Table B.1 shows the results for interactions between the economic variables and
the dummy for opposition control of an upper parliamentary house. The first row
shows the number of cases in which β1, the coefficient on the constitutive economic
term, was correctly signed (positive for growth; negative for inflation and unemploy-
ment) but the interactive term was incorrectly signed. Growth was correctly signed
in 24 regressions; inflation was correctly signed in only 3; and 101 were correctly
signed for unemployment. In no case, however, were any of these estimated coeffi-
cients statistically significant. Likewise, the second row shows that the cases in which
the coefficient on the interaction term was estimated to be in the correct direction
(opposite to the expected direction of the constitutive term), but the constitutive
term was incorrectly signed. None of those interaction coefficients were estimated to
be statistically significant. In fact, very few cases fall into this category, with only 9
growth interactions, 58 inflation interactions, and 3 correctly signed unemployment
interactions being paired with an incorrectly signed constitutive term. The third row
shows the cases in which neither the constitutive economic term nor its interaction
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Table B.1: Coefficient signs for Divided Government interactions with Economic Per-
formance
Growth Inflation Unemployment
Only β1 Correct 24 (0) 3 (0) 101 (0)
Only β3 Correct 9 (0) 58 (0) 3 (0)
Neither β1 nor β3 Correct 72 (15) 15 (0) 4 (0)
Both β1 & β3 Correct 3 (0) 29 (0) 3 (0)
with divided government was correctly signed. Fully 72 regressions estimated this
effect when considering growth, of which 15 were statistically significant. This is
implies a perverse relationship in which the incumbent government is harmed by im-
proving GDP growth, and is only rewarded when it has to govern with an opposition
controlled second chamber. The perverse economic voting relationships were less per-
vasive when considering either inflation or unemployment with only 15 and 4 cases
falling into this category, respectively. Finally, the fourth row shows the number of
regressions in which both the coefficient on β1 and β3 were correctly signed. Regres-
sions considering either growth and unemployment as the economic measure had only
3 cases each where the expected relationship is observed. 29 regressions with inflation
found the expected relationship, but like the unemployment and growth regressions,
none of these were found to produce a statistically significant marginal effect.
Table B.2 shows the same coefficient relationships when economic performance is
interacted with coalition government as a measure of institutional clarity. Given that
a government contains multiple parties rather than a single party is readily available
information that ought to be low cost for voters to learn, we would expect this to
have a particularly strong moderating effect on economic voting. Very few sets of
coefficients have either the β1 or β3 solely signed correctly, and in none of those cases
is the coefficient significant. The third row shows that there were, however, a large
number of estimates in which both coefficients were incorrectly signed for inflation
and growth, but no set was incorrectly signed for unemployment and its interation.
There are 74 sets of coefficients that are signed counter to theory for growth, of which
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Table B.2: Coefficient signs for Coalition Government interactions with Economic
Performance
Growth Inflation Unemployment
Only β1 Correct 10 (0) 8 (0) 10 (0)
Only β3 Correct 6 (0) 29 (0) 4 (0)
Neither β1 nor β3 Correct 74 (21) 50 (0) 0
Both β1 & β3 Correct 18 (0) 21 (0) 94 (15)
21 were statistically significant. This implies that as growth increases, single party
governments are likely to either be punished or receive no credit, while coalition gov-
ernments (or the leading parties of those governments) are likely to be rewarded, the
precise opposite of what is predicted by the economic voting literature. On the other
hand, the final row of Table B.2 shows that most estimates of unemployment’s effects
(94 of 108) have both coefficients correctly signed and 15 are also statistically signif-
icant, indicating that coalitions have the expected moderating effect on punishment
of governments when they rule of periods of higher unemployment. The evidence
from unemployment bolsters the existing literature’s claims, but those for growth
undermine it.
Considering the moderating effects of minority governments, we can see from the
last row of Table B.3 that while there were a considerable number of regressions in
which the coefficients on both β1 and β3 were signed in accordance with theory (partic-
ularly among the sets of coefficients including unemployment or inflation), none were
statistically significant. The third row shows that the majority of coefficient sets that
include a measurement of GDP growth (62 of 108) were incorrectly signed, of which
12 were also statistically significant. The second row shows that the plurality of coef-
ficient sets including inflation (48) had a theoretically inconsistently signed estimate
for the constitutive term but a correctly signed interactive term, though again, none
were statistically significant. Finally, the first row shows that a substantial number of
coefficient sets including growth and unemployment had correctly signed constitutive
terms and incorrectly signed interactive terms, 25 and 39 respectively. Of those, none
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Table B.3: Coefficient signs for Minority Government interactions with Economic
Performance
Growth Inflation Unemployment
Only β1 Correct 25 (0) 3 (0) 39 (3)
Only β3 Correct 18 (0) 48 (0) 0
Neither β1 nor β3 Correct 62 (12) 28 (0) 4 (0)
Both β1 & β3 Correct 3 (0) 29 (0) 65 (0)
Table B.4: Coefficient signs for Opposition Control of Committee Chairmanships
interactions with Economic Performance
Growth Inflation Unemployment
Only β1 Correct 11 (0) 18 (0) 2 (0)
Only β3 Correct 12 (0) 14 (0) 0
Neither β1 nor β3 Correct 68 (5) 62 (3) 4 (0)
Both β1 & β3 Correct 17 (0) 14 (0) 102 (1)
were statistically significant for growth and three were significant for unemployment.
This implies that increased unemployment may harm all governments, but it does
not harm minority governments any less than majority ones.
There are again few sets of coefficients in which only one of the coefficients is
correctly signed when moderated by opposition control of committee chairmanships
in Table B.4, as seen in the first two rows. The third row of Table B.4 is slightly
more concerning. The majority of estimated set of coefficients for both growth (68)
and inflation (62) suggest the perverse moderating effects described above. Five of
these sets of coefficients on growth and three sets on inflation result in statistically
significant marginal effects. This implies that those governments that have the most
control over agendas in parliamentary committees are rewarded for worse performance
on these economic measures, while those who need to compromise with opposition
parties are punished for these outcomes. The final row, however, finds that fully
102 of the 108 estimated regressions including unemployment produce coefficients in
which both the constitutive and interactive terms are correctly signed, though only
one set produced statistically significant marginal effects.
171
Table B.5: Coefficient signs for Weak Party Cohesion interactions with Economic
Performance
Growth Inflation Unemployment
Only β1 Correct 15 (0) 0 92 (2)
Only β3 Correct 0 28 (0) 0
Neither β1 nor β3 Correct 81 (42) 48 (0) 3 (0)
Both β1 & β3 Correct 12 (0) 32 (0) 13 (0)
Finally, Table B.5 shows the moderating effects of weak party cohesion on eco-
nomic voting. The first row shows that the vast majority of constitutive unemploy-
ment coefficient estimates (92) were correctly signed, but paired with an incorrectly
signed interactive coefficient, of which two produced statistically significant marginal
effects. From the second row, we can see that there were no sets of coefficients in-
cluding either growth or unemployment that had an incorrectly signed constitutive
term and correctly signed interactive term, but there were 28 such sets of coefficients
that included inflation. The third row shows that a plurality of the coefficients that
consider inflation (48) and a large majority of the coefficient sets with growth (81)
estimated both the constitutive and interactive terms to be incorrectly signed. While
these numbers are similar to those in Tables B.2 and B.4, the number of incorrectly
signed sets that were statistically significant in these earlier models was negligible. As
can be seen in the first cell of the third row, the majority of those sets of incorrectly
signed coefficients including growth–and nearly a majority of all estimated coefficient
sets–are statistically significant, with 42 statistically significant perverse marginal ef-
fects. The final row indicates that a sizable number of estimated sets of inflation
coefficients (32) were correctly signed, but few growth (12) or unemployment (13)
were correctly signed, and there were none that were statistically significant.
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APPENDIX C
Election Types and Descriptions
Country Date Type Description
Australia 1972-12-2 End-of-term —–
Australia 1974-5-18 Premier-
timed
Whitlam facing opposition in
the Senate and a government
loss on three supply (budget)
bills, asked for a double dis-
solution from the Governor-




PM Whitlam following a
five-week standoff between
Liberal-National controlled
Senate and Government over
supply bill.
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Country Date Type Description
Australia 1977-12-10 Premier-
timed
PM Fraser requested that
House of Representatives be
dissolved to synchronize bal-
loting with regularly scheduled
election of half of Senate.
Australia 1980-10-18 End-of-term —–
Australia 1983-3-5 Premier-
timed
PM Fraser requested a double-
dissolution to overcome the two
houses’ inability to agree on a
number of economic bills and
the strong Labour opposition




PM Hawke said he called for
early election of House of Rep-
resentatives to allow voters to
pass judgment on the govern-
ment and renew its mandate.
Australia 1987-7-11 Premier-
timed
PM Hawke requested a double-
dissolution to address the Sen-
ate’s rejection of the govern-
ment’s tax reform plan.
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Country Date Type Description
Australia 1990-3-24 Premier-
timed
PM Hawke dissolved House of
Representatives in order to syn-
chronize the election with the
Senate election. Viewed by
many as a response to Liberal-
National disorganization.
Australia 1993-3-13 End-of-term —–
Australia 1996-3-2 End-of-term —–
Australia 1998-10-3 Premier-
timed
PM Howard called a snap elec-
tion following announcements
of tax reforms, fears of a dete-
riorating economy, and leveling
of opinion polls with the oppo-
sition ALP.
Australia 2001-11-10 End-of-term —–
Australia 2004-10-9 End-of-term —–
Australia 2007-11-24 End-of-term —–
Australia 2010-8-21 Premier-
timed
Following an internal challenge
to PM Rudd, PM Julia Gillard
called new elections 2 months
after coming to power.
Austria 1970-3-1 End-of-term —–
Austria 1971-10-10 Premier-
timed
SPÖ minority government dis-
solved parliament following the
withdrawal of outside support
by the FPÖ in July.
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Country Date Type Description
Austria 1975-10-5 End-of-term —–
Austria 1979-5-6 Premier-
timed
Chancellor Kreisky called early
elections following the govern-
ment’s loss on a national ref-
erendum to open the country’s
first nuclear power plant.
Austria 1983-4-24 End-of-term —–
Austria 1986-11-23 Premier-
timed
The SPÖ ended its coalition
with the smaller FPÖ follow-
ing the FPÖ’s perceived shift
to the right with the election of
Jorg Haider as its leader.
Austria 1990-10-7 End-of-term —–
Austria 1994-10-9 End-of-term —–
Austria 1995-12-17 Opposition-
timed
Junior coalition partner (ÖVP)
withdrew from coalition with
SPÖ. The coalition agreement
between the parties tied the
fate of the parliament to the
tenure of the government; the
dissolution of the government
forced Chancellor Vranitzky to
call early elections.
Austria 1999-10-3 End-of-term —–
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Country Date Type Description
Austria 2002-11-24 Opposition-
timed
An internal coup in the ju-
nior coalition FPÖ party that
returned Jorg Haider to lead
the party made it a party the
ÖVP could no longer work
with. Following the dissolution
of the government, Chancellor
Schuessel asked the parliament
to vote on dissolution, which it
approved.
Austria 2006-10-1 End-of-term —–
Austria 2008-9-28 Opposition-
timed
Following prolonged policy dis-
agreements between the grand
coalition of the SPÖ and ÖVP,
the junior ÖVP withdrew from
the coalition, forcing a dissolu-
tion of parliament as per the
coalition agreement tying the
survival of the parliament to
the survival of the government.
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Country Date Type Description
Belgium 1968-3-31 Early other A constitutional change in the
federal structure of the state
led to an automatic dissolution
of the parliament, because con-
stitutional changes need to be
passed by two parliaments with
an election between them.
Belgium 1971-4-17 Early other Parliament was dissolved fol-
lowing the First State reform
establishing the cultural com-
munities by the Belgian consti-
tution in 1970. Any amend-
ment of the constitution re-
quires the dissolution of the
parliament and the amendment
passed again by the subsequent
parliament.
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Country Date Type Description
Belgium 1974-3-10 Opposition-
timed
The three-party coalition fell
in a crisis over Iran’s with-
drawal from a joint refinery
project with Belgium. When
King Baudoin asked Tinde-
mans to form another govern-
ment, his attempts failed due
to the French speaking group




PM Tindemans dissolved par-
liament shortly after expelling
two of his RW coalition part-
ners’ cabinet ministers after
their refusal to support the
government’s budget proposal.
The RW left the government,
leaving it short of a majority





ing prolonged internal disputes
over economic and industrial
policies.
Belgium 1985-10-13 End-of-term —–
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Country Date Type Description
Belgium 1987-12-13 Premier-
timed
Government resigned over in-
ability to address linguistic dis-
pute.
Belgium 1991-11-24 End-of-term —–
Belgium 1995-5-21 Premier-
timed
PM Dehaene called early elec-
tions to obtain a mandate for
his austerity program and to
reduce the damage of his So-
cialist coalition partners’ cor-
ruption scandal on the govern-
ment.
Belgium 1999-6-13 End-of-term —–
Belgium 2003-5-18 End-of-term —–
Belgium 2007-6-10 End-of-term —–
Belgium 2010-6-3 Opposition-
timed
PM Leterme forced to re-
sign following the Open VLD’s
withdrawal from the the coali-
tion over a dispute surround-
ing the voting rights of the
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde con-
stituency.
Canada 1972-10-30 End-of-term —–
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Country Date Type Description
Canada 1974-7-8 Opposition-
timed
PM Trudeau lost a motion of
confidence in respect to the
budget, initiated by the Pro-
gressive Conservatives from op-
position.
Canada 1979-5-22 End-of-term —–
Canada 1980-2-18 Opposition-
timed
PM Clark lost a motion of
confidence with respect to the
budget, initiated by the New
Democratic Party from opposi-
tion.
Canada 1984-9-4 End-of-term —–
Canada 1988-11-21 Premier-
timed
PM Mulroney called early elec-
tions in October 1988.
Canada 1993-10-25 End-of-term —–
Canada 1997-6-2 Premier-
timed
PM Chrétien announced early
elections, a move seen as mo-
tivated by a desire to secure a





Though preceded by a cabi-
net reshuffle, it appeared to a
premier-timed election to se-
cure a third straight term.
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Canada 2004-6-28 Premier-
timed
Followed the beginning of the
sponsorship scandal in which
the ruling Liberal Party was
accused of distributing $250
million in advertising firms




Government lost a vote of con-
fidence put forward by opposi-
tion legislators after PM Mar-
tin refused to resign following




PM Harper dissolved parlia-
ment that he presided over with




PM Baunsgaard called elec-
tions 4 months early due to
the unpopularity of winter elec-
tions and the need for a public
pronouncement on joining the
EC.
182
Country Date Type Description
Denmark 1973-12-4 Premier-
timed
PM Joergensen dissolved par-
liament following the minor-
ity government’s loss on a bill
to increase homeowner taxes,




The prime minister dissolve
parliament after the majority
of parliamentary parties op-




PM Joergensen dissolved par-
liament after the opposition
failed to agree on economic




Parliament was dissolved fol-
lowing an internal government
disagreement about economic
policy between the Liberal
Party and the Social Demo-
cratic party.
183
Country Date Type Description
Denmark 1981-12-8 Opposition-
timed
A majority of 78 against 74
voted to condemn the govern-
ment’s plan to transfer money




The government resigned fol-




The minority coalition gov-
ernment of Prime Minister
Schlüter called early elections
stating that it was important
for the economy to avoid un-




Parliament was dissolved fol-
lowing a failure to agree to a




PM Schlüter called early elec-
tions after the parliament failed
to support his tax reform.
Denmark 1994-9-12 End-of-term —–
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Denmark 1998-3-11 Premier-
timed
PM Rasmussen called elections
6 months early to ask voters
if they wanted to maintain the
course of the Rasmussen gov-
ernment of the past 5 years.
Denmark 2001-11-20 Premier-
timed
Elections were called 4 months





PM Rasmussen called for elec-
tions 9 months early following
an improvement in the polls for




Elections were called over a
year early by PM Rasmussen,
ostensibly to allow the parlia-
ment to focus on needed wel-
fare reform without the distrac-
tion of an election campaign.
Finland 1970-3-15 End-of-term —–
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the cabinet to step down and
new elections to be held follow-
ing a dispute between the So-
cial Democrats and the Centre





the cabinet to step down and
new elections to be held due to
disputes over regional policies.
Finland 1979-3-18 Early other By all accounts this was called
early to put elections back at
their usual time in the Spring
after the previous election had
been called in early fall. All
accounts of the election discuss
it as though it were an end-of-
term election.
Finland 1983-3-20 End-of-term —–
Finland 1987-3-15 End-of-term —–
Finland 1991-3-17 End-of-term —–
Finland 1995-3-19 End-of-term —–
Finland 1999-3-21 End-of-term —–
Finland 2003-3-16 End-of-term —–
Finland 2007-3-18 End-of-term —–
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France 1967-3-12 Premier-
timed
President de Gaulle dissolved
the parliament 9 months early
after his supportive cabinet
faced increasing opposition
from the Independent Re-




President de Gaulle dissolved
the parliament following the
student protests and the nearly
passed censure vote on the Leg-
islative Assembly’s floor.
France 1973-3-4 End-of-term —–
France 1978-3-19 End-of-term —–
France 1981-6-14 Opposition-
timed
10 days after the election of
Socialist President Mitterrand,
he dissolved the Gaullist con-
trolled Legislative Assembly.




election, he dissolved the
conservative-leaning parlia-
ment.
France 1993-3-21 End-of-term —–
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France 1997-5-25 Premier-
timed
President Chirac called early
elections in an attempt to
bolster his supportive govern-
ment’s hold on power.
France 2002-6-9 End-of-term —–
France 2007-6-10 End-of-term —–
Germany 1976-10-3 End-of-term —–
Germany 1980-10-5 End-of-term —–
Germany 1983-3-6 Premier-
timed
Chancellor Kohl staged a gov-
ernment failure after the previ-
ous SPD-FDP government had
broken up and a new CDU-
FDP government formed. In
order to gain legitimacy for the
new coalition, Kohl went to the
voters.
Germany 1987-1-25 End-of-term —–
Germany 1990-12-2 Early other An early election was held after
German reunification.
Germany 1994-10-16 End-of-term —–
Germany 1998-9-27 End-of-term —–




trated a loss of confidence in
parliament in order to earn a
new mandate from the people.
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Germany 2009-9-27 End-of-term —–




called early elections, citing
the Cyprus stalemate and ques-
tions over the power of the
president.
Greece 1989-6-18 End-of-term —–
Greece 1989-11-5 Early other The elections in June of 1989
produced no majority, and the
alliance between New Democ-
racy and the Coalition of Left-
Wing and Progressive Forces
was formed to govern in the
short-term. Following their in-
vestigation of the former PA-
SOK government, they called
new elections.
Greece 1990-4-8 Early other The previous election in
November 1989 failed to pro-
duce a majority, and an all
party coalition formed. This
coalition collapsed in mid-
February following a dispute
over military promotions. All
parties agreed to an election.
189
Country Date Type Description
Greece 1993-10-10 Opposition-
timed
The government of PM Mitso-
takis lost its majority in parlia-
ment when several members of




PM Simitis called early elec-
tions to renew its mandate fol-




PM Simitis called early elec-
tions in the hopes of benefiting
from Greece’s economic gains.
Greece 2004-3-7 End-of-term —–
Greece 2007-9-16 Premier-
timed
PM Karamalis called elections





PM Karamalis called elections
to seek a mandate to steer the
country through the economic
crisis.
190
Country Date Type Description
Ireland 1973-2-28 Premier-
timed
PM Lynch called for early
elections on the grounds that
they needed a popular mandate
to address the Northern Ire-
land problem and appraise the
forthcoming British White Pa-
per on the subject.
Ireland 1977-6-16 Premier-
timed
PM Cosgrave dissolved parlia-
ment 8 months early under the
expectation that the incum-
bent Fine Gael-Labour coali-
tion would be reelected.
Ireland 1981-6-11 Premier-
timed
PM Haughey asked for a disso-
lution to receive a clear man-
date to pursue a political solu-




The coalition government lost
a budget bill by a single vote,




PM Haughey’s government was
defeated twice in confidence
motions on 4 November 1982
and the parliament was dis-
solved the same day.
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Ireland 1987-2-17 End-of-term —–
Ireland 1989-6-15 Premier-
timed
PM Haughey announced an
early election that was inter-
preted as an attempt to take
advantage of the party’s high
standing in opinion polls.
Ireland 1992-11-25 Opposition-
timed
Following the split of the coali-
tion between Fianna-Fail and
the Progressive Democrats,
PM Reynolds was defeated in




PM Bruton called early elec-
tions following impressive eco-
nomic performance but trailing
in the polls to his opponents.
Ireland 2002-5-17 End-of-term —–
Ireland 2007-5-24 End-of-term —–
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Italy 1972-5-7 Premier-
timed
The dissolution of parliament
was precipitated by the cabi-
net’s resignation. Much of the
cause of discontent in the cab-
inet arose from the passing of
Italy’s divorce law in December
1970 and the subsequent refer-
endum on its repeal that put
the governing parties at odds.
Italy 1976-6-20 Opposition-
timed
Parliament was dissolved by
the President of the Republic
following a political crisis in
which the minority Christian
Democratic government failed
to obtain the support of the So-
cialist group in parliament.
193
Country Date Type Description
Italy 1979-6-3 Opposition-
timed
Dissolution followed the fall of
two successive minority Chris-
tian Democratic governments,
both led by Giulio Andreotti.
The first fell after the Com-
munists withdrew from the of-
ficial parliamentary majority of
the minority CD government in
January 31. The second fell af-
ter losing a vote of confidence
in the Senate on March 31.
When no alternative majority
could be formed, the President




The withdrawal of the So-
cialist Party (PSI) from the
four-party coalition precipi-
tated early elections. Reports
indicate that PSI’s leader (Bet-
tino Craxi) had wanted to force
elections for the previous year
in order to solidify his party’s
position as the left alternative
to the Christian Democratic
Party.
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Italy 1987-6-14 Premier-
timed
The four year-old Craxi govern-
ment fell in April following the
PSI’s failure to hand-over lead-
ership to the DC as previously
agreed.
Italy 1992-4-5 End-of-term —–
Italy 1994-3-27 Excluded This election is excluded be-
cause the change in the elec-
toral system makes comparison





of Prime Minister Dini lacked
sufficient parliamentary sup-
port and withdrew. No al-
ternative government could be
formed, and so parliament was
dissolved.
Italy 2001-5-13 End-of-term —–
Italy 2006-4-9 End-of-term —–
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Italy 2008-4-13 Opposition-
timed
The withdrawal of UDEUR
from PM Prodi’s coalition fol-
lowing a corruption scandal for
the party led to a lost vote of
confidence. President Napoli-
tano asked Senate President
Marini to form an interim gov-
ernment to pass a new elec-
toral law before the next elec-
tions. Former PM Berlus-
coni insisted the country should
have snap elections to end the
impasse; leader of the UDC,
Casini, also called for new elec-
tions. Following unsuccessful





The House of Representatives
was prematurely dissolved at
the request of the government.
Japan 1976-12-5 End-of-term —-
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Japan 1979-10-7 Premier-
timed
The parliament was dissolved
on the initiative of Prime Min-
ister Ohira. In public state-
ments, PM Ohira said he con-
sidered his majority of 249 out
of 511 MPs (plus the support
of independent MPs) too small




PM Ohira dissolved parliament
following the government’s loss
of a vote of confidence. The
Japan Socialist Party with-
drew its support of the govern-
ment and 70 LDP ministers ab-
stained from the vote, leading
to the government’s loss.
Japan 1983-12-18 Premier-
timed
PM Nakasone decided to dis-
solve parliament in the wake
of political deadlock resulting
from the bribery conviction of
former LDP Prime Minister
Tanaka.
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Japan 1986-7-6 Premier-
timed
Elections were called 18 months
early to coincide with the reg-
ular election of half of the
House of Councilors with an
eye toward regaining the ab-
solute majority of parliamen-
tary seats for the LDP that had
been lost in the 1983 election.
Japan 1990-2-18 Premier-
timed
Elections were called 5 months
before the expiry of the parlia-
ment’s term by the prime min-
ister, having put off an election
in which the LDP expected to




PM Miyazawa and his cabinet
lost a vote of confidence that
had been tabled by the left-
wing Social Democratic party
of Japan and two smaller op-
position parties that had been
formed by LDP defectors.
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Japan 1996-10-10 Premier-
timed
The dissolution of the parlia-
ment by PM Hashimoto was
widely expected due to a com-
bination of his high popularity
and the fact that unpopular tax
increases were set to go into
effect three months before the
mandated expiry of the parlia-
ment.
Japan 2000-6-25 Early other On June 2 PM Mori dissolved
the House of Representatives
and called for early general
elections to be held on June 25.
PM wanted to seek a mandate
from the people after his prede-
cessor had suffered a stroke.
Japan 2003-11-9 Premier-
timed
PM Koizumi dissolved the
House of Representatives and
scheduled early general elec-
tions for Nov. 9. He had been
generally expected to move up
the election date after he over-
whelmingly won the leadership
race within the LDP in Septem-
ber 2003.
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Japan 2005-9-11 Premier-
timed
PM Koizumi dissolved House
of Representatives after the
House of Councillors failed to
pass a bill on postal sys-
tem reform that would pri-
vatize Japan Post and divide
it into three separate compa-
nies. Koizumi said the election
should be seen as a referendum
on the reform.
Japan 2009-8-30 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 1974-5-26 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 1979-6-10 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 1984-6-17 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 1989-6-18 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 1994-6-12 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 1999-6-13 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 2004-6-13 End-of-term —–
Luxembourg 2009-6-7 End-of-term —–
Netherlands 1971-4-28 End-of-term —–
Netherlands 1972-11-29 Opposition-
timed
PM Bieshuevel dissolved par-
liament two months after DS70
withdrew from the cabinet,
producing a four-party minor-
ity government.
Netherlands 1977-5-25 End-of-term —–
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Netherlands 1981-5-26 End-of-term —–
Netherlands 1982-9-8 Opposition-
timed
PM van Agt dissolved parlia-
ment two months following the
Labour Party’s (PvdA) with-
drawal from the government,
forcing the government into mi-
nority status. The main dis-
pute that led to withdrawal re-
lated to a failure to enact the




PM Lubbers called elections
less than 4 months before the
mandated expiry of the parlia-
ment.
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Netherlands 1989-9-6 Opposition-
timed
The coalition government fell
on May 2 after the parliamen-
tary party of the VVD, the
junior coalition partner, had
called a debate to object to
the financing arrangements of
part of a wide-ranging plan
to reduce environmental pollu-
tion. The package had been
agreed by the cabinet, includ-
ing 5 VVD ministers, 3 days
earlier. The VVD abandoned
its confidence in the Cabinet
due to a difference of opinion
about a section of the scheme
to finance the National Envi-
ronment Plan.
Netherlands 1994-5-3 End-of-term —–
Netherlands 1998-5-6 End-of-term —–
Netherlands 2002-5-15 End-of-term —–
202
Country Date Type Description
Netherlands 2003-1-22 Opposition-
timed
General elections were held
after the resignation of the
Prime Minister in October
2002. Elections followed the
collapse of the government in
October 2002 when bitter in-
fighting in the far-right Lijst
Pim Fortuyn party had para-
lyzed the three-party governing
coalition. The LPF withdrew
from the government and the
remaining 2 parties said they
would stay on as a minority
government until a new election
could be held.
Netherlands 2006-11-22 End-of-term —–
Netherlands 2010-6-9 Opposition-
timed
The PvdA’s withdrawal from
the government over the ex-
tension of Dutch troops NATO
activities in Aghanistan led to
a dissolution of the parliament
six months before the expiry of
its term.
New Zealand 1969-11-29 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1972-11-25 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1975-11-29 End-of-term —–
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New Zealand 1978-11-25 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1981-11-28 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1984-7-14 Premier-
timed
PM Muldoon, while visibly
drunk, called for an ealry
dissolution of parliament af-
ter an MP from his National
Party announced she planned
to vote against the govern-
ment on an opposition spon-
sored anti-nuclear bill.
New Zealand 1987-8-15 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1990-10-27 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1993-11-6 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1996-10-12 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 1999-11-27 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 2002-7-27 Premier-
timed
PM Helen Clark called elec-
tions four months early while
her Labour Party was above 50
percent in the polls and her
coalition partner, the Alliance,
was disintegrating.
New Zealand 2005-9-17 End-of-term —–
New Zealand 2008-11-8 End-of-term —–
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Portugal 1979-12-2 Opposition-
timed
President Eanes dissolved par-
liament on the advice of the
Council of the Revolution (cab-
inet), since the minority and
non-partisan governments had
fallen quickly.
Portugal 1980-10-5 Early other Even though elections had oc-
curred the previous year, an
election was required under the
1976 constitution, article 174
stating that each legislative pe-
riod is to last 4 years and any
premature dissolution does not




PM Pinto Balsemao resigned
following his Social Democratic
Party’s heavy losses in local
elections. With no alternative
governing majority, President
Eanes dissolved the parliament.
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Portugal 1985-10-6 Opposition-
timed
The PSD withdrew from the
coalition government with the
Socialist Party, and PM Soares
formally issued the cabinet’s
resignation 12 days later. The
government stayed in office un-
til the ratification of the acces-
sion treaty into the EC.
Portugal 1987-7-19 Opposition-
timed
The minority Social Demo-
cratic government was brought
down by a censure vote. The
resulting political crisis led to
President Soares’ dissolution of
the parliament.
Portugal 1991-10-6 End-of-term —–
Portugal 1995-10-1 End-of-term —–
Portugal 1999-10-10 End-of-term —–
Portugal 2002-3-17 Premier-
timed
Socialist PM Guterres resigned
from office following his party’s
defeat in local elections, result-
ing in the calling of new elec-
tions.
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Portugal 2005-2-20 Opposition-
timed





citing instability and distrust
between society and the state.
Portugal 2009-9-27 End-of-term —–
Spain 1982-10-28 Opposition-
timed
The defection of many of the
minority UDC government’s
MPs and the party’s weak
showings in Andalusians elec-
tions eroded the government’s




Elections were held four
months early, following the
success of a government spon-
sored referendum on staying
in NATO. The date of the
election also allowed it to be




Country Date Type Description
Spain 1989-10-29 Premier-
timed
PM Gonzalez Marquez called
elections early, citing the need
for Spain to prepare for the Eu-




PM Gonzalez called for parlia-
ment’s dissolution, citing tense
political climate and the need




Following the loss of allied sup-
port, the government’s budget
failed to pass. Prime Minister
Gonzalez Marquez announced
early general elections.
Spain 2000-3-12 End-of-term —–
Spain 2004-3-14 End-of-term —–
Spain 2008-3-9 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1970-9-20 Early other Elections were called early fol-
lowing the constitutional re-
forms of 1969 that created a
unicameral parliament, dissolv-
ing the upper house.
Sweden 1973-9-16 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1976-9-19 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1979-9-16 End-of-term —–
208
Country Date Type Description
Sweden 1982-9-19 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1985-9-15 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1988-9-18 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1991-9-15 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1994-9-18 End-of-term —–
Sweden 1998-9-20 End-of-term —–
Sweden 2002-9-15 End-of-term —–
Sweden 2006-9-17 End-of-term —–





PM Wilson requested that the
Queen proclaim a premature
dissolution of the parliament in
the midst of economic recovery






PM Heath called early elections
after calling a state of emer-
gency and imposing a three-day
work week as a result of the na-
tional coal-miners strike.
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PM Wilson announced early
elections. His Labour Party
controlled a minority in the
House of Commons (only two
seats more than the Conserva-
tive Party), which made rul-
ing during turbulent economic






Following a lost vote of no con-
fidence, PM Callaghan called






PM Thatcher called early elec-
tions in an effort to improve
her Conservative Party’s share
of parliamentary seats and to





PM Thatcher dissolved parlia-
ment a year early following
strong showings in local elec-













Elections were called a year
early and coincided with lo-













An Alternative Approach: Causal Mediation
Analysis
The Imai et al. framework (e.g., Imai, Keele and Yamamoto, 2010; Imai, Tingley
and Yamamoto, 2013; Tingley et al., 2013) attempts to establish the causal relation-
ship between a treatment variable, a psychological mediator, and an outcome variable
in experimental work. This method uses a potential outcomes framework in which a
mediating variable takes on a potential value Mi(t) for unit i under treatment Ti = t,
where Yi(t,m) denote the potential outcome that would result if the treatment and
mediating variables take on values of t and m, respectively. Because we only observe
one of the potential outcomes–the one in which Yi = Yi(Ti,Mi(Ti)), where Mi(Ti) is
the observed value of the mediator–we cannot directly observe the total treatment
effect (τi ≡ Yi(1,Mi(1))−Yi(0,Mi(0))) for any individual. τi can be decomposed into
two parts, the causal mediation effects
δi(t) ≡ Yi(t,Mi(1))− Yi(t,Mi(0))
for each treatment status t = 0, 1. All other causal mechanisms are captured in the
direct effects of the treatment
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ζi(t) ≡ Yi(1,M(t))− Yi(0,Mi(t))
for each unit and each treatment status t = 0, 1. Together, these sum to τi =
δi(t) + ζi(1− t) for t = 0, 1. The population averages of these effects are represented
by the average causal mediation effect (ACME) δ̄(t) and the average direct effects
(ADE) ζ̄(t).
In order to estimate these effects, the mediating variable is regressed on the treat-
ment variable, as well as any pre-treatment confounders. Then, the outcome variable
is regressed on both the treatment and mediating variable. The ACME and ADE are
calculated using 500 simulations of these estimates which are then used to compute
confidence intervals around these values.
The identification of the ACME requires only two assumptions: strong ignorability
of the treatment and sequential ignorability. While we have reason to expect that the
strong ignorability assumption is valid, there is no way to ensure that the sequential
ignorability assumption is valid. Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) have developed
a sensitivity analysis that estimates the range of values of a sequential ignorability
violation that would reverse the direction of the estimated ACME and ADE. The
mediation package in R allows us to estimate the ACME, ADE, and to test for
violations of sequential ignorability.
The results of the causal mediation analysis testing the effects of benchmarked
unemployment on the change in the prime minister’s vote share are shown in Table
D.1. Because the first stage of the causal mediation effect requires the use of OLS
estimation, the indicators of premier- and opposition-timed are compressed into a sin-
gle variable, Type, which equals -1 for opposition-timed elections, 0 for end-of-term
elections, and +1 for premier-timed elections. The first section of Table D.1 shows the
results of a linear regression of Type on NationalUnemployment. In both models,
an increase in the unemployment rate over the OECD’s average unemployment rate
increases the likelihood of a premier-timed election. The direction of this relationship
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is somewhat puzzling, given that the expected negative relationship was found in ear-
lier analyses of election type in Chapter 4. At least two possible explanations for this
finding are evident. The first is that prime ministers anticipate further deterioration
in their benchmarked unemployment rates and so call elections before that informa-
tion is revealed (Smith, 2004). The second possible reason is that given that a single
mediating variable incorporating two very different data generating processes has to
be used here, the positive relationship may be an artifact of model design, which is
more problematic for inference. If Type is problematic with respect to its relationship
with the treatment variable but not with its relationship to the outcome variable, we
may end up correctly estimating the indirect effects but incorrectly estimating the
direct effects of unemployment.
In model 1, we see that clarity of responsibility has no discernible impact on the
type of election voters face. However, the positive coefficient on Power in model 2
suggests that it is the power to call early elections, not other types of institutional
constraints, that affect election type.
The second half of Table D.1 shows that neither the type of election nor bench-
marked unemployment rates significantly affect the election’s outcome in either model.
While both the unemployment rate and the type of election are signed correctly, nei-
ther achieves statistical significance.
Clarity of responsibility has a significant and negative effect as expected in the
literature: a one point increase in clarity of responsibility leads to a nearly one point
decrease in vote share, ceteris paribus. The effective number of parliamentary parties
is negatively related to changes in vote share. An increase of one additional party in
parliament decreases the prime minister’s party’s vote share by nearly 2 percentage
points. The prime minister’s party’s previous vote share is negatively related to
changes in vote share. That is to say that larger parties that see smaller changes in
vote share from election to election.
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The bottom of Table D.1 shows the average causal mediation effects and average
direct effects. Because the treatment variable UnemploymentRate is continuous, the
ACME reported is in fact the average of two estimates of ACME at “control” and
“treatment” values. Those shown in the Table D.1 were calculated using the values
of UnemploymentRate at the 25th and and 75th percentiles, -2 and 2 percentage
points respectively. Estimates using the median value of unemployment (-0.1) as the
“control” value produced substantively similar results and are available in the online
appendix. As one would suspect from the lack of significant effects in the regression of
change in vote share on election type and unemployment rate, the ACME and ADE
are both statistically insignificant.
These results are not as hypothesized above. Though I posited that there was
reason to expect no direct effect of unemployment on vote share, the lack of an indirect
effect as well is more troubling. It may be that the disproportionality between votes
and seats is what is driving these null results.
Estimates using seat share as an alternative dependent variable is shown in Table
D.2. The first column of Table D.1 shows the results of a linear regression of Type on
UnemploymentRate. This model is identical to the first section in Table D.1 with the
replacement of the prime minister’s party’s previous vote share with her party’s seat
share. Once again, Unemployment has a positive and significant effect on the type of
election in both models. Clarity of responsibility has no statistically significant effect,
but Power has a positive and statistically significant effect on the type of election,
as expected.
The second section of Table D.2 shows the relationship between unemployment,
election type, and seat share. In both models, the type of election has a positive and
significant effect at the 0.10 level. Premier-timed elections increase the seat share
of the incumbent by 1.6 percent over end-of-term elections, while opposition-timed
elections harm them by the same magnitude. Benchmarked unemployment has a
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Table D.1: Average Causal Mediation Effect of Unemployment on Change in PM’s
Vote




























































Average Mediated and Direct Effects of Unemployment on Change in Prime Ministerial Vote Share
(1) (2)
Average Causal Mediated Effect
0.095 0.079
(-0.137, 0.391) (-0.119, 0.321)
Average Direct Effect
-0.282 -0.518
(-1.482, 0.920) (-1.739, 0.656)
N 245 245
All estimates computed with R package mediate using 500 simulations. ACME and ADE estimates
computed at 25th and 75th percentiles of treatment comparative unemployment, -2 and 2 points,
respectively. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10.
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negative effect on seat share, significantly so in model 4. These findings are much
more in line with the expectations described in section 1.
Increased clarity of responsibility has a negative effect on vote share, a finding
that is significant at the 0.10 level. Previous seat share is a strong, positive predictor
of current seat share, as predicted by the literature. Approximately 67 percent of a
party’s current vote share is predicted by its previous vote share. Finally, leaders of
minority governments receive a bump in seats.
The final section of Table D.2 shows the estimated ACME and ADE. Both esti-
mates of ACME just miss statistical significance at the 0.1 level, but the estimates
of the ADE in model 4 are statistically significant at the 0.1 level. This evidence
is somewhat supportive of the arguments presented at the beginning of this chapter.
Direct effects of the economy can be found for an outcome relatively near to the voter:
seat share is quite closely related to vote share in most of the countries in this sample.
However, the weakness of the indirect effects remains a challenge to theory.
If politicians are most concerned with who controls the prime minister’s office,
then we would expect the indirect effects of the economy to be strongest here and,
importantly, the direct effects to be particularly weak. Table D.3 shows the esti-
mated results for the prime minister’s retention. The first section of Table D.3 shows
the estimated regression of Type on UnemploymentRate. Again, the benchmarked
unemployment rate and Power have positive and significant effects on election type.
Unlike the previous cases, the second stage of this causal mediation analysis uses
a probit regression instead of linear regression.Type has the expected positive and
significant effect on retention in both models. Unemployment has a negative and
significant effect in model 6. The ACME in both models 5 and 6 is statistically
significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Notably, the ADE fails to achieve
statistical significance, as predicted above. This means that the economy’s main
influence on prime ministerial retention is through the mechanism of election type.
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Table D.2: Average Causal Mediation Effect of Unemployment on Prime Ministerial
Seat Share






















































Average Mediated and Direct Effects of Unemployment on Seat Share
Average Causal Mediation Effect
0.169 0.145
(-0.066, 0.475) (-0.085, 0.472)
Average Direct Effect
-0.804 -1.059†
(-1.881, 0.233) (-2.105, 0.045)
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This is suggestive evidence in favor the theory presented in this chapter.
However, in order to increase certainty in the validity of these results, Figures D.1
- D.4 show the estimated ACME for the election mediator against differing values
of the sensitivity parameter, ρ under the control and treatment conditions of the
treatment variable. Figures D.1 and D.2 show the control and treatment sensitivity
analyses, respectively, for the ACME in model 5 of Table D.3; Figures D.3 and D.4
show the control and treatment sensitivity analyses, respectively, for the ACME in
model 6 of Table D.3 The dotted horizontal line is the estimated value of the ACME
while the solid line traversing the diagonal shows the point estimates of the ACME at
each value of ρ. If ρ takes on any value to the left of this solid line’s intersection with
the x-axis, the sign of the ACME will remain unchanged. The grey band surrounding
the point estimates is the 95% confidence region. Values of ρ in the region where
the grey band intersects the x-axis are those in which the true value of the ACME
could be zero. Figures D.1 and D.2 demonstrate that any value of ρ less than 0.16
will continue to produce an ACME with the same (negative) sign as that estimated
above. The values of rho where the 95 percent confidence band encompasses zero
are from 0.03 to 0.26. Figures D.3 and D.4 show that any value of ρ less than 0.14
will produce an ACME in the same direction as that estimated above. The region in
which the 95 percent confidence band encompasses zero ranges from -0.01 to 0.26 for
the results in Table D.3.
These figures indicate that the results above are relatively sensitive to the viola-
tion of the sequential ignorability assumption of the causal mediation effects models.
In general, only if ρ is negative will the ACME relationship retain its current sign.
However, the consistently signed ACMEs and ADEs across the three dependent vari-
ables ought to bolster confidence in these early findings. Further, the significance of
the ADE in the case of seat share but its lack of significance where prime ministerial
retention is concerned provides additional support for the theory put forth in this
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chapter. Because the economy has a direct effect on the outcome voters have more
control over but has only an indirect effect through the type and timing of elections
on the outcome with which politicians are most concerned is as predicted.
While these findings are promising, they are not particularly robust to violations
of the sequential ignorability assumption. Omission of pre-treatment covariates could
be a substantial problem. As such, addition pre-treatment predictors of election
type ought to be considered and included in both stages. Additionally, the lack of
post-treatment covariates could also be weakening results. Because these methods
were designed for experimental settings, where concerns about post-treatment con-
founders is less problematic due to the short time between treatment, mediation, and
outcome, post-treatment covariates cannot be included in the analyses. However,
with election outcomes, particularly prime ministerial retention, other factors affect-
ing the outcome may arise between the realization of the type of election and the
outcome. These concerns should spur further methodological work on the issue of
including post-treatment confounders in mediation models with an eye toward their
use in observational settings. These results, however, are broadly in line with the
main findings of Chapter 5, found in Table 5.2
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Table D.3: Average Causal Mediation Effect of Unemployment on Prime Ministerial
Retention
















































Average Mediated and Direct Effects of Unemployment on Prime Ministerial Retention
Average Causal Mediation Effect of Election Type
0.013* 0.012†
(0.002, 0.029) (-0.001, 0.030)
Average Direct Effect of Unemployment
-0.045 -0.058
(-0.100, 0.018) (-0.130, 0.014)
N 245 245
Estimates computed with R package mediate using robust standard errors using 500
simulations. ACME and ADE estimates computed at the 25th and 75th percentiles
of comparative unemployment, -2 and 2 points around the OECD average in that






























Figure D.1: Sensitivity analysis of ACME





























Figure D.2: Sensitivity analysis of treat-






























Figure D.3: Sensitivity analysis of ACME


























Figure D.4: Sensitivity analysis of ACME
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